Collected Essays

Moral Obligation
And the Military

COLLECTED
ESSAYS

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Foreword

LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE PURsuit of happiness, as enunciated in the Declaration of Independence and protected by the Constitution, are foremost among the ideals we cherish. When our government calls upon the Armed Services to use military force to defend our ideals, every soldier confronts an apparent contradiction between actions and values—an ethical or moral dilemma. This dilemma is the subject of this book.

Few groups in American society are so keenly aware as the military of the price for resorting to warfare. Few groups so frequently examine the ethical and moral bases for their professional lives. This constant reexamination, though unsettling, is surely one sign of our nation's moral soundness.

On behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Defense University hosts an annual conference on professional ethics involving representatives of all the Armed Services and Departments of Government, as well as numerous private citizens. This volume includes the best papers offered at the past two conferences. For the soldier, more so than the civilian, these topics are not theoretical, but real questions of moral obligation.

BRADLEY C. HOSMER
Lieutenant General, US Air Force
President, National Defense University

Publisher's Preface

IN OUR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE relations, we conduct ourselves under highly organized layers of responsibilities—a generalized ethics system, if you will. Under these systems, some of what we do is ordered by law and some by social convention. Our societal and religious institutions remind or require us to be just and responsible, and we teach similarly desirable behavior in our families. This pervasive influence of ethics is very much a part of what makes our lives satisfying and conscionable, because when we act ethically, we act for the good of both ourselves and society. When we act on our responsibilities in these prescribed ways, whether personal or institutional, we are also fulfilling moral obligations.

Those who serve in the military shoulder a layer of moral obligation not borne directly by the rest of society, that of underwriting the nation's defense, standing ready to fight and to win if other measures fail—a responsibility neither they nor society takes lightly. For those who serve to defend and fight, this added responsibility sometimes seems hard to reconcile with the ethics of society as a whole. Policies that threaten annihilation and weapons that can kill indiscriminately make them and us uneasy, because our societal and religious ethics—our morality—strongly urges us to love and forgive our fellow human beings. In this way the soldier faces especially difficult moral dilemmas.

This book, *Moral Obligation and the Military*, escorts us through some of these moral mine fields.

Recognizing the difficult obligations of the men and women who serve, the armed forces include ethics courses throughout the various curricula of their schools and academies. They also sponsor conferences on ethical issues, and generally encourage discussion of professional ethics. One such effort—the annual Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics—has inspired and informed this book. Respected and influential ethicists and educators, both military and nonmilitary, gather each year to address ethical issues in all levels of national defense. These Joint Services Conferences have examined such difficult matters of ethics as terrorism and the morality of strategy and tactics. The collected essays in this book were among the best presented at two of these annual Conferences.

The issues addressed in this book are representative of the concerns of the men and women in the Services and in the society as a whole. The contributors are *not* in accord, indicative perhaps of the difficulties faced by individuals in reconciling military tasks with ethical responsibilities. In part I, Nicholas Fotion and John H. Yoder carefully weigh the terms *morality* and *immorality*, offering perspectives from semantics and history, and David E. Johnson examines the terrorist's ethic of "the ends justify the means," finding it incompatible with American principles. Part II, "The Clash of Ethical Systems," contains four lively essays. In the first, Barry D. Watts, drawing examples from the military art and national values, concludes that we and the Soviets are *not* alike. John B. Chomeau, in a different approach, relates current Soviet actions to Marxist doctrine. In a pair of complementing essays, British Royal Marine Jake R. Hensman describes conflicts between different ethics systems and between civil law and military necessity in the line of duty in Northern Ireland.

Part III, "Military Applications," addresses ethics in both everyday military practice and exceptional situations. Perry M. Smith describes his experiences handling ethical issues in command and before Congress. From a pragmatist's point of view, Roy G. Dixon contemplates a terrorist and hostage dilemma. J. Harold Ellens and Thomas M. Fabyanic delve into the determinants of our strategy, tactics, and morality—the variables of threat, doctrine, force structure, and society. Concluding this collection, Thomas C. Linn suggests that the Vietnam war became a grey area of self-interest in which we failed to follow the ethics of the military profession, and Linda M. Ewing describes schisms in ethics education in the Service academies and other military schools.

The National Defense University Press thanks all those who have helped create *Moral Obligation and the Military*. The Joint Service Conferences were chaired by Colonel Malham M. Wakin, US Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado, and by Chaplain (Colonel) Billy W. (Bill) Libby, The National Defense University, Washington, DC. Colonel Wakin, Chaplain Libby, Major Donald Anderson of The National Defense University, and Lieutenant Colonel William O. Schmieder, Defense Security Assistance Agency, critically reviewed the essays. Editorial reader Major Kurt Frederick Weiland, US Military Academy, contributed valuable editorial assistance during his summer tour of duty with NDU Press. Editor Janis Hietala arranged the essays under the theme of "obligation" and designed this book. The selection of essays was made with the expert assistance of Colonel Robert Kvederas, Colonel John C. Bordeaux, and Dr. Joseph E. Goldberg of The National Defense University.

PART ONE

Moral
Integrity

Military Tactics
and Strategy:
In the Moral Realm

NICHOLAS FOTION

ON THE FACE OF IT, IT WOULD
seem that in doing his work, a military tactician or strat-
egist would be acting neither morally nor immorally
but, rather, *non*morally.[1] Developing a strategy or some
tactic is, after all, a form of planning. Unlike the strat-
egies and tactics used for dealing with poverty and ill-
ness, it is true that the strategies or tactics of war tend to
get many people killed and maimed. But strategical and
tactical planning, it could be argued, are simply matters
of gathering information, and using logic and imagina-
tion to decide what to do in the future and, insofar as
they are so, they would seem to be nonmoral. In other
words, these activities might be considered morally neu-
tral. After all, planning is something that can be done
both during war and before it starts and also by both the
"good" and the "bad" side during a war. But can a
military strategist or tactician consider logically that his
task is morally neutral? I think he can not.

Contrast the rather neutral sounding words *strategy*
and *tactics,* as well as *plan, policy, proposal,* and

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University.

design, with the following concepts. Think here of a scheme or the activity of scheming. Think also of a plot or plotting. Or about engaging in intrigue or a conspiracy. Each of the latter concepts carries a defeasible negative connotation. Thus although we normally would suppose that a scheme, a plot, or a conspiracy is a bit shady or shoddy morally, it is not logically inconceivable to suppose that there are morally good schemes, plots, or conspiracies. A plot to assassinate Adolf Hitler in 1944, for example, would be thought by most of us to be morally worthy of support. Still, the negative connotation is undeniably there for all these concepts.

Instead of having negative connotations, the concepts of strategy and tactics might, if anything, lean in the opposite direction. They might not quite be neutral since, especially in their dispositional senses, the concepts of strategy and tactics seem actually to have a positive connotation. It is true that these expressions when used without any modifying phrases are primarily descriptive in nature. That is why it makes sense to think of them as morally neutral. Still, to call someone a strategist or a tactician is to credit that person with certain skills that not everyone possesses. So to that extent we are not merely describing but mildly commending a person by calling him a strategist or tactician. Indeed, if the commendatory sense of the expression is not strong enough, we can say that he is a *good* (or possibly a *real*) strategist or tactician. For the negative sounding terms, it sounds more strained to talk of someone as a good schemer, plotter, or conniver.

But if, as I now seem to be suggesting, strategists and tacticians can be praised either by simply being labeled as such or by being labeled good at what they do, is this not to imply that these terms are not morally neutral after all? Not necessarily. When we praise

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someone as a good tactician, we can be praising him for
being good at doing certain tasks conceived of very nar-
rowly. Imagine here two excellent military tacticians.
One is fighting on the side of the Allies in World War II
and the other on the German side. Imagine that the Ger-
man is a dyed-in-the-wool Nazi. Is the latter less of a
tactician because he has immoral views and is fighting
for an immoral political ideology? The praise we give
him and the Allied tactician can be for the battle skills
they possess quite apart from the morality of the overall
positions they hold. Thus, we can, if we know that the
Nazi is a truly excellent tactician, learn much about tac-
tics by reading his works and following his moves on
the battlefield. To the extent that we can do this sort of
analysis, we can say that tactical moves, even when
well done, are morally neutral (that is, they are non-
moral activities or virtues).

However that is not the end of the story. That it is
possible for certain purposes to separate the concept of
tactics and perhaps even strategy from morality does not
mean that they can always be so separated. We can see
how this is so by focusing first upon the concept of tac-
tics. Part of the meaning of the term has to do with
arranging things. The tactician puts and moves his per-
sonnel and equipment in a certain order in the face of
the enemy, presumably in order to disable him. In con-
trast to strategic goals, tactical ones are usually thought
of as short ranged. One of many reasons tactics can so
easily be thought to be morally neutral is that most
short-ranged goals during a war are taken for granted
morally. During the war, one is supposed to be able to
attack bridges over which the enemy moves and attack
his tanks in the valley below. It is possible then to view
the tactician as a person playing a kind of game where
we can watch and assess his moves as if they have no

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moral significance. But when we do this, we tend to forget that in drawing this nonmoral portrait of tactics even in a purely military setting, such as where ships are fighting at sea or where fighter planes are dueling in the sky, the tactician has duties to his own people.[2] If his tactics cause unnecessary casualties among them, he is subject to moral (and military) criticism. Presumably it is conceivable that there are tactical options that will get the job at hand done in the same time and with the same number of casualties, and yet one option is more imaginative and therefore more admired by the tactician's peers than another. The moral difference between these tactical options could then be said to be zero. But most tactical options will carry with them different costs in personnel and supplies, and, insofar as they do, they will unavoidably be liable to moral assessment.

The point made here has nothing to do with the distinction between the result of a tactical move and the planned result. In one sense we hold the tactician, actually any actor on any moral stage, as responsible for what happens. But we know, especially in war, where the unanticipated (one is tempted to say the unanticipatable) happens, that we cannot hold the tactician strictly accountable for what actually happens. Nonetheless, to the extent that we can assess tactical plans either in retrospect or in anticipation of the results they will bring, the tactician and his moves are morally assessable for the reason the tactician cannot help but put the lives of many of his own people at risk in doing his work.

There is another reason why military tactics can be seen as having moral import. Some tactical moves are made in settings where the tactical arrangements are solely between two military forces. Unfortunately, as we all know, not all settings are of this sort. Many will

be of the kind where civilians will be getting in the way of the battle. If the tactician, knowing this to be so, designs his moves so as to take advantage of the civilian presence, those tactics will intrinsically be immoral. Thus if the tactician deliberately moves his people where large groups of civilians are found, knowing full well that by doing so the enemy will hesitate before making its next move (and thereby lose the initiative), we can hardly call such a move morally neutral—no matter how clever it might be. The point is that the tactic in such a setting cannot be characterized without making reference to how the civilians were used. And if that is the case and if, further, there is a rule against using civilians in ways that puts them in jeopardy, then we have at least a presumptive case for condemning this tactic as immoral. Much the same point applies to the tactician's moves if they disable the enemy in a manner far out of proportion to need. Thus if the tactics devised are such as to not even allow the enemy the opportunity to surrender if he should wish to do so, then again the presumption is that the tactics are immoral.

The issues surrounding strategy, most especially grand strategy, are more complicated. Strategy, of course, has to do with longer ranged goals than tactics. Although the distinction between tactics and strategy is not devoid of vagueness, it is clear that strategy is concerned with arrangements not just of the fighting forces (usually prior to battle) but of all the resources that these forces might need in battle. Whatever the precise meaning of strategy, there is no doubt that it is subject to the same analysis I have given to tactics. If different strategies lead (or are expected to lead) to different levels of casualties on the strategist's side of the war, then insofar as such casualties could have been anticipated, the strategist is accountable both morally and militarily.

In the same vein, if an intrinsic part of the strategy involves the use of the military in ways that violate moral rules having to do with how wars are fought (for example, by aiming first at civilian populations or needlessly slaughtering enemy soldiers), then a prima facie case for saying that the strategy is immoral can be made.

What makes strategy more complicated than tactics and, in the end, makes it additionally liable to be judged on moral grounds is that the goals usually taken for granted in assessing tactics are not taken for granted in strategy. Strategy may not only set the framework for tactics that might be used in fighting the war (for example, as it would if the tactics adopted by field commanders had to be largely defensive in nature because the overall strategic policy were one of containment), but may even set the goals. The goals of winning a certain kind of war may be set because part of the strategy might be that the war must start with a surprise attack. Further strategy may dictate when the war is to end, that is, what is to count as victory. The standard of victory set by the Japanese in World War II, for example, was "a standoff," since such a result would have allowed them to do what they wished with large portions of Asia. Strategy for the United States was different because, in part, US goals were different. The United States was in no mood to declare the war won just because it recaptured some of the lands that the Japanese had occupied during the first year of that war.

To be sure, like different tactical schemes, different strategies could result in no morally significant differences. Two different strategies could result in the same kind of victory with roughly the same casualties within roughly the same time span. In such cases, we would say that there was no moral (and military)

difference between them. But, different strategies will more than likely yield different results and, insofar as they do, they will be judgeable morally.

There are several obvious objections to saying that military tacticians and strategists are assessable morally as well as militarily. In fact, we do not seem to be quick to morally condemn generals and admirals because their casualty rates are higher than others in comparable command positions, or because they have been defeated in battle. Often, the objection continues, we take commands away from these officers, but, in the process, we do not condemn them in moral terms. This suggests that strategists and tacticians are not playing the moral game when they are doing their work.

There is something right about this objection. We are indeed slow to morally condemn those who bring us high casualty rates or who have absorbed a defeat or two. In fact we are downright tolerant in these matters, and that makes it appear that morality is not involved here at all. But the toleration we practice should not mislead us. We hold back from morally condemning tacticians and strategists because we realize that military judgments are difficult to make, to say the least. We know that even good military leaders will miscalculate in this dangerous business. But notice that there is a limit to our tolerance. Should the leader miscalculate so grossly that his side takes enormous casualties, we do not spare him any longer from moral criticism. We call him irresponsible, callous, criminal, and immoral just because it is his duty to look after his people in a way that does not lead to such casualties. Our reluctance to quickly condemn mistakes, then, does not mean that we are not thinking in moral terms in these settings but merely that we hesitate in applying these terms to those in charge when we are not sure that we would have

done a better job in that situation. It is as if we withhold the highest of all form of criticism we can level at a person, that is, moral criticism, until we are more certain of culpability.

There is another reason we hesitate to morally condemn a strategist or tactician when things go wrong. The paradigm case when we morally condemn another person is when he *intends* to do wrong. If the tactician defeated in battle turns out to be working for the enemy, moral (and other forms of) condemnation are quickly expressed. There is no tolerance under such circumstances. But the vast majority of tacticians and strategists do not intentionally bring about high casualties and defeats upon their own side. Rather, unfortunate results come about in spite of efforts to avoid them. The tacticians and strategists may be careless, overworked, mentally inflexible, or just not so intelligent as their enemy counterparts. Whatever the case, the fact that they did not do an intentional wrong is (pace Kant) not enough to remove the wrongs that occurred from the realm of morality. Again we may not publicly and morally condemn the wrongdoer for the reasons I have cited, but that, too, does not mean that the failed tactician or strategist is not engaged in working within the moral realm.

With another objection the opponent grants that moral responsibility does apply to these concepts when both sides are shooting at each other, but denies such application during peacetime. To plan strategy and tactics during peacetime is a different matter from doing it during war. With the former, so the argument might go, the main consequence of our planning is a waste of paper and time. During war the waste is of lives.

This is really not a serious objection. Of course, developing strategy and tactics that are never applied during wartime costs no lives. And, of course, since

such plans are "wasted," it seems as if peacetime military strategy and tactics have about as much to do with morality as do strategy and tactics in baseball and football. But even so-called wasted plans might have had an impact on the military scene. Much like a health care insurance policy that was never needed, they certainly might have been needed, and, in that sense, they quite properly should be in place. Further, developed strategies and tactics are not just pieces of paper in the hands of the generals and admirals. Beyond that they are manifested in the deployment of personnel with certain kinds of equipment in certain places. And that deployment can, and often does, have an impact upon a potential enemy. It might have made him hesitate as he was about to attack, or attack if the deployment were particularly provocative. So it seems that there is little reason to doubt that morality is closely connected to the concepts of military strategy (and strategist) and tactics (and tactician) during peacetime as well as in times of war.

Another objection runs as follows. "You have admitted that at times choices between strategies and tactics will make no moral difference. One strategy or tactic will yield just as much harm or good as the another strategy or tactic. Isn't it true that in such cases there is no moral decision to be made just because it makes no moral difference what option is chosen? And doesn't that indicate that the connection between military strategy and tactics, and morality isn't that great?"

Hardly. Any kind of moral decision, military or nonmilitary, might end in a calculation where the reasons (moral) on one side balance out the reasons on the other. It is true that if that happens the decision to go with one or the other options makes no moral difference. But the reasoning process is one that

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involves balancing reasons that themselves are moral. So it hardly means that types of activity such as devising strategy or tactics are not moral just because the result ends in a tie. A hockey game is still a hockey game even though the final score is 2 to 2.

The next objection is the most serious. It gets to the heart of the matter. "Surely," the objector says, "you are not arguing that military strategy and tactics are tied to morality the way, for example, strategy and tactics in medicine are? Surely, in the field of medicine, if a person acts in a grossly immoral fashion by using his knowledge of medicine to torture and crudely experiment on people, we do not count what he does as acts of medicine. This is because 'medicine' entails 'acting on behalf of people.' To medicate means to in some way or other be helpful to people with respect to their health or welfare. But in military matters, no matter how immoral the strategist or tactician is, he still is a military strategist or tactician. Not only that, he can be clever and imaginative and also grossly immoral, and, yet, we can still speak of him as a strategist and a tactician."

In order to assess this criticism, it is important to remember what concepts are being analyzed here. The analysis is not of the concepts of tactics or strategy in the abstract but, rather, *military tactics* and *military strategy*. If the former concepts were under analysis then it might well be easier to make a case for saying that the concept of morality is not closely connected to them. Tactics and strategy in the abstract apply not just to military activities but to business practices, institutions such as hospitals and unions, and to games of all sorts. Because the goals of all these activities differ sharply from one another, the concepts of tactics and strategy, viewed in the abstract, are separable from

morality. But military tactics and military strategy are narrower and richer concepts. These concepts involve arranging people in situations where many lives are at stake and where, speaking very roughly, the goals of the activity are circumscribable at least to some extent. The goals of military tactics and strategy, especially the latter, can vary all the way from cutting one's losses in defeat to achieving unconditional surrender of the enemy. Still, no matter what the precise nature of the goals may be, too many lives are at stake under too many varying conditions for anyone to suppose that the connection between military tactics and strategy, on the one side, and morality, on the other, is not a very close one.

In making the claim that these concepts are closely connected I am not, of course, saying that we can derive moral principles simply by analyzing the concepts of military strategy and tactics. In this sense these concepts are not like those of murder and theft. These latter legal and moral concepts characterize fairly specific sorts of behavior as immoral. They are what can be called verdict concepts. To know that someone has murdered or stolen is to have arrived at the verdict that an identifiable wrong has been done. In contrast, when we are military strategists or tacticians, we do not know automatically that we are doing something wrong or right but, at most, that we are doing something that is assessable morally one way or the other. These are concepts of agency or perhaps they can best be labeled concepts of moral responsibility.

My claim that there is a close connection between military strategy and tactics, on the one side, and morality, on the other, is not that it is just the same connection found between medicine and ethics. That latter connection is indeed via the stated purpose of medicine.

One cannot achieve the purpose of medicine without engaging in activity that is not only moral in scope but, more specifically, morally good. The military's connection to ethics is not in terms of its purpose. As the objector claims, one can pursue military goals and not act morally. The objector is right about that. Rather, the connection has to do with agency and more broadly with what might be called the realm of ethics. The point is that military strategists and tacticians and their activities are unavoidably assessable in the realm of ethics or morality. They can act well or badly, but, either way, given the consequences of the sorts of activity in which they are engaged, morality cannot be left out of our full understanding of their activity.

In this connection, consider the difference between a strategist or tactician in baseball and his counterpart in the military. The former can act immorally if he breaks or stretches the rules the way Leo Durocher was supposed to have done when he was a manager of the Brooklyn Dodgers and was supposed to have said, "Nice guys finish last." In one sense, even games can be played morally or immorally. But when Durocher calculated whether to send a runner to second or to have a batter take the next pitch, he was not engaged in moral thinking. The game itself, one is tempted to say, is apart from, rather than a part of, the moral realm. When played within the rules, it is as if baseball and ethics are two separate games. Military activity (including strategy and tactics) and morality are not in this same way two separate games. One reason they are not is that, when all is said and done, morality is never a separate "game." It is not an activity unto its own the way other activities, such as baseball, business, research and academics, are. We don't engage in business, academics *and* ethics. To suppose that we do is to

make what Gilbert Ryle a generation ago called a category mistake.[3] Morality has to do with how we engage in other activities and is not itself a separate activity. We can't engage in pure ethical activity in the sense that we can do something moral or immoral and not be doing something else. In the days of G. E. Moore and the intuitionists in moral theory, this point was expressed by saying that ethical qualities were piggybacked. Given this piggybacked character of morality it is understandable that morality's concern is with how we behave in the business, academic, legal, and military world, and others. It has, we might say, the character of absorbing or encompassing activities of various sorts.

It is true that ethics is not all encompassing. It does not absorb all activities. For instance, choices that we make between flavors of Jell-o are not normally thought to have moral import. Nor do other so-called taste choices, such as the color or brand of car we choose, type of home we live in, style of clothes we wear, and so on. But although not all encompassing, moral judgments are powerful in that those activities encompassed by ethics have to pass muster. That is, they come by the label nonmoral only after they have shown that they do not have any moral import. The reason for this, speaking roughly, is that what counts as ethical or moral is thought to be important to the well-being of people. That is. why games of baseball are not absorbed in the moral or ethical realm. The activity of playing the game itself (for example, getting a hit) does not directly harm or help anyone.[4] With military activity and planning it is otherwise. How these "games" are played makes a tremendous difference, so they cannot help but belong within the realm of morality.

Having said that there is a close connection between military tactics/strategy and morality, I have

not as yet specified whether this connection is so close as to be definitional or merely contingent in nature. It might be thought that deciding this point is merely playing the philosopher's game and that it matters little how it is answered so long as the fact of a close connection has been established. There is something to be said for such a thought. Nonetheless, it does matter, to some extent, what the connection is because if it is definitional, that is an indication that it is as close as it can possibly be.

Well, are these concepts connected definitionally? I think the right answer is "yes." Much of what I have said here can be summarized by saying that the connection is unavoidable, and this suggests that the connection is definitional. One cannot be a military strategist or tactician and avoid facing moral problems. The definitional connection is not in terms of the purpose of these activities, the way medicine's connection is with ethics. If it were that sort of connection, one would have to be morally good in order to be a military strategist or tactician. The military strategist or tactician is not necessarily acting morally when doing his work, but he is acting (barring the sorts of ties mentioned above) either morally or immorally. If there were no connection here, he would be acting neither morally nor immorally, the way Leo Durocher acted when he had his Dodger base-runners steal bases at every opportunity. So there is a connection between strategy and tactics and morality, though the connection is subtle rather than straightforward. If it were less subtle, more like medicine's, it would have been obvious almost from the beginning what the answer to our question about the relationship between strategy and tactics *and* morality is. If it were that obvious, I would have had no reason to write such a long paper and there would then

have been no real reason for having this conference in the first place.

Notes

1. I say nonmorally rather than amorally because the latter term implies that a person has no sense of moral concern at all. He is like the wolf boy, unaware of these concerns. Acting nonmorally, in contrast, implies that one is acting in an area that has no moral consequences or concerns (and that one is aware that this is so).

2. James M. Dubik, "Human Rights, Command Responsibility, and Walzer's Just War Theory," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 11 (Fall 1982): 354–71.

3. Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949), p. 16.

4. Indirectly, of course, harm can come about. The professional player who fails to steal second base or fails to get a hit may not get a contract next year. But the act of stealing second base itself is not an immoral (or moral) act. It is, we are tempted to say, just part of a game.

Terror Tactics:
A Conceptual Analysis

DAVID E. JOHNSON

LENIN SAID THE USE OF TER-
ror "will terrorize the society into submission." In
other words, he believed that acts of terror do more than
merely neutralizing an enemy unit, or gaining some ter-
ritory in a military campaign; terrorist acts strike fear
into the hearts of those who are not even present. A
good example is the October 1984 attempt on the lives
of British Prime Minister Thatcher and her cabinet in a
hotel bombing in the south of England. Had that bomb-
ing succeeded, a lot of British and Irish citizens would
have had their level of fear raised (about themselves and
about members of their families or government being
victims of random violence).

Among the worldwide acts of violence in recent
times, frequently in contexts other than military opera-
tions, terrorism seems to be (1) used for revolution by a
minority out of power, and (2) used for repression by a
minority in power (for example, Argentina, until
recently, and South Africa). I am focusing here on the
form of terrorism used for revolution.

Attacks on individuals (and property) intended to
frighten and coerce a large number of others and efforts

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Academy.

to overturn the status quo by violent acts that sometimes kill the innocent indicate the contrast between the position this society represents and the position of the terrorist. For this society, the individual and his life, his liberty, and his just treatment are important. The concept of an innocent individual makes sense. Government is established to keep order in a way that liberty and justice can be accommodated to the greatest extent possible. Conflicts in society should be dealt with in a spirit of reasonableness and, if necessary, compromise. Also, the means must be both moral and successful.

The terrorist, as I understand him, would probably attempt to destroy the conceptual framework of Western, middle-class values. In his view, to compromise is to side with the oppressor. He is adopting some sort of absolutist position that contrasts markedly with the way which this society approaches social issues. There is a very real sense in which, when you become a terrorist, you leave rational argument behind. The audience for an analysis of terrorism is very definitely not the terrorists, whom I doubt would be persuaded by comments (because of their different conceptual framework).

The only thing we may have in common is sharing the goal of eventually meeting human needs. My belief, however, is that those of us who share the assumptions and principles that I have outlined cannot consistently do what the terrorist does, nor can we encourage our surrogates to act that way.

The goals espoused by terrorists can be lumped under the heading of improving the living conditions of the people represented; that is, meeting their very real needs—removing poverty and injustice. I take this to include changing the regime in power and replacing it with one committed to what the terrorist represents. Given that view of their goals, then in tactical terms it

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would seem that there have been very few successes in the contemporary world, certainly with *decreasing* frequency since Castro in Cuba. Various governments have established antiterrorist forces, like the Delta Force in the USA, and developed antiterrorist tactics, thus making terrorist programs even less likely to succeed in the sense of causing an uprising of the population or allowing the terrorists to actually take over the government. Generally we seem to see one part of the government (the military) taking over another part of the same government. In these terms, I would *not* call terrorism successful, on balance, in the latter part of the twentieth century. Terrorists *have* achieved publicity and *have* drawn governments into being more repressive but have generally *not* brought about the social and political changes that they desired (for example, the Tupamaros). It appears that even if the terrorists are able militarily to neutralize their opponents, they and the opponents do not share enough of a moral community to be able to build a society together. Even in instances of ''success,'' we will have to ask what sort of situation the terrorist struggle has created. If the terrorists' goal is ultimately to create a just social order after the revolution, with whom will they do that, and how? Of course, in our pluralistic country we tend to think that diverse groups will have to share a community, whereas in a colonial situation, it may be possible just to kick the colonialists out.

In the type of ethical theory espoused by terrorist organizations, the writings of terrorist theoreticians espouse a ''higher morality'' than that held (or perceived to be held) by their opponents. For example, thinking back to the origin of the use of terror in a political context, the French Revolution, recall that the full title of Robespierre's program was not ''Reign of

Terror," but "Reign of Terror and Justice." That gives you the flavor of the way in which terrorists see themselves. Champions of the common man, the people, against their exploiters (foreign or domestic) who are acting unjustly. The goals of some terrorists are those that we might agree with: liberty (opposition to dictatorship), fraternity, and equality (as we understand these terms, which are admittedly slippery).

The celebrated terrorist document *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla,* by Carlos Marighella, adopts a moral tone: "Today to be an assailant or a terrorist is a quality that ennobles any honorable man because it is an act worthy of a revolutionary engaged in armed struggle against the shameful military dictatorship and its monstrosities." In other words, he is justifying his tactics in terms of the evil nature of the opponent. Marighella writes, "The urban guerrilla's arms are inferior to the enemy's, but from a moral point of view, the urban guerrilla has an undeniable superiority."[1] Bayo's *150 Questions to a Guerrilla* states that rebels must engage in a "struggle against the injustices which a people suffer." Bayo warns, "Whoever revolts unrighteously reaps nothing but a crushing defeat."[2]

In what does this moral superiority rest? How could terrorist actions be justified? Let us make some conjectures. Because the terrorist is a freedom fighter and his opponent represents an evil dictatorship? To claim this is to focus on the worth of the ends. Or, the terrorist is claiming that it is okay for him to adopt means similar to his opponent's since the opponent deserves to get as bad as he gives.

Another type of justification might be in adopting a nihilistic worldview (which we have seen with revolutionaries in the past). From this perspective, the terrorist might argue that there is no authority for any of our

standards, so that one might as well kill other people if (since) the social arrangement (contract) has collapsed. Why assume you need a *reason* to kill?

Another defense of terrorism could be to argue that the task of established governments is to maximize liberty. If the state has become a closed system that is manipulative and does not enhance the autonomy of its citizens, then terrorism can be seen as a form of feedback. In this view, terrorism is not a problem, but a solution to a problem. If in many countries of the world, there is no peaceful way to redress grievances or to alter an inequitable distribution of wealth, then one might consider the use of violence a last resort. But even at that point one can ask, given analysis, whether or not this sort of violence would be at all successful.

I contend that both the terrorists and the government that they are combating share a faulty conceptual framework—namely that violence to defend abstractions (liberty rather than free men) will produce beneficial change. The two questions with which we must be concerned are (a) what are the best means for really changing our lives, and (b) by whom will the future be built. In terms of the latter, we need to ask whether the opponents now share or can ever share a moral community. As Walzer points out, if dignity and self-respect are to be the outcomes of armed struggle for human freedom, the struggle cannot consist of terrorist attacks on children.[3] There may be a lesson here in the career of Begin in Israel—forty years after Irgun activity, strikes and counterstrikes are continuing.

A further moral problem with the terrorist is that he holds his victim responsible for something he cannot possibly be responsible for. The child who dies when a school bus is bombed is not the author of or able to change the governmental policies that the terrorist

opposes. The terrorist is treating the victim merely as a means and not as an end in himself. He is saying that terrorists matter but that victims do not. The terrorist has turned his victim into a thing, no longer regarding him as a person.

It is my conclusion that a teleological (consequentialist) justification for terrorism will not work because the ends do not justify *any* means whatsoever. As Gandhi observed, means are ends in process so that there has to be a consistency between means and ends. We can see that terrorist activity cannot be justified in terms of success, because the probability of success is just not there, but even if it were, the actions of the terrorist would not be morally justifiable on teleological grounds.

Let us turn to the third aspect, the religious component in terrorism. A religious type of motivation might be seen in those terrorists who claim that they are trying to usher in a social paradise on earth. Bayo has some cutting remarks for the clergy who preach *for* the dictatorship by telling people that heaven is for the poor in spirit. Those preachers use religion as a cover to justify exploitation, misery, oppression and injustice.[4]

Some historians see the enlightenment in Europe as a kind of secular religion. The concept of progress absorbed the millenial expectations of the second coming of the Christ and placed these expectations on earth. The problem to be addressed is how do you change (get rid of) the old regime? This question was answered in the nineteenth century with a cult of violence that was part of the romantic revolutionary tradition. Its origins lie with men like Bakunin, at least as far back as the 1860s. Man is regenerated (or saved) through violence and the masses can be awakened through violence. This movement provides its own martyrs, who function for it

like the Christian martyrs did in the early church. We can see a more recent example of this in the revolutionary use made of the death of Che Guevara. There is a further metaphysical aspect to this violence, to demonstrate that the state is vulnerable and does not exist in any fundamental sense. What I have indicated here is what we might call a secular religion. It shares with the traditional religions the idea that the Kingdom of God or the Messianic Kingdom is in the future. A central issue is what kind of means are justified in moving us towards that future state.

Now there *is* a legitimate religious concern here, especially in the Judaic-Christian tradition with its emphasis on social justice in the Old Testament and on service to the neighbor in the New Testament. This religious focus is part of the conceptual framework with which many of us claim to be working. However, it is not (should not be) in the repertoire of the faithful to slaughter the innocent (to pave the road to the Kingdom of heaven on earth with the bodies of the innocent). That is not to say that the religious or secular proponent of significant values is to remain inactive. Rather, we must look at the *form* this activity is to take. I find a useful model to be the ideas and practices espoused by Gandhi and those of King (which come out of a variety of religious contexts, including Christian and Hindu). For many of us today this might form the limit on one end of the spectrum of possible activity. I think it fair to say that many of us today consider violence to be an appropriate solution to certain problems. Certainly a conceptual framework including violence is one of the sources of the terrorist activity we find in the world today.

The concern of Gandhi is similar to that of the terrorist at the outset—that is, how to accomplish social

change. The core of the Gandhian system for me is his doctrine of truth, "Satyagraha is literally holding on to Truth, and it means therefore Truth-force." We might ask what this truth is, how it becomes a force, and how it relates to human action in the area of conflict. Gandhi replies, "It excludes the use of violence, because man is not capable of knowing the absolute truth and therefore not competent to punish." Especially, we might add, not punishing absolutely and irrevocably by killing. In other words, since no human being is capable of knowing the truth in any absolute sense, we must be tolerant (open) to those who would differ from us. If we are serious about pursuing and finding the truth to the best of our abilities, we must use the way of nonviolence (or as Gandhi later translated it, love). In our own culture we can see this functioning in the area of scientific and other professional societies that do not include violence or terrorism as approved methods of arriving at the truth in their disciplines.

My sons have reached the age that when I go to a conference they no longer ask what I'm going to bring them, but what I'm going to be doing. I found myself saying that I was going to join a group of adults trying to justify killing one another in extraordinarily horrible ways. That may have been a sentence-long Freudian slip, but that off-hand comment occupied my mind after it slipped out one evening at supper. The conclusion that I wish to leave is that the random violence that we label terrorism is not justifiable in the three ways I have indicated.

The aims that some terrorists have may be worthy, but there are other means to achieve them as has been indicated by Gandhi and King. Of course, one rejoinder is going to be that Gandhi and King were not uniformly successful. I have argued that terrorism has not been

uniformly successful, so that might put the two positions on a par in that regard. What recommends the Gandhi/King position as a tactic for social change over the terrorist method is the moral consistency of the former (especially between means and ends). I would not call the present world situation, based on a conceptual framework including violence, one of success in terms of improving people's lives around the world, that is, of meeting human needs. If we look at the larger picture that might involve nuclear blackmail by terrorist groups, it seems to me that those in power and those trying to get into power (the terrorists) need to move to *a different vision* of how to resolve conflict in order to arrive at the world they want.

Of course, the fact that we discuss this topic indicates that we do not live in a perfect world. One might ask how we respond to terrorism *realistically*. What does this mean ... *realistically*? At one time in our history, realism meant burning heretics at the stake, because of the accepted conceptual framework of that day regarding truth and error. We now regard that as a tactical, moral, and religious error. Because terrorism breeds terrorism (as in Northern Ireland), how can we break the cycle? We need to consider carefully the issue of how we deal with those who disagree with us. If we adopt their tactics (that is, terrorist ones) for ends that are or sound very similar, such as liberty, or order, or justice, then we cannot logically criticize them. On these grounds I contend that terrorism is not justifiable as a component of warfare (as conducted by the United States).

Terrorism, defined as an attack on an individual to frighten and coerce a large number of others, is not justified (whether or not war has been declared) because (a) it will probably not be successful; (b) it is internally

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inconsistent—the means do not morally promote the ends; (c) it cannot help to build the future—it might be successful in the short run, but not in the long run; this is where religion comes in—terrorism does not help to reconcile or regenerate people; and (d) it is externally inconsistent; that is, it is inconsistent with our democratic principles, especially regarding the enhancement of personal liberties.

If *we* were to adopt terrorism as a mode of warfare, or encourage allies (sympathetic groups) in other countries to do so, then (a) we could not logically criticize terrorist activity aimed against us; and (b) we would be acting inconsistently with our principles.

The underlying issue here is clarification of our conceptual framework and its relation to the conceptual framework of the terrorist. Our views of the value of the individual, the nature of society, the role of the supernatural, and of worthwhile ends to pursue and the legitimate means with which to pursue them provide the context in which we evaluate terrorist activity. It is confused logic and morality for us to adopt parts of the terrorist's conceptual framework that deviate sharply from ours. My focus of this difference has been on justifiable *means,* the point at which the philosophy of Gandhi has direct confrontation with the ideas of the terrorist.

We cannot justify the adoption of terrorist activities as a mode of warfare.

Notes

1. Carlos Marighella, *Minimanual,* quoted in *Terror and Urban Guerrillas: A Study of Tactics and Documents,* ed. Jay Mallin (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1971), p. 72.

2. Bayo, "150 Questions to a Guerrilla," in *Terror and Urban Guerrillas: A Study of Tactics and Documents,* p. 118.

3. Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1977), p. 205.

4. Bayo, "150 Questions to a Guerrilla," in *Terror and Urban Guerrillas; A Study of Tactics and Documents,* p. 162.

What It Means to Ask Whether Strategy and Tactics Are Amoral

JOHN H. YODER

To DEFINE LANGUAGE IN THE service of ethical clarity, civility, and democracy, a prerequisite of respectful debate distinguishes the path from its end, the language that is the instrument of our conversation from the agreement or decision that we hope will issue. Even when we disagree—especially when we disagree—on important matters of substance, we must work at agreeing about what it is we are talking about and what rules and logic will help us to talk about it. It is a prerequisite of ethical discourse to be able to distinguish the rules that make a process of discourse understandable and accountable from the ultimate conclusions that a given party in that discourse believes ought to be ultimately attainable. In other words, we should learn to talk the same language independently of our judgments upon the merit of the other person, the merit of the other person's case, or the ultimate truth of a matter. To discuss questions of matters of strategy and amorality, thus, requires that we disentangle the different meanings the different answers might have, and

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the reasons people might be subject to misunderstanding when using that language.

Most of the time our public discourse is clouded by the fact that immediate biases so polarize a discussion that conversation is barely civil, and most of the time people talk past one another. This has been largely the case with regard to Vietnam. It is still largely the case with regard to the nuclear arms race, and the prospects for development and deployment of bacteriological and chemical weapons. Clarifying the debate's shape can thus better be served by taking our guidance from some historical distance, such as now begins to obtain with regard to obliteration bombing of cities in World War II.

The death of General Arthur (Bomber) Harris gave one occasion to review the debate that raged within British society (strikingly much more openly than in the United States) and that to some extent was carried on also between the American and the British air forces with regard to the legality, the morality, and the cost-benefit wisdom of city bombing. Likewise the fortieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki renewed attention to the dimensions of that massive annihilation, which has much in common with the fire bombing of Hamburg or Dresden or Tokyo, but which in other psychologically important ways has brought us into a new epoch.

In either the larger question of the massive bombing of urban populations in World War II or the narrower one of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki decisions, I note that it is in the current experience of reviewing those events, as it is now being done by survivors and later generations, that we see our societies working through the debate about their moral components. It is in reviewing such cases that we find some people

asserting that it is wrong to try to make moral decisions about them.

To argue that matters of strategy and tactics are *amoral* is not a meaningful statement unless the terms are defined. Since *amoral* is a composite word, formed with a privative prefix, we need to know first what *moral* means. There is however another composite with another negative prefix, namely *immoral.* Unpacking the different kinds of negation may point us to different kinds of affirmation. Sometimes when we say that a matter is a moral matter we mean that it is in a realm in which it is appropriate that ethical decisions should be made. The entire question is a moral question, independent of what the *right* answer might be. Then *amoral* represents a realm or a subject matter for which the language of morality is inappropriate because there are no decisions to be made or the decisions to be made are not of an ethical nature.

The other meaning of *moral* is the opposite of *immoral;* the moral thing to do is the right thing to do, and the immoral choice is the wrong choice.

This variety of realms of discourse is not necessarily confused, but it is appropriate that we recognize it as at least potentially confusing. Terms have multiple meanings and need first to be sorted out. Until we have done that sorting, neither a "yes" nor a "no" to the broad question will be of much help.

The standard meaning of the term *amoral,* for which the *Oxford English Dictionary* dates first use as 1882, is "not within the sphere of moral sense: not to be characterized as good or bad: non-moral." So the adjective *amoral* describes a realm or a question for which moral questions are not appropriate. Not that they cannot be answered; they cannot properly be asked.

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Questions can be asked that use moral-sounding language with verbs like *should* and verbs in the imperative mode. Yet the imperatives are instrumental: you *should* pay your bills on time *if* you don't want to pay interest on the balance. You *should* not get caught breaking the rules if you want to avoid punishment. You *should* not eat peas with a knife. You *should* not split your infinitives. You *should* speak more clearly. These uses of moral-sounding language are based in etiquette, taste, convention, or practicality. These realms may have moral implications but they are not at their center properly moral issues.

I take note parenthetically of one quirk of language usage, which I have observed in the realm of fiction and literary criticism. It is not yet in the dictionaries. It is a component of our background language awareness, though it does not relate directly to our topic. For a *person* to be described as amoral is not neutral but negative. It means that that person lacks a moral sensitivity which he/she ought *to* have.

The properly academic, ideal way to proceed with such an investigation would be to gather a large number of statements, as contemporary as possible, where the notion of amorality occurs, seeking to interpret them in context and if necessary to classify their differences as to just what is meant each time. For three reasons we have to renounce such an enterprise. The fact that the bulk of the study would be prohibitive is not the basic reason. Another is that many of the utterances we should need to deal with would be occasional, unself-critical, philosophically amateur, not so phrased as to submit easily to careful analysis. A more complex reason is the paradox involved in the psychological side of warfare. When President Richard Nixon reportedly told Secretary Kissinger that he wanted the nation's Asian

adversaries to perceive him as a wild man, or when John Arbuthnot Fischer, the legendary admiral who dominated British naval policy at the turn of the century, predicated Britannia's rule of the waves on the readiness to fight with utter disregard of the rules of war, each was projecting for public perception a posture that was not the same as the operational ethos of his fighting forces.

The difference between declared and operational policies complicates ethics enormously: (a) Hugo Grotius, generally counted symbolically as the father of the modern notion of international law, begins his Laws of War with a recognition of the challenges of those who, since ancient Greece, claim that once war has broken out there can be no law at all; (b) Robert W. Tucker, an eminent political scientist, reading from the American record, believes that there seems to exist a specific American variant of the Just War tradition in both law and morals. According to Tucker, the United States is especially reticent to enter hostilities; the limits of *jus ad bellum* are respected with conscientiousness and caution. The guys in the white hats never shoot first. Yet once hostilities have begun, the tendency, says Tucker, is to be impatient with the restraints on its prosecution;[1] (c) Michael Walzer in his landmark work *Just and Unjust Wars*[2] identifies as his major adversary the view he calls "realistic," a denial of any firm, final restraints; (d) General Kermit D. Johnson, former US Army Chief of Chaplains, speaking at National Defense University in August 1985 addressed the claim that "ethics never won a battle."[3] He noted the special challenge of officers who believed that their superiors were without ethical sensitivities. The moral erosion Johnson denounced is not limited to the ethics of battle, but it includes that.

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Some adversarial observers are philosophers, claiming only to be honest with the dismal facts of experience. Some are persons with command decision authority, wanting their elbows free to do their job. What they have in common is what the term *amorality* represents, a denial that moral rules can apply in armed combat.

The case against effective moral discrimination can be made on different levels of severity. The strongest, sometimes called "nihilism," denies that moral standards have any ultimate meaning at all. The nihilist cannot deny that people do, in fact, use moral language and take it seriously, but he can argue that its usage is self-deceptive or hypocritical, since moral categories are reducible to statements of interest, desire, or taste.[4]

Less rigorous is the moral "relativist," who affirms that moral standards really exist, are definable, and lay real claims upon us. But the relativist denies that the substance of those claims can be firmly specified in important conflictual situations in a way that will be accepted by all parties concerned, since every definition is dependent on time, place, culture, religion, interest, and other factors.

Still less rigorous, but still strong enough for example is the "realistic" view (characterized by Hans Morgenthau, who used the term affirmatively, and by Michael Walzer, who uses it to name what he rejects. The realist does not deny that standards exist and may be specified. Yet he knows that they are not respected and will not be. Since others do not respect them, we cannot afford to do so either. In fact, to bear any responsibility for defending the legitimate interests of a specific political community, it would be wrong (a moral judgment after all) to respect all the other moral standards at the cost of our community's interests.

To be clear about what is going on when some people do deny that there is a moral component in decisions made about strategy and tactics, it is helpful to define the affirmative position that they deny. The affirmative alternative is a logical continuation of the Just War tradition, most clearly taught by theologians since the early middle ages. We will do well to distinguish this possible morally coherent position from the other typological alternatives that are alive in contemporary thought. In describing and naming these latter options, I am discovering nothing, making no unprecedented observations, making no argument, only classifying the conceptual reality that we all deal with, but it is important to name those alternatives, since they lie behind the thesis that moral considerations do *not* count.

1. In the "Holy War" tradition represented by the Christian crusades, by the wars of JHWH in the age of Moses, Joshua, and the Judges, by the Muslim jihad, and by certain kinds of ideological rhetoric in favor of socialist or fascist visions, violence is justified by the authority of an absolute value in the face of which the enemy has no rights and our victory is assured.

2. There is the simple affirmation that the exercise of power is a rule unto itself. Some of this view was present in the ancient cynics, and it was developed into a full-blown philosophy by Machiavelli. Michael Walzer in his landmark treatment on *Just and Unjust Wars* calls it "realism."

3. In a kind of mythic macho heroism, represented by the images of John Wayne or Rambo, deeply rooted in earlier cultural experiences, whether Islamic, Iberic, or Teutonic, the power and the courage of the heroic figure are themselves an ultimate moral validation. Sometimes it is claimed or assumed that what the hero does is right by the law, but there is no due process of

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law to verify that or to defend the rights of the innocent bystanders or of his adversaries. Sometimes it is claimed that God is behind him. In that case it becomes a variant of the Holy War tradition, but "God" tends to have few other functions than to empower the hero. I have spoken of individual hero figures because they most simply incarnate the macho mythos, but obviously it is also possible to find this kind of rejection of moral standards incarnated as well in a particular military unit or a particular ruling elite.

4. There is a specific variant of the Just War tradition which I have named and analyzed.[5] It is like the Just War tradition in that it is not unconcerned for moral values. It is unlike the tradition in that it reduces moral evaluation to a promise of effectiveness. It is ready to use disproportionate and indiscriminate means either as a threat in the case of the contemporary vision of mutual assured destruction or in actual implementation as in the bombing strategy of RAF General Arthur Harris. If it works it will bring victory most quickly and cheaply, which will be best for all concerned, even the losers, rather than having the hostilities dragged out by being too ticklish about keeping the rules. This is in one sense still a moral position. Yet it has reduced all morality to consequential calculations, linked with a high level of trust in the accuracy of one's own predictions and projections of how things will go if we continue to follow a particular strategy or tactic.

5. The meaning of the logic of the Just War tradition properly so called can be somewhat clarified when contrasted with these other views, which are also about morals and morality in human values but in more simple ways that are less capable of exercising critical moral restraint.

The Just War tradition defends the values of the adversary by defining *numerous* criteria that need to be met if the selfish desires of a given nation are to have the right to claim legitimacy for any military undertaking against that adversary. One set of criteria regulates the right to go to war at all, what we call *jus ad bellum*. The second set, elaborated later in European history, limits the *means* that are legitimate, even in a just cause being prosecuted by a legitimate authority in a situation of last resort. Strategy and tactics fall into this latter category of *jus in bello*. The means must be necessary, proportionate, and discriminating and must respect the immunity of the noncombatant and the laws and conventions of war. Thus claims that "strategy and tactics are amoral" would at the least mean the rejection of *jus in bello*.

6. The only other logically possible position, pacifism, is not a part of this analysis at all, except that it shares with the Just War tradition the commitment to the rights and dignity of the adversary and to the principle of restraint as such.[6]

If we ask which of the stances can speak of strategic and tactical matters as "amoral," it is obviously attitudes (2) or (3), since they have a stake in denying that moral considerations count. Yet even these do make some moral claims, saying it is an error or even a falsehood to try to apply usual moral yardsticks to matters of strategy or tactics. But then that means that these positions are actually making (without admitting it) two moral arguments: (a) The specific goals for the sake of which one carries on a war do justify whatever one wants to do towards those ends. One's own values transcend all the moral claims of the other parties to the conflict. (b) One *should* describe military phenomena in terms which do not take account of moral dimensions.

These are moral arguments. They represent the specific moral view that is technically, objectively called egoistic or cynical, according to which one's own values so clearly come first that the claims of others have no standing.

It seems clear then from looking closer at the variety of concrete meanings behind the verbal usages that when people speak of the absence of a moral dimension within the execution of war, what they mean is not that there is no moral dimension at all. If that were really the intention, they would have to be saying that war happening is subject to no criteria at all. That would mean that it can be and should be incalculable and spontaneous. If that were the case, neither the word *strategy* nor the word *tactics* would be at all appropriate. Readiness for war is a highly structured institutional investment supported by an entire society. Its execution is highly organized, except in the case of rout, and even then it is disorganized only on the losing side. The dimensions of confusion and incoherency within a military operation that have been rendered legendary by literature like *Catch–22* have been the result of organization that was excessive and inappropriate, not of spontaneity.

Certainly the most respectable case for the irrelevance of moral criteria, we saw, is what has been called "realism." It has regularly been brought to the fore against those who call for wars to be fought by the rules. But what is really going on in realism is not the denial of *any* morality. It is rather the affirmation of an unquestioned specific moral commitment according to which the interests of one party to the conflict, as interpreted by one set of leaders, takes precedence over the claims of others. That superior value will often be expressed by saying that our very survival is at stake, or

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that in our survival all of the values of civilization are at stake. That language is an escalated form of the true statement that a present administration's control of a particular political structure is at stake. Forty years after the end of War War II, Germany, defeated in a war demanding unconditional surrender, is still alive and well in the form of three relatively sovereign nations carved out of the rest of Hitler's Reich. In all three of them, people speaking German and cultivating German culture are ruled over by their own kind. One of them, a Federal Republic, is bound by treaties and commerce to the United States, one to the Soviet Union, and Austria is formally neutral; in no case did defeat mean that the nation or its people or culture went out of existence.

There may be racist or ideological conflicts in which the elimination of the enemy people or culture is actually intended, but this is not typical of war. It is usually not even the case when the rhetoric about all of civilization being at stake is used. What usually happens after losing a war is the establishment of another government structure, supported by a minority of the people of that country, as the previous one had been. This ruling minority claims to be heir to that nation's traditions, as the previous one had been, operating the same railroads, subways, hospitals, and telephone services. What the war was about was the choice of who should determine which minority would have the positions of managerial prominence and which network of foreign alliances the country would affirm allegiance to. Those matters are very important. They are morally important. They are not, however, so infinitely important that they transcend absolutely all other moral claims.

By no means am I saying that nothing at all is at stake in a war. Certainly the choice between two different alliance systems or two different commercial

networks is important. What I am saying is that those values are not infinite or absolute. To speak of them in terms of the absolute survival of a nation or of a civilization is to prevaricate, as is done when the claim to an absolute stake is used to justify suspending the obligations of the laws of war.

It is worthy of note that when people begin to argue against the applicability of the rule of law in a given case, this generally permits them to be loose about the facts of the case in more than one direction. Michael Walzer argues the appropriateness of the massive bombing of German cities on the grounds that all of Western civilization was at stake in the battle with Hitler. Yet he did not demonstrate either that Hitler and his generals at that time had any serious expectation of an imminent successful invasion of Great Britain, or that the massive bombing of German cities would have a sure efficacy in slowing down the Nazi war effort. Both of those unproven assumptions have since been strongly challenged by historians.

Although it may well be meaningful in some circumstances to speak of one realm of decisionmaking as not being characterized by any moral dimensions, this certainly cannot be said of war or of any of the component elements within it. War is a highly structured and costly human activity. It is not undertaken without strong conviction that the values that it risks and destroys—lives, property, and the survival of institutions—should properly thus be risked and if necessary be destroyed. Then what someone means, in saying that a given realm is amoral, is that the person or the other persons described, prefer not to *recognize* this moral dimension, not to name the values that are being held superior to other values, so as not to undergo moral scrutiny. They may not wish to avow that the values for

which they sacrifice other values may be those of selfish interest or of ideological partisanship. They may not want to recognize that in some of their relative judgments of what is worth killing and dying for they are giving very high value to imponderables like the honor of the Corps or the secrecy of a code, as weighed over against the value of human lives or the rule of law.

The language of amorality is a semantic error, often committed innocently. It signals the priority of some value or interest of one's own over the claims of the adversary or the innocent. The morality that it mistakenly disavows would rightly defend the other party's claims. Moral accountability, on the other hand, would accept testing one's own claims by the standard criteria of legitimacy, cause, intention, last resort, proportion, innocent immunity, respect for treaties, and all the rest. To do that testing, one must name those values, not cover them with the claim that they are somehow exempt from moral accountability.

Notes

1. Robert W. Tucker, *The Just War: A Study in Contemporary American Doctrine* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1960).

2. Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), especially pp. 3–20.

3. Kermit D. Johnson, "Military Ethics," *Military Chaplains' Review* 14, no. 5 (Summer 1985): 5–16.

4. Richard A. Wasserstrom, "On the Morality of War," in his collection *War and Morality* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1970), p. 79; also Malham M. Wakin, ed., *War, Morality, and the Military Profession* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1979), p. 301, distinguishes three modes of nihilist or realist argument: descriptive, prescriptive, and analytical. The prescriptive mode is the one most pertinent to the present analysis. Yet the argument often slides from one to the

other, from the descriptive observation that people do act realistically to the claim (prescriptive) that it is right that they should do so or (analytic) that it is meaningless to contemplate anything else.

5. John H. Yoder, "A Consistent Alternative View Within the Just War Family," *Faith and Philosophy* 2, no. 2, (April 1985): 112–120.

6. Idem, *Nevertheless: The Varieties of Religious Pacifism* (Scottsdale. PA: Herald Press, 1971). I have distinguished numerous moral stances covered by the term "pacifist." All but two of them would fit the above description, but otherwise they range widely from withdrawn Tolstoyan "nonresistance" to the aggressive "soul force" of Gandhi. They would, however, stand together for purposes of this exposition.

PART TWO

The Clash
Of Ethical
Systems

The Military Art
And National Values

BARRY D. WATTS

*IF YOU KNOW THE ENEMY AND
know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred bat-
tles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory
gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the
enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.*

—Sun Tzu

As sweeping as Sun Tzu's generalization to know
the enemy may be, his words nevertheless highlight an
enduring truth about the application of military force.[1]
Going to war ignorant of yourself and your enemy cer-
tainly stacks the deck heavily against your efforts. Con-
sider the United States twenty-five year involvement in
Southeast Asia. Regarding the overall outcome, I must
agree with General Bruce Palmer's assessment that
Vietnam was "the first clear [military] failure in our
history."[2] As for the causes of that failure, most
observers agree that they were many and complex, but
the more thoughtful postmortems tend to echo in one
way or another Sun Tzu's maxim about the importance

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of knowing yourself and your enemy in war. According to Stanley Karnow's 1983 history of the conflict,

The enemy's intransigence was grotesquely apparent during the war in the spectacle of North Vietnamese and Vietcong corpses stacked up like cordwood following battles. In Vietnam after the war, I interviewed Communist veterans who had spent seven or eight or nine years fighting in the south, their jungle sanctuaries pounded by US bombs and artillery. When I asked them to describe their motives, all replied almost by rote that it had been their duty to "liberate the fatherland." The slogan sounded contrived to my skeptical ears. Yet, as I listened to them, I thought of the old Mathew Brady photographs of Union and Confederate bodies at Antietam and Manassas and Gettysburg, where thousands of young men had also sacrificed themselves. Theirs had been a cause Americans could comprehend.

Only much later did American officials begin to recognize that the United States had faced a formidable foe. Dean Rusk, secretary of state under Kennedy and Johnson ... finally admitted in 1971 that he had "personally underestimated" the ability of the North Vietnamese to resist.... General Maxwell Taylor, who had contributed to Kennedy's decisions on Vietnam and afterward served as Johnson's ambassador in Saigon, had a similar confession to make after the war: "First, we didn't know ourselves. We thought we were going into another Korean war, but this was a different country. Secondly, we didn't know our South Vietnamese allies. We never understood them, and that was another surprise. And we knew even less about North Vietnam. Who was Ho Chi Minh? Nobody really knew.[3]

What, you may be wondering, does this apparent support for Sun Tzu's injunction to know yourself and your enemy have to do with military art and national values? The connection, I would suggest, is as follows. On the one hand, Sun Tzu's maxim offers at least a kernel of truth about the application of military force from

a Chinese general who lived some five centuries before Christ. On the other hand, we seemingly have evidence confirming the validity of Sun Tzu's insight, in the recent war experience of a twentieth-century industrial nation with a vastly different history, culture, and level of technology from that of ancient China. Evidently there are enduring truths about the conduct of war that can transcend enormous differences in history, culture, time, and technology. Because the physical dynamics governing the employment of particular weapons—whether ancient sword and pike or modern tank and fighter plane—are presumably the same for all combatants, it appears initially plausible to infer that effective military strategy and tactics must also be pretty much the same for everyone. Strategy and tactics, in other words, would seem to be basically amoral in the dictionary sense of not entailing ethical norms or value judgments.

To be quite candid, this argument leaves me somewhere between the proverbial rock and a hard place. I wrote a book that, among other things, soundly condemned the US Air Force doctrinal *Weltanschauung* for failing to appreciate Karl von Clausewitz's century-and-a-half old insight that "the elemental processes of war are too uncertain, too riddled with chance and the unforeseen to be wholly, or even mostly, captured by pat formulas and engineering calculations."[4] I have a personal stake in the intellectual survival of the premise that there are fundamental truths about war that have stood the test of at least the last 150 years. As for the proposition that the kinematics of employing a given weapon must be essentially the same for everyone, air combat tactics, for example, have all been known for the past quarter century.[5] So, I would not want to reject either of the premises on which the putative argument

for the amorality of strategy and tactics rests, yet I also happen to think that the argument's conclusion is patent balderdash. As a practical matter, the strategy and tactics to which I have been exposed during the course of twenty years in the US Air Force have been about as value-free as Thomas Jefferson's 1776 Declaration of Independence.

As a matter of empirical fact, basic elements of the tactics, operational art, and strategy used by modern US and Soviet forces, far from being amoral, are shaped, if not determined, by prevailing value judgments associated with American and Soviet societies concerning issues of fairness and the intrinsic worth of individuals. Based on details of the evidence, I question whether, in any concrete sense, it is plausible, even in principle, for strategy or tactics to be amoral. To return to the example of air combat tactics, it makes no sense to me to predicate goodness or badness of a basic maneuver, like the barrel-roll attack. But the full-blown activity of air-to-air combat, as actually prosecuted in the real world, involves considerably more than these bare tactical forms. Among other things, flight and squadron leaders must also decide whether to give highest priority to scoring kills or surviving, and such choices not only affect fundamentally the tactics flown, but entangle the entire tactical enterprise in value-laden judgments about ends versus means. Construed in this broader sense, even air combat tactics seem hard to isolate from moral considerations.

There is, I think, a moral lesson in this outcome for those who would broach ethical issues with the professional military officer. Admittedly, to deal with the morality of war convincingly and competently, you need to know something about ethics. But every bit as important, you also need to know something about

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war—and not just war on paper or in the abstract but war as it actually is.

Preliminaries

I argue that an empirical connection—if not a necessary one—exists between national values and basic elements of twentieth-century military art. However, two items properly set the stage. First, I prefer and use the term *military art* in lieu of *strategy and tactics*. Second, I need to highlight my assumption that objective, philosophically meaningful differences can be discerned between the moral values characteristic of contemporary nations as divergent in their approaches to social justice as are the United States and the Soviet Union. The first item is, ostensibly at least, one of terminological clarification. The second, substantive and controversial, as a practical matter, narrows my task to something reasonably manageable in scope. Because so many people today hold the United States to be morally indistinguishable from the Soviet Union, I do want to go to the trouble of sketching, if only in outline, a prima facie case for thinking that this viewpoint may be unsound.

The 1983 Soviet *Military Encyclopedic Dictionary* defines military art *(voyennoye iskusstvo)* as the "theory and practice of preparing for and conducting military operations on land, sea, and in the air."[6] It goes on to specify that Soviet military art includes "strategy, operational art, and tactics," explicitly noting that although these three components are closely interlinked, "in capitalist countries operational art is generally not considered as an independent part of the art of warfare."[7]

Let me begin by conceding that the backhanded criticism of Western military theory implied in this Soviet definition is by no means entirely misplaced. Soviet military writers have long argued—and not

without reason in light of the relevant history—that one of the pivotal factors in the USSR's eventual triumph over Nazi Germany was increasing Soviet mastery, as the war progressed, of "deep operations" by fronts and groups of fronts, that is, of the operational level of warfare.[8] Yet, as Lieutenant General Richard D. Lawrence, US Army (Ret.), former President of National Defense University, noted, operational military art has long been ignored in the doctrine, research, writing, teaching and practice of the US military.[9]

While I cannot speak as authoritatively of the US Army's historical neglect of operational art as can General Lawrence, I have to agree that this charge is true of American airmen. From the 1943 Field Manual (FM) 100–20, *Command and Employment of Air Power,* through the 1984 version of Air Force Manual (AFM) 1–1, *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force,* the doctrinal writings of the Army Air Corps and (later) the US Air Force have essentially viewed strategy and tactics as exhausting the realm of modern warfare.[10] Granted, the last few years have witnessed some awakening of American interest in operational art. National Defense University, for example, is in the process of introducing a course on joint operational art, and one of the most significant changes in the 1985 rewrite of AFM 1–1 is its focus on the operational level of war.[11] Nevertheless, serious study of operational art in the Soviet sense of "army and front operations, operations of groups of fronts, and also independent and joint operations by (army-size) units" is, at best, something of a new phenomenon within the US military.[12]

Lieutenant General Lawrence went so far as to characterize the teaching operational art to the future leaders of the US military as "the most crucial subject facing us today."[13] Even within the uniformed military,

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I suspect many people would be inclined to view so dramatic a characterization as overdrawn. But speaking for myself at least, the more I wrestled during the closing months of 1985 with the persistent problems of developing an even-handed ''net assessment'' of the military balance in Europe, the more persuaded I became that General Lawrence may not be overstating the situation very much at all. Indeed, insofar as likely war outcomes of a future conflict in Europe are concerned, he may well be right on the mark. Therefore, I consider military art in the Soviet sense of including strategy, tactics, and operational art as the ''connecting link'' or bridge between the two.

For the sake of argument, let me just say plainly that I assume what the average man in the street commonly assumes about national values, namely, that there are differences between the moral values characteristic of modern nation states (especially regarding fundamental matters of justice, fairness, and the ultimate worth of individuals) and that in the case of nations as different in their arrangements concerning social justice as are the United States and the Soviet Union, these differences are fairly straightforward and discernible.

Even for the seemingly extreme cases of a totalitarian state like the Soviet Union and a Western democracy like the United States, there are those who would flatly deny that meaningful moral distinctions can be drawn between the US and Soviet governments. In discussing the continued growth of American and Soviet nuclear arsenals since the 1960s, Dr. Carl Sagan offered his ''historical '' interpretation:

Most citizens of the two nations were unconcerned. Even more weapons of mass destruction were necessary, we were told, to protect us. We believed it. The agencies of national

propaganda inculcated fear and hatred of the potential enemy, and many people felt, despite their misgivings, that the issues were too technical and accountability too remote for the nation's leaders to be influenced much by public opinion. So we put it out of our minds. We hoped for the best. Psychiatrists called this "denial."[14]

I openly confess that I find this passage more than mildly astonishing. The agencies of national propaganda inculcated fear and hatred of the potential enemy? Did Dr. Sagan truly mean to refer here to agencies of the American government as well as to those of the Soviet government? Evidently he did. Evidently he rejects any moral distinction between the positions of the US and Soviet governments on strategic nuclear arms.

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who has perhaps thought a bit more profoundly about the ethical differences between Soviet Russia and the United States, would, of course, disagree. According to Solzhenitzyn, one of the great mistakes of American policy advisors and political leaders has been

the failure to understand the radical hostility of communism to mankind as a whole—the failure to realize that communism is irredeemable, that there exist no "better" variants of communism; that it is incapable of growing "kinder," that it cannot survive as an ideology without terror, and that, consequently, to coexist with communism on the same planet is impossible.[15]

John Rawls' notion of social justice as fairness, explicated in his 1971 book, *A Theory of Justice*, explicitly portrays the obligations of individuals in a society as flowing from two conditions being met. They are (1) that the society's institutions are just and (2) that the individuals in that society must have "voluntarily accepted the benefits of the arrangement or taken advantage of the opportunities it offers" to further their

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interests.[16] What if these conditions are not met? Rawls' answer is clear. If they are not met then there cannot be any obligations:

In particular, it is not possible to have an obligation to autocratic and arbitrary forms of government. The necessary background does not exist for obligations to arise from consensual or other acts, however expressed.[17]

Yet, there is every reason to believe that the Soviet government remains autocratic and arbitrary to its very core. Lenin and Stalin are long dead, but as Robert Conquest concluded, without general elections, without unrestricted freedom of press and assembly, without a free struggle of opinion, the post-Stalin "Soviet Union can best be described as not fully cured, but still suffering from a milder and more chronic form of the affliction which reached its crisis in the Yezhov years."[18] To this day, Russia remains ridden by the party machine. The "Khrushchevite 'de-Stalinization' consisted of little more than the abandonment of a specific set of excesses" associated with Stalin, and it did not result in "any change of substance in the system of political rule in the USSR, or in any of the principles behind that system."[19] Indeed, even the Soviet forced labor system— Aleksandr Solzenitsyn's infamous Gulag Archipelago— still contains, according to the US State Department, some 1,100 forced labor camps and an estimated four million people, of whom at least ten thousand are considered political and religious prisoners.[20] So withstanding the skill with which General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has handled the Western media, or the well-advertised imperfections of contemporary America, it is not at all difficult to make a prima facie case for the existence of significant moral differences between the USSR and the United States. On the evidence, in fact, Rawls' theory of justice as fairness would appear to

provide a basis for arguing that moral obligations between individual citizens and the state cannot even arise in Gorbachev's Russia.

Values Structuring Tactics

To establish as a matter of empirical fact that differing national values have shaped fundamental aspects of the tactics employed by the US and Soviet armed forces, I begin with a somewhat anecdotal but, I think, insightful, story from a former Soviet officer who, before his defection to the West, served for fifteen years in the Red Army, including command of a motorized-rifle company during the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and graduated from the prestigious Frunze Military Academy.[21] The pseudonymous Victor Suvorov told of tactics.

When I lecture to Western officers on tactics in the Soviet Army, I often close my talk by putting a question to them— always the same one—in order to be sure that they have understood me correctly. The question is trivial and elementary. Three Soviet motor-rifle companies are on the move in the same sector. The first has come under murderous fire and its attack has crumbled, the second is advancing slowly, with heavy losses, the third has suffered an enemy counter-attack and, having lost all its command personnel, is retreating. The commander of regiment to which these companies belong has three tank companies and three artillery batteries in reserve. Try and guess, I say, how this regimental companies and three artillery batteries in reserve. Try and guess, I say, how this regimental commander uses his reserves to support his three companies. "You are to guess," I say, "what steps a Soviet regimental commander would take, not a Western one but a Soviet, a Soviet, a Soviet one."

I have never yet received the correct reply. Yet in this situation there is only one possible answer. From the platoon level to that of the Supreme Commander all would agree that

there is only one possible decision: all three tank companies
and all three artillery batteries must be used to strengthen the
company which is moving ahead, however slowly. The
others, which are suffering losses, certainly do not qualify for
help. If the regimental·commander, in a state of drunkenness
or from sheer stupidity, were to make any other decision he
would, of course, be immediately relieved of his command,
reduced to the ranks and sent to pay for his mistake with his
own blood, in a penal battalion.

My audiences ask, with surprise, how it can be that two
company commanders, whose men are suffering heavy cas-
ualties, can ask for help without receiving any? "That's the
way it is," I reply, calmly. "How can there be any doubt
about it?"[22]

Suvorov's *rationale* for this distinctly Soviet solution to
the tactical problem in question is, if anything, even
more revealing.

Soviet tactics are of the utmost simplicity; they can be con-
densed into a single phrase—the maximum concentration of
forces in the decisive sector. Anyone who was found respon-
sible for dispersing forces of divisional strength or above dur-
ing the [Great Patriotic] war was shot without further ado. At
the lower levels the usual penalty for wasting resources in this
way was reduction to the ranks and a posting to a penal bat-
talion, which would also lead to death, though not always
immediately, it is true.[23]

The aspect of the Soviets' "tactical style" that I
want to emphasize in this characterization is, of course,
the evident indifference to casualties and, especially, to
the fate of units experiencing difficulties. Attacks are to
be ruthlessly prosecuted regardless of losses, and units
that fail to make progress or suffer reverses should
expect no help. Indeed, according to Suvorov, units
experiencing difficulties do not even have the right to
ask for help.[24]

Suvorov's characterization of Soviet tactics is
somewhat anecdotal—at best, the testimony of a single

former Soviet Army officer who defected years ago—
and we would probably be wise not to base too much on
it. Nonetheless, I think we can safely use his description
as a point of departure for certain observations. To
begin with, Suvorov's condensation seems historically
sound in that it does square with the testimony of Ger-
mans who had extensive combat experience on the
Eastern Front during the years 1941 through 1945. Wit-
ness, in this regard, the following excerpts from US
Army Pamphlet 20–230, *Russian Combat Methods in
World War II*, prepared by a committee of former Ger-
man officers in late 1947 and early 1948:

In the attack the Russian fought unto death. Despite most
thorough German defensive measures he would continue to
go forward, completely disregarding losses.[25]

[During 6th Panzer Division's defensive of the Porechye
bridgehead on the Luga River from mid-July to August 1941]
as often as 10 times a day the enemy attacked the road fork
which was enclosed by the projecting arc of the bridgehead.
Each attack was headed by as many tanks, echeloned in
depth, as the narrow road would accommodate. Time and
again the enemy attacks were repulsed, and time and again
they were renewed. Wave after wave of Russian forces
assembled, concealed by many wrecked tanks and heaps of
corpses, and stormed recklessly into the murderous defensive
fire. The attacks did not subside until the enemy no longer
had the necessary men and ammunition at his disposal.[26]

[The Russians] relied, in attack as well as in defense, on
reckless employment of manpower.[27]

In short, the Soviet tactical style during the Great
Patriotic War (1941–1945)—particularly in the attack—
was characterized by a profligate willingness to sacrifice
great masses of men and materiel to obtain battlefield
objectives.[28] Right up to the end of the conflict, Soviet
infantrymen were, more often than not, thrown unin-
telligently into battle almost shoulder to shoulder;

attacks delivered twice would be repeated, usually without variation, a third and fourth time irrespective of losses; and units smashed or decimated in battle would simply be replaced—often with surprising speed—by fresh formations.[29]

I would hasten to add that this view of Soviet battlefield tactics has also been consistently born out by the research of leading Western specialists on the Soviet military like Christopher Donnelly. According to Donnelly, Director of the Royal Military Academy's Soviet Studies Research Centre at Sandhurst,

The ability to achieve a military objective *no matter what the cost in lives* [italics in original] has always been ... a crucial element of Soviet battlefield tactics. The ability to retain the viability of formation despite enormous casualty rates, indeed the readiness to accept casualties on such a scale, is one of the hallmarks of Soviet operational practices.[30]

From the cultural vantage point of modern American (or British or Israeli) military practice, which tends to stress minimizing the unnecessary use of force or loss of life even under the worst stresses of combat, this feature of Soviet tactics is extremely difficult to accept. The incredulousness of those raised in the capitalist West notwithstanding, this approach to battle appears to have deep roots in Russian society.[31] Furthermore, during the Great Patriotic War, the blind obedience to orders necessary to fight this way was enforced by a truly draconian system of discipline. Soldiers who hesitated or disobeyed could be, and were, summarily executed by company commanders, without recourse to higher authority; and the higher authorities, from 1941 through 1945, executed outright or consigned to near certain death in penal battalions some 230 generals and correspondingly larger numbers of the more junior ranks.[32] Thus, the fact that during the years 1941 through 1945

millions of Soviet citizens opted instinctively for possible death in defense of the *rodina* (motherland) in lieu of certain death with dishonor for the slightest signs of disobedience is perhaps less surprising than we might at first think.

Even so, the indifference manifested in past Soviet tactical practice toward the fate of individuals or particular units contrasts starkly with American attitudes. Consider, by way of illustration, the extraordinary search-and-rescue efforts that the US Air Force came to mount almost as a matter of course to extract downed aircrew members during the Vietnam war.

Rescue efforts generally took precedence over normal strike missions and aircraft were often diverted from their assigned targets to support the A–1s and rescue choppers. On one mission in December 1969, 336 sorties were flown over a three-day period to help rescue forces recover a navigator evading capture near Ban Phanop, Laos, just outside Tchepone. In addition to the A–1 and Jolly Green [HH–3E] sorties, the Air Force used fifty F–105, forty-three F–4, four F–100, plus assorted 0–1 and 0–2 sorties. The Navy contributed a number of A–6 and A–7 sorties.[33]

This sort of wasteful expenditure of combat power is the sort of thing that in the Great Patriotic War would have gotten the Soviet commanders responsible promptly shot or sent to a penal battalion.

Still, as suggestive as the historical evidence of value-derived differences between Soviet and American tactics may be, it is possible to question whether such differences would be likely to persist on future battlefields. Regarding this question, I would turn next to some of the empirical evidence regarding differences between American and Soviet tactics that the US Army and Marines have gleaned in recent years from operating Soviet-style "threat units" in tests and field training exercises.

An Antiarmor Vehicle Evaluation (ARMVAL) took place at Fort Hunter Liggett, California, during a period of six months in 1980. The immediate objective of ARMVAL "was to determine the combat worth of lightweight armored vehicles ... in over 150 battles against a Soviet-style Threat Force in one of the most realistic settings imaginable short of actual combat."[34] What I specifically want to highlight from ARMVAL are the unexpected "engagement outcomes" that accumulated during the initial weeks of the test. Colonel Robert Thompson, the ARMVAL test director, summarized these early results:

During the first two months of testing, the Threat Force completely dominated the Marine Force. In the attack, it almost without exception, repeatedly rolled through Marine defenses virtually unscathed. Similarly, Marine attacks were defeated in detail. As you can imagine, this unexpected turn of events puzzled everyone. At first it was suspected that the Marine Force battlefield impotence might be caused by an error in the computer software program that favored the weapon systems used by the Threat Force. However, this was found not to be the case after a careful scrub of the software program. Next we looked at tactics. Perhaps Marine fire and movement tactics were not valid in opposing an armored/mechanized force. After much agonizing and analysis of test data—particularly TV gun tapes—it became apparent that the problem was not one of tactics but of application. Our Marine Force was simply not executing properly. Techniques were poor. Shortcomings ranged from the simplest details (often taken for granted) to the more complex aspects of combined arms coordination. . . .

Once the array of operational deficiencies was identified, the Test Force commander took remedial action, and in a few weeks the Marines began to improve dramatically. Soon they were able to hold their own with the Threat Force, and about midway through the trials, they began to dominate the battlefield and consistently did so throughout the remainder of

the field experiments. But even after achieving the upper hand, the Marine Force occasionally would experience defeat, during a trial, if some element of that combined arms team failed to execute properly.[35]

In considering the overall validity of the "Threat Force" versus Marine engagement outcomes during ARMVAL, could the results, especially during the first two months of the test, have been somehow anomalous? I do not think so. As of 1983, the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, had two units of American soldiers (roughly 1,200 men) performing as a typical Soviet motorized-rifle regiment (MRR) under the fictitious designation, 32nd Guards MRR.[36] Moreover, the US Army's own assessment of how regular US units fared against this mock Soviet regiment from October 1980 to November 1982 was that the Americans were usually defeated.[37] So the disturbing kinds of engagement results seen during the first third of ARMVAL appear to have been repeatedly replicated at the National Training Center against the "32nd Guards MRR."

With these experiences in mind, does ARMVAL lend explicit support to the idea that there are fundamental differences between contemporary US small unit tactics and those we currently attribute to the Soviets? Without question, it does. In language strikingly similar to that used by Suvorov, the German authors of *Russian Combat Methods in World War II,* and Christopher Donnelly, Colonel Thompson characterized the Soviet tactics used in ARMVAL:

We know that the Threat combat system is simple, straightforward, brutal. On the offensive it involves attacks by echelon and the concentration of overwhelming combat power at the chosen point of penetration. It moves straight at its opponent at high speeds and when contact is made, one

element fixes while another maneuvers. It is a "meat axe" approach to offensive combat with little concern for finesse or casualties. If unable to bypass resistance, it seeks to blast through main defenses and quickly get into the opponent's rear area.[38]

Even more revealing is Colonel Thompson's comparison of the Soviet "meat axe" approach with our own. Because of its simplicity and disregard for losses,

the Threat system is often stereotyped as the "dumb enemy." Some even find its doctrine difficult to accept. Using the "rational man" test, doubters feel that no one in his right mind would be so inflexible and unconcerned about casualties. They believe that regardless of doctrine, the Threat will adapt to battlefield conditions by employing a "smart system" such as ours. And I must admit, that before the ARMVAL field experiments, I shared some of the same views about Threat inflexibility—and weakness—but not anymore.

One of the real strengths of the Threat system is its simplicity, and because it is simple, it can be perfected with a minimum of training. The ARMVAL Threat Force learned to operate the system effectively with a few weeks of intensive training even though the force was a task organized mixture of Marines and soldiers led by a young Marine lieutenant with less than three years' service. Yet, the lieutenant was able to control and maneuver up to 30 armored vehicles in high speed attacks using only one radio net, and he did it with effectiveness.

Threat commanders are taught a set of battle drills with predetermined battlefield alternatives that allow them to relentlessly press the attack without having to delay to modify plans. Simplicity is further enhanced by the amount of redundancy in combat power built into the Threat system....

In contrast, we have a complex system of combined arms requiring highly coordinated and refined techniques of fire and maneuver. High technology and the synergistic potential of a combined arms system are seen as compensators for unfavorable force ratios. And unlike the Soviet's,

there is little combat power redundanc⸱⸱ in the system. Conse-
quently, every member of the combined arms team must
contribute to the maximum and the total effort must be
orchestrated to maximize the system.[39]

With regard to the existence of fundamental dif-
ferences between contemporary American and Soviet
ground force tactics, I think the empirical evidence pre-
sented to this point is fairly persuasive, if not compel-
ling. All that remains to be done is to link these
differences to equally straightforward differences in
Soviet and American national values, which brings me
to Colonel Thompson's discussion of the so-called
"dumb enemy" issue. Why is it that American partici-
pants in ARMVAL were so strongly inclined to insist
that nobody in his right mind would fight the way the
"Threat Force" fought during the test? After all, the
historical record certainly suggests that throughout
World War II, Soviet units employed very much the
sort of brutal, "meat axe" approach that these
"doubters" felt the Soviets would quickly abandon on
any modern battlefield.

The answer seems to be not that Soviet tactics are
ineffective, but that they are unfair. Indeed, the inequity
at issue is not the unfair distribution of opportunities
and wealth among individuals within a society, but the
unfair distribution of battlefield risks of mutilation or
death in combat. Still, the point is clearly that in the
Soviet tactical system, every individual or unit is not
going to have even a roughly equal chance of surviving
the next attack. Those unfortunate enough to find them-
selves at points of penetration or in main attack sectors
will tend to have much lower prospects of survival than
their companies elsewhere. Thus, I would argue,
Americans instinctively find Soviet ground force tactics
unacceptable—if not unbelievable—because they are

inherently unfair from the standpoint of American societal values. In the strongest sense, the Soviet approach to tactics is predicated on the principle that particular individuals can be sacrificed for the greater good of the Soviet state and the Communist party—a principle that plainly flies in the face of the American ideal that each person "possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override."[40]

Values and Operational Art and Strategy

In the preceding section, I went into the evidence for an empirical linkage between national values and tactics in considerable detail. As my colleague Lieutenant Colonel John G. Hines has suggested, the very content of the evidence bearing on tactics suggests an immediate argument for extending this linkage to both the operational and strategic levels. If Soviet marshals, generals, and admirals need not concern themselves either with proportionality between the amount of force applied and the ends sought, or about minimizing the needless loss of life in wartime, then they would clearly have options in the conduct of operations, campaigns and wars that their American counterparts would be reluctant, or possibly even forbidden, to choose.

To illustrate the sort of operational-strategic options that might be open to Soviet commanders, consider the Soviets' Berlin operation of 16 April through 8 May 1945. Now on the evidence, I will not be able to do much more here than suggest that the Soviets were something less than overly concerned with casualties during this operation. Nevertheless, the circumstantial evidence seems fairly persuasive. To begin with, there is the sheer magnitude of the resulting casualties, particularly Soviet casualties.

The cost to Berlin [was] probably 100,000 civilian and an undetermined number of German military casualties; to the three Soviet Fronts—1st and 2nd Belorussian, 1st Ukrainian—for the three weeks from 16 April to 8 May: 304,887 men killed, wounded and missing, 2,156 tanks and SP guns (with Koniev [commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front] losing over 80), 1,220 guns and mortars, and 527 combat aircraft lost.[41]

To put these figures in perspective, the total number of battle deaths suffered by the United Kingdom throughout World War II was less than 250,000.[42] As for the overall goal of this operation, Stalin appears to have had a mixture of motives for being determined that the Soviet Army, not the British or Americans, would actually seize the capital of Hitler's Third Reich.[43] In any event, at the final planning conference for the operation, which took place in Stalin's office on 1 April 1945, the Soviet dictator left Marshal Zhukov (1st Belorussian Front commander) and Marshal Konev (1st Ukrainian Front) to race each other to see which would wear the title "Conqueror of Berlin," saying "Whoever breaks in first, let him take Berlin."[44] Stalin also continued to play the two marshals off against one another at crucial stages in the operation.[45] Zhukov and Konev themselves appeared to have been far more interested in winning the race to Berlin than in sparing Soviet lives. Around noon on the first day of the operation, for example, Zhukov, by then "in a transport of rage," ordered his six armored corps committed to the attack despite the absence of penetrations in the German defense by his infantry, thereby disregarding the battle plan and adding to the general chaos.[46] "Inadequate knowledge of the German defensive system and inefficient use of artillery and air resources contributed to Zhukov's failure," which proved not only costly in terms of men, machines, and time, but it was quickly

blamed on Zhukov's subordinate commanders.[47] Finally, within an hour of Konev's 20 April signal ordering two of his commanders categorically to enter Berlin, Zhukov ordered 1st Guards Tank Army to enter the outskirts of the city no later than 0400 hours on 21 April "at any cost."[48] Although we cannot be entirely sure, available evidence certainly indicates that literally thousands of Soviet (and German) lives were sacrificed during the Berlin operation for questionable purposes. At best, many lives were expended to push Soviet domination of eastern Europe as far west into Germany as possible; at worst, they were sacrificed to satisfy little more than the ruthless ambitions and vengefulness of Stalin and his military commanders.

There remains one further step necessary to link national values to operational and strategic matters. Besides demonstrating Soviet operational-strategic disregard for the proportionality of ends to means and for the avoidance of excessive casualties, we still need to demonstrate that American commanders would, by and large, be inclined to show more sensitivity to such concerns, even in the face of the terrible pressures of combat.

I turned to certain operational and strategic decisions that were made by Army Air Corps leaders in late 1943 and early 1944 regarding the daylight portion of the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) against Nazi Germany. Throughout this period, the overriding "objective second to none in priority" of the US strategic air forces in Europe was to defeat the German Air Force.[49] While this overriding emphasis on defeating the Luftwaffe initially grew out of the internal logic of (then) Major General Ira C. Eaker's April 1943 CBO Plan, this task gradually took on increased importance as Allied commanders began to contemplate landings in

France (code-named Overlord) and Italy (Anvil). General Henry H. Arnold, head of the Army Air Forces during World War II, told the Commanders of 8th and 15th Air Forces on 27 December 1943,

It is a conceded fact that Overlord and Anvil will not be possible unless the German Air Force is destroyed. Therefore, my personal message to you—this is a MUST—is to, "Destroy the Enemy Air Force wherever you find them, in the air, on the ground, and in the factories."[50]

By the end of 1943, however, there was growing concern as to whether the American strategic air forces would in fact be able to accomplish this mission—especially in time for the Normandy landings in France. In September and October 1943 General Eaker, then Commander of the US 8th Air Force based in England, had mounted a series of large-scale bombing missions against targets deep in Germany to which the Luftwaffe responded in force. The upshot of these raids, which culminated with the second Schweinfurt mission of 14 October 1943, was attrition so high for Germany's fighter forces and the 8th Air Force that both sides approached the point of losing cohesion and effectiveness as combat forces.[51]

In the wake of this tactical defeat of 8th Air Force, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe (USSTAF), consisting of the 8th Air Force in England and 15th Air Force in Italy, was brought into being as the overall headquarters for the American daylight bomber effort against Germany. Along with USSTAF's creation in early January 1944, Generals Carl T. Spaatz and James H. Doolittle were brought in from North Africa to take over USSTAF and the 8th Air Force, respectively, while General Eaker was given the newly created Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.[52]

These changes, in turn, set the stage for what General Doolittle later described as the "most important

decision'' he made during World War II, directing 8th's growing force of deep-escort fighters to take the offensive.[53] Up to that point, 8th Fighter Command's pilots had been constrained to operate in fairly close proximity to 8th's bombers; pursuit of German fighters that left the immediate vicinity or altitude of the bomber stream, particularly all the way back to their home bases, had not been permitted. Soon after assuming command of 8th Air Force in early January 1944, Doolittle began loosening the fighters' ties to the bombers, specifically directing 8th Fighter Command to flush out German fighters "in the air and beat them up on the ground on the way home."[54] As Doolittle subsequently wrote, "The fighter pilots rose to the occasion."[55]

They did not do so, however, without certain incentives. The doctrine of "ultimate pursuit" of enemy fighters initiated within 8th Air Force in January 1944 not only permitted American fighter groups to range freely throughout German airspace to engage German fighters in air-to-air combat, but encouraged the American flyers, fuel permitting, to attack Luftwaffe airfields, German transportation, and other ground targets while returning to base.[56] The rub, of course, was that strafing German airfields, which were veritable flak traps, was a terribly high-risk venture, and the fighter pilots knew it.[57] How then to get them to do it anyway? The Soviet solution, of course, would have been simply to order strafing attacks and shoot any pilot who looked the least reluctant. Eighth Air Force's solution, by contrast, was to begin offering kill credits for German aircraft shot up on the ground, credits that had the same standing as air-to-air kills.[58] It was an ingenuous, thoroughly capitalist solution and, more important, it worked. By March 1944, the German day fighters in western Europe were finding it harder and harder to avoid the growing numbers of Allied escort fighters, much less to deal with the

American bombers. In the air, the Germans' former sanctuary at the lower altitudes was gone; on the ground, their airfields were constantly at risk of unpredictable strafing attacks by marauding swarms of P–47s and P–51s, and they no longer had any leeway for regenerating a cadre of seasoned fighter leaders, or for building up a pilot reserve.[59] Thus, on the day of the Normandy invasion, 6 June 1944, the Allies enjoyed almost total control of the skies over the landing beaches in western France.[60]

There are two points I would draw from this bit of airpower history. The first concerns the operational level of war. Not until January 1944 was 8th Air Force sufficiently recovered from the attrition suffered during the preceding fall to resume deep penetration attacks on Germany in earnest, and poor weather eventually conspired to push the next all-out effort, "Big Week," into the third week of February. However, from the beginning of Big Week through April 1944, the clear objective of American strategic air forces was to defeat the Luftwaffe, and, at the operational level, fighter attacks directly against the German airfields were an important means toward this end. Yet 8th's fighter pilots were not ordered to undertake such attacks on pain of being executed or condemned to penal battalions. True, for the more aggressive and capable fliers—especially those who had begun accumulating victories in air-to-air combat—the lure of air-to-ground kill credits was an offer few could refuse. Nonetheless, individual flight, squadron, and group leaders were relatively free to make their own choices about strafing airfields and other ground targets. Faced with the operational imperative stemming from the pending invasion of France, 8th Air Force was able to find a way to encourage individual fighter pilots to accept extraordinary risks without depriving them of any say in deciding their own fates.

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My second point, more strategic in nature, concerns the proportionality of means to ends in war. The offensive use of escort fighters in air-to-ground strafing was a costly stratagem. In the end, 8th Fighter Command "lost the cream of its pilots" in this role.[61] Still, as a means of ensuring air superiority over the Normandy beaches, the cost was not judged exorbitant or excessive. By January 1945, though, this judgment no longer made sense. Strafing attacks continued to entail high losses, but there was no longer any overarching strategic purpose sufficient to justify the attrition. As a result, impromptu strafing was forbidden within 8th Air Force in early 1945 on the grounds that "the fighter losses were not worth the few targets available."[62] So in decided contrast to the apparent lack of proportionality in the Soviets' conduct of their 16 April through 8 May 1945 Berlin operation, there is straightforward evidence of 8th Air Force commanders taking steps to keep human and material costs in line with the ends being served.

I believe there is good reason to conclude that differing national values have, in actual combat, produced different operational and strategic choices. In this sense, operational art and strategy appear no more value-free or amoral than tactics. As Soviet Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy so perceptively observed over two decades ago,

If someone were to hand an American general, an English general, and Soviet general the same set of objective facts and scientific data, with instructions that these facts and data must be accepted as unimpeachable, and an analysis made and conclusions drawn on the basis of them, it is possible that the American and the Englishman would reach similar conclusions—I don't know. But the Soviet general would arrive at conclusions which would be radically different from the other two. This is because, first of all, he begins from a completely different set of basic premises and preconceived ideas,

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namely the Marxian concepts of the structure of society and the course of history. Second, the logical process in his mind is totally unlike that of his Western counterparts, because he uses Marxist dialectics, whereas they will use some form of deductive reasoning. Third, a different set of moral laws governs and restricts the behavior of the Soviet. Fourth, the Soviet general's aims will be radically different from those of the American and the Englishman.[63]

Questions and Implications

One question obviously remains. Even if, as a matter of empirical fact, American military art is fundamentally different from Soviet military art and even if these differences appear to derive, at least in part, from differing national values, is there any reason to think that the linkage between military art and national values might be a necessary one?

To answer this question, if but speculatively, we need to consider another. What motivates men to confront the terrible dangers, mind-numbing fear, chaos, and emptiness of battle? Why do men, contrary to every instinct of self-preservation, choose to risk mutilation or death to fight rather than flee? Over a century ago, French Colonel Charles J.J.J. Ardant du Picq offered the following answer:

What makes a soldier capable of obedience and direction in action ... includes ... confidence in his comrades and fear of their reproaches and retaliation if he abandons them in danger; his desire to go where others do without trembling more than they.... Self-esteem is unquestionably one of the most powerful motives which moves our men. They do not wish to pass for cowards in the eyes of their comrades.... We are all proud people, but people who would skulk [in battle] if we were not seen, and who consequently must always be seen, and act in the presence of our comrades and the officers who supervise us.[64]

Based on post-combat mass interviews with approximately four hundred infantry companies in the Central Pacific and European theaters during World War II, S.L.A. Marshall echoed Ardant in 1947, saying,

I hold it to be one of the simplest truths of war that the thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapons is the near presence or the presumed presence of a comrade. The warmth which derives from human companionship is as essential to his employment of the arms with which he fights as is the finger with which he pulls a trigger or the eye with which he aligns his sights. The other man may be almost beyond hailing or seeing distance, but he must be somewhere within a man's consciousness or the onset of demoralization is almost immediate and very quickly the mind begins to despair or turns to thoughts of escape.[65]

As recently as 1984, Lieutenant Colonel John F. Guilmartin and Daniel W. Jacobowitz endorsed and expanded upon S.L.A. Marshall's answer, saying,

Cohesion must precede tactics. Primary military groups must exist before they can effectively maneuver or employ weapons; these groups are bound together and kept on the battlefield primarily by shared, internalized moral forces. Soldiers may be motivated by common social values, love of comrades, love of country, or whatever, but only the moral chains of primary group dynamics can bind men together, impelling them to effective action in combat.[66]

Although military technology has advanced dramatically in this century, I am aware of no evidence that refutes Ardant du Picq, Marshall, or Guilmartin and Jacobowitz on the vital role of small unit or primary group cohesion in combat—whether on land, in the air, or at sea. In fact, the growing lethality and precision of late twentieth-century weaponry would seem to argue for just the opposite. The more lethal and deadly weapons become, the more individuals and units must

disperse'to survive. Hence, the more important becomes
primary group cohesion to offset the growing isolation
of the individual.

Primary group cohesion, in turn, is preeminently a
social phenomenon. Cohesion exists when the day-to-
day goals of individual soldiers, sailors, and airmen, of
the small groups with which they identify, and of unit
leaders are congruent, with all giving primary loyalty to
the unit so that the group "trains and fights together
with all members willing to risk death to achieve a com-
mon objective."[67] But if the tactics employed by the
group are at odds with the values of its members, would
these tactics be likely to undermine unit cohesion and,
in the end, combat effectiveness? On the tactical level at
least, it is hard to imagine how fundamental incon-
gruencies between military art and national values could
endure for any length of time under the stresses of
actual combat.

As for the higher levels of military art—operational
art and strategy—here, too, it is most difficult to
envisage how the government of a democracy like the
United States could persist with operations or strategies
fundamentally at odds with the values and convictions
of the majority of the electorate. If the tragic American
involvement in Vietnam has taught us no other lesson, it
has surely taught us this one. By contrast, Soviet
leaders appear, as a practical matter, to be somewhat
less constrained to pay attention to the wishes of the
masses—a situation, once again, that seems reflective
of both Soviet social values and the principles underly-
ing the Soviet state.

Lest any misunderstanding arise, I further point out
that there appear to be value-based constraints that oper-
ate against the Soviets, as well as in their favor.
Reflect, for a moment, on the complex combined-arms

tactics that the Marine Force was increasingly able to execute successfully against the Threat Force during the second half of the ARMVAL field test. The Soviet conscript army of the 1980s at the junior and noncommissioned officer levels is simply not capable of the flexible, innovative leadership and execution needed to fight this way. More important, short of dramatic changes in Soviet society, it seems unlikely that any of us will live to see the Soviet Union produce enough Rommels, Guderians, and Pattons to operate a "smart system" like that preferred by the ARMVAL Marine Force—regardless of how incessantly exhortations to develop greater initiative and activeness appear in Soviet military press journals such as *Military Thought* (Voyennaya Msyl'), *Aviation and Cosmonautics* (Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika), and *Military Herald* (Voyenniy Vesnik). As former German General Hermann Balck, who fought the Soviets in both World Wars, observed in 1980, the combination of excessive control from the top and inflexibility at the lower echelons historically characteristic of the Soviets is unlikely to change "because no army can separate itself from the principles on which it has acted from the very outset."[68]

However, the influence of societal values on a nation's military art cuts both ways. In the United States we value the individual above the *kollyektiv* (collective). As a result, we tend to presume that enough tactical success by those individuals at the point of attack will inevitably add up to operational and strategic victory. Certainly this is the viewpoint implicitly espoused by S.L.A. Marshall in his analysis of American success on the Omaha beachhead during the Normandy invasion:

In the whole of the initial assault landings on the Omaha Beachhead, there were only about five infantry companies which were tactically effective during the greater part of

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June 6, 1944. In these particular companies an average of about one-fifth of the men fired their weapons during the day-long advance from the water's edge to the first tier of villages inland—a total of perhaps not more than 450 men firing consistently with infantry weapons in the decisive companies....

Yet had not this relatively small amount of fire been delivered by these men, the decisive companies would have made no advance in their separate sectors, the beachhead would not have begun to take form, and in all probability Normandy would have been lost. At their backs was the power of the mightiest sea and air forces ever to support an invading army in the history of the world. But in the hour of crisis for these infantry companies, the metal, guns and bombs of these distant supporters were not worth three squads from that small band of men which had gone to work with their grenades and rifles.

These riflemen did not win the victory at Omaha Beach. To say that they did would be giving them too much credit. But without them, there would have been no beachhead and no victory.[69]

The Soviets have a different viewpoint. In sharp contrast to S.L.A. Marshall, they do not think that all hopes for victory rest on the tactical brilliance of a few rifle companies or squadrons of aircraft. According to Marshal N.V. Ogarkov,

during the years of the Great Patriotic War the main form of military operations of our Armed Forces at the operational scale was the front operation....

However, ... especially in its [the war's] second and third periods, to achieve major resources of several fronts, two or more, were required. Accordingly the need arose for the simultaneous conduct of several front operations, combined by a single concept and plan, under the leadership of representatives of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command. Thus, a new form of military operations was born, which differed substantially from the front operation. This was the operation of a group of fronts....

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At present the military capabilities of troops, aircraft and the navy, the long range of their weapons and their maneuverability have sharply increased. The periods to concentrate strike groupings and obtain replenishments of material resources have been reduced, and the conditions and methods of accomplishing operational and strategic missions by large units and formations of the Armed Forces have changed. The military leadership at the highest level has obtained the capability of directly and decisively influencing the course and outcome of war. As a result, the past forms of using large units and formations of armed services have already largely ceased to correspond to modern conditions. In connection with this, it is customary to view as basic no longer the frontal operation or even the operation of a group of fronts, but a more modern, perfected and large-scale form—the operation in a theater of military operations.[70]

The contrast between these divergent views of the ultimate springs of victory in late twentieth-century welfare has numerous implications. Briefly highlighting two, first, the Soviet view of military art is grounded in Soviet society and, hence, is profoundly different from our own. We need, therefore, to take Sun Tzu's ancient dictum to heart and know both ourselves and our potential enemy. But, secondly, it would also seem to follow from the differences between the Soviets' style of war and our own that, should a major conflict erupt between the United States and the Soviet Union, it is vital to force the Soviets "to meet us under battle conditions which correspond to our social strengths."[71] I strongly doubt that anyone could demonstrate conclusively in advance of the event itself that Marshal Ogarkov's view of how a future war in Europe or elsewhere would be won is correct and S.L.A. Marshall's wrong. But I certainly see little wisdom in meeting the Soviets, or any other adversary, on their terms rather than our own.

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Notes

1. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, ed. James Clavell, trans. Lionel Giles (New York: Delacorte Press, 1983), p. 18. This version of *The Art of War* is essentially a reworking of Giles' 1910 translation, page 6.

2. General Bruce Palmer, Jr., *The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam* (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky, 1984), p. vii.

3. Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam: A History* (New York: Viking, 1983), p. 19. General Palmer, who was frequently in a position to know, during the height of American involvement in Southeast Asia, offered some striking confirmation of Karnow's clear implication that we did not even know ourselves during the Vietnam era. Palmer writes in *The 25-Year War*, page 46, "There was one glaring omission in the advice the JCS provided the president and the secretary of defense. It is an obvious omission, but more importantly, a profoundly significant one. Not once during the war did the JCS advise the commander-in-chief or the secretary of defense that the strategy being pursued most probably would fail and that the United States would be unable to achieve its objectives." The reader interested in Palmer's critique of the actual American military strategy pursued in Vietnam after August 1965—an open-ended, Americanized war of attrition conducted inside South Vietnam which conceded the strategic initiative to Hanoi—should see chapter 9 of *The 25-Year War*, especially pages 184–88.

4. Lieutenant Colonel Barry D. Watts, *The Foundations of US Air Doctrine: The Problem of Friction in War* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1984), p. 53.

5. Idem, "Fire, Movement and Tactics," *Topgun Journal*, published by the US Navy, Fighter Weapons School, Winter 1979/80, p. 9.

6. *Voyennyy entsiklopyedichyeskiy slovar* (Moscow: Voyennoye izdatyelstvo, 1983), p. 140; *Military Encyclopedic Dictionary*, vol. 2, trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), JPRS–UMA–85–002–L, 8 January 1985, p. 538. Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, then head of the Soviet General Staff, chaired the main editorial board responsible for this dictionary; see FBIS translation page a.

7. *Military Encyclopedic Dictionary*, vol. 2 (FBIS trans.), p. 538.

8. Interview with Marshal Nikolay Vasil'yevich Ogarkov, "The Defense of Socialism: Experience of History and the Present

Day," *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Red Star), 9 May 1984, First Edition, pp. 2–3; N.V. Ogarkov, *Istoriya uchit bdityelnosti* (History Teaches Vigilance), trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), JPRS–UMA–85–021–L, 30 August 1985, pp. 28–29. According to Christopher N. Donnelly, Director, Soviet Studies Research Centre of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, the Soviets have traditionally believed that the "most important scale of activity on the battlefield is the operational scale and operational art is the most important level of skill to develop" ("The Human Factor in Soviet Military Policy," *Military Review*, March 1985, p. 19). Historical examples frequently cited by Soviet writers of their superior military art above the tactical level include, at the battle of Moscow in 1941, attaining a decisive superiority in men and materiel on the directions of main efforts; at Stalingrad during the winter of 1942–43, encircling and destroying von Paulus' 6th Army; prior to the Battle of Kursk in 1943, deliberately assuming the strategic defensive; and in the summer-fall 1944 Belorussian operation, deceiving the Germans concerning the scale of the Soviet offensive as well as the location of the main effort. These examples are from Marshal S. Akhromeyev in "The Great Victory and the Lessons of History," *Novyy air* (New World), no. 5, May 1985, trans. FBIS, JPRS–UMA–85–041, 16 July 1985, pp. 22–23 and 25. Those interested in a detailed history of Soviet military art may wish to consult B.V. Panov, V.N. Kiselev, I.I. Kartavtsev, et al., *Istoriya voennogo iskusstva* (The History of Military Arts) (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1984), trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, JPRS–UMA–85–009–L, 21 March 1985.

9. Lieutenant General Richard D. Lawrence, letter to Lieutenant Colonel Barry D. Watts, 2 August 1985, p. 1. This letter invited the author to attend a 13–14 August 1985 conference at National Defense University to discuss the university's proposed new course on joint operational art. Within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the US military is by no means alone in having neglected operational art. In the case of England, for example, Christopher Donnelly stated categorically that this concept simply "does not exist in the British military tradition which recognizes only tactics and strategy" in *Military Review*, March 1985, p. 19.

10. US, War Department, *Command and Employment of Air Power*, FM 100–20 (Washington, DC: War Department, 21 July 1943), pp. 8–12; *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force*, AFM 1–1 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Air Force, 5 January 1984), p. 2–11.

11. Colonel Timothy E. Kline, memorandum, ''Proposed Review of [the 27 November 1985 Draft of] AFM 1–1,'' Headquarters Air Force, Doctrine and Concepts Division (AFXDXID), memorandum dated 27 November 1985, p. 1. This cover letter accompanied the proposed draft of AFM 1–1 when it was sent to the major commands for comment in November 1985.

12. Marshal Pavel A. Rotmistrov, ''On Modern Soviet Military Art and Its Characteristic Features,'' *The Soviet Art of War*, eds. Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), p. 140.

13. August 1985 letter to Lieutenant Colonel Watts, p. 2.

14. Carl Sagan, ''Star Wars: The Leaky Shield,'' *Parade* Magazine, 8 December 1985, p. 13.

15. Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, ''Misconceptions about Russia are a Threat to America,'' trans. Alexis Klimoff and Michael Nicholson, *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1980, p. 797.

16. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 111–12.

17. Rawls, p. 112.

18. Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror: Stalin's Purges of the Thirties*, rev. ed. (New York: Collier Books 1973), p. 696. The estimated number of deaths in the purges of 1929–1938 usually accepted in the West is eight million souls; see Conquest, page 713, and Donnelly in *Military Review*, March 1985, page 14.

19. Conquest, p. 693.

20. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence S. Eagleburger, letter to Senator William L. Armstrong, 9 February 1983, p. 1. This letter transmitted to Congress a 1983 State Department report on forced labor in the USSR. A *Washington Times* article discussing this report featured a map showing psychiatric prisons, extermination camps, and women's and children's camps throughout the USSR; see Bill Gertz, ''Labor camps thrive despite Soviet rhetoric, experts say,'' *Washington Times*, 22 November 1985, p. 6. The number of individuals involved, however, is not known with much precision in the West. As of 1983 the State Department estimated the ''total Soviet penal population to be around 4 million—around 2 million incarcerated in labor camps, and another 2 million in the status of unconfined forced laborers''; see ''Report on Legal Issues Relating to Forced Labor in the Soviet Union,'' United States Department of State, p. 2. The total number of persons convicted for political or religious offenses was even more uncertain; the figure of ''at least 10,000'' cited in the State

Department report was simply the "low-end" estimate agreed upon by Amnesty International and two other studies, and other estimates ranged much higher.

21. Viktor Suvorov, *Inside the Soviet Army*, with a foreword by General Sir John Hackett (New York: Macmillan, 1982), pp. vii and viii.

22. Ibid., p. 170.

23. Ibid., p. 172. During World War II, Soviet penal battalions "were given exceptionally dangerous tasks in battle. In winter, they alone wore no white camouflage to attract the enemy's fire. They were often sent off to attack across minefields and clear them for subsequent waves of troops"; see Donnelly in *Military Review*, March 1985, p. 17.

24. Suvorov, p. 170.

25. US, Department of the Army, *Russian Combat Methods in World War II*, Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20–230 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1 November 1950), p. 4. The preface to this document states that it was prepared by a committee of former German officers at the EUCOM Historical Division Interrogation Enclosure, Neustadt, Germany, in late 1947 and early 1948 (page iii). All of the individuals involved had extensive experience on the Eastern Front during World War II. The principal author, for example, commanded in succession a panzer division, a corps, a panzer army, and an army group.

26. Ibid., p. 42.

27. Ibid., p. 60.

28. Ibid., p. 73.

29. Major General F.W. von Mellenthin, *Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War*, trans. H. Betzler, ed. L.C.F. Turner (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), pp. 296–7. From 1 November 1942 through 14 August 1944, von Mellenthin served on the Russian front as 48th Panzer Corps chief of staff; from 15 August to 14 September 1944 he was chief of staff of the 4th Panzer Army, which, by this stage of the war, was fighting to hold the Russians along the Vistula River; see pages 287–91 and 367.

30. Christopher N. Donnelly, "The Human Factor in Soviet Military Policy," *Military Review* 65 (March 1985): p. 18.

31. Ibid., p. 16. Donnelly's thesis in the cited article is that national characteristics, "however overgeneralized or inapplicable they may seem when applied to individuals ... can be proven to have a general historical validity"—particularly with respect to the

reaction of a nation's military forces to the stresses of battle; see page 13. In the case of the Russians, Donnelly argues that a key social determinant of the Soviet style of war has been the widespread acceptance of a strict autocratic form of government. Indeed, given the geographical and political constraints of the USSR, a strict autocracy "has proven—in Russian eyes at least—to be the only effective form of government over the centuries. Not only have the Soviets, therefore, in absence of a viable alternative learned to accept rule by force; they have come to expect it and even, after a fashion, to respect it"; see page 16.

32. Donnelly, p. 17. It is worth noting that even in the darkest hours of Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, Stalin took steps to impose fierce new disciplinary bonds on the Red Army. "In his order of 20 July [1941], Stalin commanded that all units 'should be purged of unreliable elements,' and that officers and men coming out of German encirclement should be rigorously investigated by the NKVD 'Special Sections' ... to root out 'German spies.' The 'Special Sections' provided the NKVD with detailed information on morale and combat performance within Red Army units and formations; in addition, NKVD troops formed 'holding detachments,' *zagraditelnye otryadyi*, whose function was to keep Red Army troops in line. The 'Special Sections' attached to General Lukin's army near Smolensk provided their chief, Colonel Korolev, with some grim reading: drunkenness, panic, incompetence, self-inflicted wounds. On 25 July, NKVD troops rounded up 1,000 'deserters': before the assembled regiment, seven men were shot and five more without trial—three deserters, two 'traitors to the Fatherland'—and then a further twenty-three (deserters, self-mutilators, deserters to the Germans) were shot by orders of the military tribunal. "Panic-mongering,' 'desertion,' 'abandoning weapons and battle-stations' (which often meant merely getting lost) cost many more their lives"; see John Erickson, *The Road to Stalingrad* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), page 176.

33. US, Department of the Air Force, Captain Earl H. Tilford, Jr., *Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia, 1961–1975* (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1980), p. 96.

34. Colonel Robert H. Thompson, "Lessons Learned from ARMVAL," *Marine Corps Gazette*, July 1983, p. 36. Colonel Thompson, a Marine, was the joint test director for ARMVAL (Antiarmor Vehicle Evaluation) field experiments.

35. Ibid., p. 39.

36. Michael Green, "Red Armor in the California Desert," *Armada International*, January-February 1983, p. 58.

37. "Soviets in war games easily beat US troops," *Chicago Tribune*, 22 June 1983. The US Army's assessment of mock combat training between regular US units and the fictitious "32nd Guards MRR" at Fort Irwin from October 1980 to November 1982 was obtained under a Freedom of Information Act request and published in the *San Bernardino Sun* on 21 June 1983.

38. Thompson, p. 40.

39. Ibid., pp. 40–41.

40. Rawls, p. 3. I cite Rawls here less as a philosophically impeccable alternative to utilitarianism than as a clear expression of the American ideal of justice as fairness.

41. John Erickson, *The Road to Berlin* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), p. 622.

42. Vincent J. Esposito, ed., *A Concise History of World War II* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 400.

43. Erickson, *The Road to Berlin*, pp. 540–41.

44. Ibid., p. 533. At the 1 April 1945 conference surveying the Soviet-German front, Allied operations and Allied intentions, Stalin opened the meeting with the question, "Well, now, who is going to take Berlin, will we or the Allies?"; see also page 531.

45. Ibid., pp. 566–67 and 570. In addition to official narratives and Soviet memoir material, Erickson's account of the storming of Berlin by the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts drew "extensively for detail from interviews with Marshal Sokolovskii, Marshal Chuikov, Marshal Konev, Marshal Rokossovskii, General Yushchuk (11th Tank Corps), Colonel K.Ya. Samsonov (in 1945 Senior Lieutenant, Commander 1st Battalion, 380th Rifle Regiment/171st Rifle Division, Reichstag fighting with ﹨ ﹍ttalions under Neustroyev and Davydov from 150th Rifle Division), also numerous eye-witness' accounts"; see Erickson, page 774.

46. Ibid., pp. 565–66.

47. Ibid., p. 571.

48. Ibid., p. 578.

49. Alfred B. Ferguson, "POINTBLANK," *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, ed. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, vol. 2, *Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK, August 1942 to December 1943* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1949), p. 666.

50. Robert F. Futrell, *Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907–1964* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1971), p. 78.

51. Williamson Murray, *Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933–1945* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1983), p. 226.

52. Ibid., p. 237.

53. James H. Doolittle with Beirne Lay, Jr., "Daylight Precision Bombing," *IMPACT: The Army Air Force's Confidential Picture History of World War II* (Harrisburg, PA: Historical Times, 1982), book 6, p. xv.

54. Ibid., p. xv.

55. Ibid., p. xv.

56. William E. Kepner, *Eighth Air Force Tactical Development: August 1942–May 1945* (England: Eighth Air Force and Army Air Forces Evaluation Board, July 1945), p. 56.

57. According to those who were there, strafing German airfields in 1944 was a risky business, if not "the most dangerous of all combat missions"; see Martin Bledsoe, *Thunderbolt: Memoirs of a World War II Fighter Pilot* (New York: Van Nostrand-Reinholt, 1982), page 102.

58. Roger A. Freeman, *The Mighty Eighth: Units, Men, and Machines (A History of the US 8th Army Air Force)* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1970), p. 121; Roger A. Freeman with Alan Crouchman and Vic Maslen, *Mighty Eighth War Diary* (London: Jane's, 1981), p. 259.

59. Watts, *The Foundations of US Air Doctrine*, p. 81.

60. The Luftwaffe flew only 319 sorties on 6 June 1944 and lost many aircraft; the Allies flew 12,015, of which not one was interrupted by enemy air action; see John Keegan, *Six Armies in Normandy: From D-Day to the Liberation of Paris* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1983), page 143.

61. John T. Godfrey, *The Look of Eagles* (New York: Random House, 1958), p. 113.

62. Kepner, p. 56.

63. Oleg Penkovskiy, *The Penkovskiy Papers* trans. Peter Deriabin (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), pp. 252–53.

64. Major Mitchell M. Zais, "Ardant du Picq: Unsung Giant of Military Theory," *Army*, April 1985, p. 60.

65. S.L.A. Marshall, *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War* (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1978 reprint of 1947 edition), p. 42.

66. John F. Guilmartin, Jr., and Daniel W. Jacobowitz, "Technology, Primary Group Cohesion, and Tactics as Determinants in Weapons System Design: A Historical Analysis of the Interactive Process," paper, 19 June 1984, pp. 6–7.

67. Colonel William Darryl Henderson, *Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 4.

68. BDM Corporation, "Generals Balck and Von Mellenthin on Tactics: Implications for NATO Military Doctrine," report BDM/W–81–077–TR, 19 December 1980, McLean, VA, p. 12. Von Mellenthin added to General Balck's terse comment regarding Soviet battlefield inflexibility, "Believe us, they are masses and we are individuals. That is the difference between the Russian soldier and the European soldier."

69. Marshall, pp. 68–9.

70. Ogarkov, JPRS–UMA–85–021–L, pp. 29–30.

71. Guilmartin and Jacobowitz, p. 69.

Domestic Law
And Terrorism

JAKE R. HENSMAN

THE TIMES OF LONDON
reported on 15 December 1984 that the first British sol-
dier to be convicted of murder while performing in the
line of duty was sentenced to life imprisonment by a
Northern Ireland judge. The dead man, the *Times*
reported, was drunk, abusive, and participating in a
riot.

A corporal had shouted, "Get that man." Private
Thain, who had been in the Army for only seven
months, shouted, "Stop, Army, or I fire!" three times,
as required by his Rules of Engagement, and shot Mr.
Reilly through the heart. The judge, in his summing up,
used the fact that Private Thain had called "Stop,
Army, or I fire" three times as proof of the cool and
calculated nature of his actions. "Politicians will
argue," wrote the *Times* correspondent, "that soldiers
have quite enough on their minds on the streets of
Northern Ireland, without wondering whether their
actions will result in heavy civil convictions."

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For the most part, the Laws of War do not apply to terrorism nor terrorism counteraction. What is so difficult for the soldier or policeman involved in stopping or defeating the terrorist is that he remains subject to the provisions and constraints of the civil law, not the Laws of Armed Conflict, not martial law, but *civil* law. Although I speak of the constraint of civil law, I am not against it. Indeed, I believe that obedience of the civil law is fundamental for the defeat of terrorism. For twenty-five years I have been participating in, learning about, and teaching counterrevolutionary warfare, which of course encompasses terrorism, one of the rev- olutionary's tactics.

One of the most important principles of counter- revolutionary warfare is Minimum Force. This principle stems from three necessities: (a) The major aim of coun- terrevolutionary warfare is to win the hearts and minds of the population, before the revolutionary does. You do not do this by killing indiscriminately and getting yourself the reputation of a butcher. (b) Another essen- tial aim of counterrevolutionary warfare is to restore law and order. You do not do this by breaking and abusing the very law that you are trying to restore. (c) Also directing the principle of minimum force is the ubiq- uitous nature of the media. Use of an excessive amount of force to resolve a situation will almost inevitably be within "eye-shot" or "ear-shot" of the media. Not only will you gain an evil reputation, you will give the terrorist a piece of gratuitous propaganda. So, I favor obedience to the civil law by security forces, for altruis- tic or even ethical reasons but, first, out of purely prag- matic necessity.

The soldier in a counterterrorist situation operates under severe difficulties or constraints. For example, picture an IRA ambush in Lenadoon Avenue, Belfast.

The Army patrol has come under fire from a gunman in a large apartment block. One soldier has already been killed, and automatic fire from the gunman is raking the street where the soldiers are. The company commander gives his orders, "If you can positively identify a man with a weapon, you may engage him. You may *not* fire just because you *think* you see a man with a weapon." The soldiers stare at the concrete and glass building two hundred yards ahead of them. A drape moves significantly. Is that the gunman? Or is a child or an old lady overcome with curiosity and wanting to see what is going on? Or perhaps just the wind? No, the soldiers cannot definitely identify a man with a weapon, so they cannot shoot. If they do, and they are wrong, they might find themselves with a life prison sentence like Private Thain. They do not shoot back.

In proper war the soldiers would be able to lay down covering fire, to keep the gunman's head low, while they maneuvered round to the back of the building to cut him off, but they cannot fire "indiscriminately," and they are not permitted to use automatic fire. The IRA do not have the same constraints. The law and fear of the law's retribution have stopped the soldiers from committing a criminal act; the law has also considerably reduced their chances of catching or killing the terrorist.

Suppose that in a hostage rescue situation, negotiation has failed, and a hostage rescue team is deployed to storm the building. Once the terrorist citadel has been breached, the rescue team is entering "the scene of the crime." Immediately there is a conflict of interest between them, conventional police procedures, and the law. In order to preserve the continuity of evidence, and sometimes to ensure securing a conviction, the law requires the scene of the crime to remain isolated and

frozen. The hostage rescue team cannot do this. Bodies must be turned over and checked; weapons must be moved away from bodies. Sometimes suspects must be questioned on the spot. The team may have to move on to clear another area; here, their weapons may be fired again. Gas or smoke will undoubtedly obscure the view of witnesses; fire may burn evidence. The difficulties of investigators matching up bullets with weapons, and shooters with those shot, will be considerable. The rescue team, in addition to resolving problems of preserving the lives of the hostages, must also strive to preserve evidence and even the lives of the terrorists. the "room entry man" is still subject to the civil law and can still be convicted of murder if he shoots a terrorist unnecessarily.

The well-known relationship that develops between terrorist and hostage (the Stockholm syndrome) puts the rescuer in even more danger from prosecution, because of accusations from the rescued.

The soldier or policeman must guard his actions carefully if he is to avoid subsequent civil conviction. Once the rescue has been completed, the movement of hostages and prisoners out of the building may still provide a minefield for accusations of ill treatment or assault. Until all terrorists are identified, every person in the building must be treated as a potential threat.

The increase in subconventional conflicts means that we are subjecting our soldiers more and more to situations where they are outside the protection of the Laws of War. Civil law, although it must be upheld, not only constrains the soldier in his struggle against terrorism, it also lays him open to legal action if heat, anger, instinct or fear should lead him into error. But, Winston Churchill said, this is the nature of our organization:

Civilization means a society based upon the opinion of civilians. It means that violence, the rule of warriors and despotic chiefs, the conditions of camps and warfare, of riot and tyranny, give place to parliaments where laws are made, and independent courts of justice, in which over long periods of time, these laws are maintained.

Strategy and Tactics: The Marxist-Leninist View

JOHN B. CHOMEAU

ANY DISCUSSION OF THE
Marxist-Leninist principles of warfare is necessarily
predicated on the determinist view of history and the
social nature of class struggle. The Hegelian dialectic
provides both a scientific interpretation of history and a
specific knowledge of the outcome of conflict between
competing social systems. A tenet for the Soviet strate-
gist is an eventual war between the progressive (and
good) forces of socialism and the repressive forces of
imperialism. This will lead to the eventual downfall of
imperialism. The victory of socialism is the final step in
the dialectic progression toward communism. To attain
this end, the role of the Soviet military is to be prepared
to conduct a war of global dimensions. This war proba-
bly will be initiated by the imperialists in a last ditch
effort to preserve their socio-economic system. The pro-
gressive forces of socialism will win (and it is the job of
the Soviet military to make sure that this is the case).
This will be a battle to the finish. There will be no
negotiated settlements. From this derives a war-winning
strategy. The socialist side may lose a few rounds, may

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have to give up large segments of territory initially, but they will eventually annihilate all vestiges of imperialism.

There are factors other than Marxist-Leninist ideology also shaping Soviet military doctrine. Probably the most of important of these is defending "Mother Russia." This has been the rallying cry of the Russian people whenever they are invaded. From a long history of invasion derives another important factor—the Russian paranoia deriving from Napoleon, Port Arthur, and Barbarossa (all of which were surprise attacks).

There is also a Clausewitz-like perception of a need for rimlands to provide a security buffer against imperialist powers antagonistic to the Soviet State. The Soviets need to surround themselves with friendly states to protect Mother Russia, and when they perceive a threat to their periphery as they did in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan, the Soviet military acts to perpetuate the security belt. The intervention of French, British, and American troops to support the counterrevolution in Russia in 1920 is a fresh memory in the Soviet Union.

The Nature of Soviet War

Lenin said that in the study of warfare, it is most important to focus on the historical and socio-economic conditions that cause it. The general essence of warfare derives from a philosophical analysis of the nature of violence in history, especially, its socio-economic foundations. From this perspective derives an interesting theory of just and unjust wars based upon the causes of the war, the aims of the war, and the classes that are waging it.

Soviet strategists write extensively on the nature of war, and the following categories are a summation of several strategists' views. The first category is a war between competing social systems. The conflict between the forces of imperialism and the forces of socialism. This is the Soviet "Case One" scenario. The next category of war is between an oppressed nation and an oppressing nation. These are the wars of national liberation and, particularly, the wars in which a friendly Socialist state has resorted to force to free itself from the oppression of imperialism. These wars are legitimate from the standpoint of the oppressed party and unjust for the oppressor (regardless of whether it is an offensive or defensive war in a military sense). The third category is a war between two oppressing nations. For example, England fights Germany. This is a plunder for both sides, and the Socialists would say, "Two thieves are fighting with each other; let them slug it out." A fourth category is a conflict between two equal systems (usually in the context of a war between two nations in the Third World, but historically this includes most wars of the nineteenth century—or until the advent of Socialist states). These wars are quite complex in nature, and it is best to judge their validity on a case-by-case basis rather than as a whole.

An important corollary to the second category of war between an oppressed nation and an oppressing nation is that although civil wars against the bourgeoisie are just and contrasting wars waged by the bourgeoisie against the revolutionaries are unjust, this does not necessarily mean that violent revolution is to be carried out everywhere and at all times. There is an appropriate time and place for the resort to arms, and if the objective can be reached through peaceful means, then this is the instrument of choice.

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From these descriptions of the types of war derive modern Soviet views of strategy and tactics. In many ways, the Soviets have a more coherent and comprehensive approach to the study of warfare than we do in the West. A word of warning, however. They use many of the same terms as we do in the West, but in an entirely different context. An example is the word "peace." For us, peace is the absence of armed conflict, whereas for the Marxist-Leninist, it is that status that obtains when all vestiges of imperialism have been eradicated. In other words, the Socialists are constantly in a state of conflict—only the means change.

Soviet military doctrine starts with a philosophical analysis of the essence and content of armed conflict. These are the official views of the Soviet state on the nature of war, the likely opponents in a war, the structure required of Soviet Armed Forces, the coordinated use of these forces in combat, and the preparation of the country for war. Military doctrine is based on the principles of *Soviet military science* and, in turn, provides guidance for military science research.

Military science is the study of the laws and nature of armed conflict and military preparations by the country and the armed services for war. Its most important component is *military art*, which focuses on how a war is to be fought. Military science is divided into four broad areas of study—the military-political, military-theoretical, military-technical, and military-historical fields. Military art has three principal components—strategy, the planning and conduct of war as a whole, the training of the armed forces, and the support of combat operations; operational art, the planning and conduct of operations by large forces; and tactics, the preparation and conduct of a battle.

Ideology Versus Praxis

There are many dilemmas inherent in such a tight theoretical military science based upon an ideology that has been dogmatized. The struggle of competing social systems and the class nature of all conflict dictate to the Soviet strategist the types of war that are to be under-taken, as well as those which are to be avoided. Marxism-Leninism, which permeates Soviet military thinking from the level of military science and doctrine all the way down to tactics, not only provides clear guidance for a general theory of war but also places severe restraints on opportunities to seize a military initiative.

One of the quandaries of the Soviet military strategist is the doctrine that a war between the forces of imperialism and socialism is inevitable and that the number one task of the Soviet military is to be prepared to win this war. At the same time that Soviet military leaders are preparing for this war, which they are certain will be initiated by the imperialists, they also realize that a nuclear conflict would be more destructive than any war in history. So they face at the same time the necessity of avoiding nuclear war and being prepared to win an all-out war if they are attacked. They are also quite concerned that a small conventional military confrontation might escalate into a global nuclear war.

Another problem faced by Soviet strategists is the use of force and violence to bring about revolutions. This has raised dissension within the world Communist movement since the Bolsheviks broke with Mensheviks prior to the Russian revolution. The current Soviet view is to avoid any direct involvement by Soviet military forces but to provide economic and military assistance to friendly revolutionary regimes. A more recent development has been the use of proxy military forces,

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such as the Cubans in Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua, in support of Soviet goals. In a few cases, such as Cuba, Egypt, and Syria, where Soviet combat units have been deployed, Moscow has been very careful to keep a low profile and to avoid any risk of conflict with NATO forces.

Moscow's support for insurgencies has likewise been through indirect channels. There have been Soviet advisors and Soviet military assistance but no direct involvement of Soviet forces. This has largely been the case as well with Moscow's support of international terrorism. The Soviets provide military training and equipment but maintain a safe distance from actual terrorist operations. For this apparent lack of commitment to the revolutionary movements in nations struggling for their independence or against the economic and political vestiges of former colonial or imperialist ties, the Soviets have been criticized by some of their colleagues in the international Communist movement.

Present Soviet doctrine favors the traditional approach of defending ''Mother Russia'' and preserving the gains of the revolution instead of undertaking military adventures in support of revolutionary movements. This doctrine was first formulated by Lenin and dogmatized by Stalin in his ''Socialism in One Country.'' This does not mean that Moscow is reluctant to provide support to such movements, only that Soviet leaders are reluctant to get their own troops involved in a conflict which might escalate to a superpower confrontation. There is little brinksmanship in Soviet military doctrine, nor a clear component in their strategy calling for distant intervention against determined opposition. Military operations on the periphery of the Soviet Union are a different matter—but judging from combat experience

in Afghanistan, the Soviets may be undertaking a reappraisal of these distant operations.

Soviet strategists have had quite a problem trying to reconcile an insurgency against the progressive forces of socialism with the tenets of Marxism-Leninism on the nature of national liberation movements and local wars. The rebels in Afghanistan have turned the tables on Soviet doctrine, so to speak, and for the first time Moscow is attempting to use conventional Soviet military forces and their traditional doctrine of employment in an effort to control an insurgency that shouldn't even be happening. The Soviets have taken a few pages from the West on how to conduct counterinsurgency operations but still are not making any major adjustments to in their mode of force employment. If any lesson has been learned from Afghanistan, it is a reluctance on the part of the Soviet military to commit troops in similar operations far from Soviet shores. The turn of events in the Third World may, however, dictate otherwise. If so, the conflict between Marxist dogma and operational necessity may again force a reappraisal of military doctrine.

The Soviets are opportunistic in their support of revolutionary movements and in fomenting insurrection and resistance to anti-Socialist or capitalist regimes, but frequently conditions in the Third World are such that they can't use their own conventional military forces in support of their political and economic goals. In the past the Soviets have either used proxy forces or relied on military aid without a commitment of regular Soviet forces. In Soviet doctrine this is all part of a whole, with a resort to armed forces the last step in an ongoing conflict with the forces of imperialism that includes political, economic, propaganda, and subversive means as well.

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There is, thus, an ideological basis for defining just and unjust conflicts and setting a justification, if not a need, for Soviet military intervention. Reflecting upon whether the Soviets would ascribe to traditional Western theories of Just War as developed by Grotius and others, I am of the opinion that Moscow would be guided by a combination of ideology and opportunism and that factors such as avoiding collateral damage to non-combatants would have little significance in their war plans. Moreover, Marxism-Leninism drives the Soviets to maintain what has already been won, for there can be no reversals in the inevitable movement toward world-wide socialism and eventually to communism. This is the Brezhnev Doctrine. Revolutionary movements derive their legitimacy from the class and social nature of their struggle for independence, so the Soviet military must stand ready to defend friendly Socialist regimes, to support with equipment and training those regimes which are on the threshold of socialism and to oppose the forces of imperialism. In these endeavors the Soviets are not necessarily in a zero-sum game. The final victory is presumed theirs, so they can afford to take a few losses or temporary reverses along the way. The supreme test of Soviet military dogma would be their response to a counterrevolution in a distant Socialist country such as Cuba. Marxism-Leninism can't permit such a reversal of the world order, but Soviet military forces don't have the capability to sustain an intervention so far from Soviet shores.

Notes

This analysis is drawn exclusively from unclassified Soviet military journals. There is a tendency here in the West to ascribe to the Soviets our strategies and theory of conflict; Soviet writers are quite

clear on the point that they have their own goals and national strat-
egy and therefore a unique military science.

Key terms and Soviet definitions follow, taken from the *Slovar'
Osnovnykh Voennykh Terminov* (Dictionary of Basic Military
Terms), Moscow, 1965, translated by the Translation Bureau, Secre-
tary of State Department, Ottawa, Canada, and published under the
auspices of the US Air Force.

MILITARY ART. The theory and practice of engaging in combat,
operations, and armed conflict as a whole, with the use of all
resources of the service branches and Services of the armed
forces, and also support of combat activities in every regard.
Military art, as a scientific theory, is the main field of military
science, and includes tactics, operational art, and strategy,
which constitute an organic unity and are interdependent.

MILITARY SCIENCE. A system of knowledge concerning the nature,
essence, and content of armed conflict, and concerning the
manpower, facilities, and methods for conducting combat oper-
ations by means of armed forces and their comprehensive sup-
port.

Military science investigates the objective laws governing
armed conflict, and elaborates questions pertaining to the theory
of military art, which is the basic component of military sci-
ence, as well as questions pertaining to the organization training
and supply of armed forces, and also deals with military histor-
ical experience.

Soviet military science is based on Marxist-Leninist teachings
and is guided by the method of materialistic dialectics and his-
torical materialism, taking into account and using the achieve-
ments of those other sciences which tend to promote continual
development and progress in the military sphere.

MILITARY STRATEGY. The highest level in the field of military art,
constituting a system of scientific knowledge concerning the
phenomena and laws of armed conflict.

On the basis of the tenets of military doctrine, the experience of
past wars, and analysis of the political, economic and military
conditions of the current situation, military strategy investigates
and elaborates on problems pertaining to the training of the
armed forces as a whole and the individual Services and their
strategic use in war, the forms and methods of conducting and

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directing war, and also problems pertaining to comprehensive strategic support to the combat operations of the armed forces.

At the same time, military strategy is a field of practical activity for higher military command in training the armed forces for war and providing leadership in armed conflict. Military strategy exerts an influence on the preparation of a country for war in such a way as to ensure victory.

MILITARY TACTICS. A special field in the theory and practice of military art which studies the objective laws of combat and develops methods of preparing for combat and conducting it, on land, at sea, and in the air. Military tactics occupies a subordinate position with respect to operational art and strategy, acting in their interests, and serving to achieve the goals set for it by the operational art. Each Service and each branch, by virtue of its intrinsic peculiarities, has its own theory and practice for the organization and conduct of combat and, consequently, its own tactics too, which are called Service tactics or branch (arms) tactics.

OPERATIONAL ART. A component part of military art, dealing with the theory and practice of preparing for and conducting combined and independent operations by major field forces or major formations of the Services. Operational art is the connecting link between strategy and tactics. Stemming from strategic requirements, operational art determines methods of preparing for and conducting operations to achieve strategic goals, and it gives the initial data for tactics, which organize preparation for and waging combat in accordance with the goals and missions of operations. Besides the general theory of operational art, each Service has its own operational art.

STRATEGIC GOAL. A goal of the hostilities, the attainment of which results in a radical change in the military, political, and strategic situation during a war as a whole, or in a theater of hostilities.

Strategic goals may be assigned to the armed forces of a country or to individual Services. They are achieved in the course of hostilities, in the first nuclear strike delivered by strategic means, or during some period of the war, or during a strategic offensive operation in a theater of operations (a strategic offensive in a theater of operations).

Depending on their nature and on the time they are achieved in
the course of hostilities, strategic goals may be intermediate or
final. On the way to attainment of a strategic goal, the armed
forces fulfill, simultaneously or successively, a number of mis-
sions of strategic character and importance.

Moral Bases—
Theirs and Ours

JAKE R. HENSMAN

LIKE EVERYTHING ELSE IN life, morals and ethics are not as black and white nor as clear-cut as we would like. At the extremes of good and bad it is normally easy to see where our moral duty lies. Here, it is almost instinct that tells us what is right and what is wrong—right gives us joy; wrong is naturally abhorrent to us. In between, of course, are the grey areas where right and wrong, good and evil are apt to merge into a morass of difficult decisions, an area where a choice is seldom between good and evil, but between the lesser of two apparent evils.

Wars, like morals, are seldom clear-cut. Of course there are extremes, like unprovoked aggression by a powerful nation against a weaker neighbor, but these days world events seem to be characterized by a growing "intestinal" grey area between war and peace—revolution, insurgency, rebellion, revolt, coup d'etat, guerrilla war, and terrorism. As a Royal Marine, I regard the Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Islands as being an unequivocal act of war. In my mind, it

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offended mightily the United Nations charter of self-determination for its members, and the invasion was wrong. Such clear-cut circumstances are becoming increasingly rare, and more often we are faced with dilemmas as in Vietnam, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and Nicaragua, where large minorities or even majorities consider their existing regime to be evil and try to overthrow them.

Abraham Lincoln, in his 1861 inaugural address, said, "This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it. Whenever they shall grow weary of the existing government, they may exercise their constitutional right of amending it, or their *revolutionary right to dismantle or overthrow it.*" Lincoln calls it "a right" to revolt against a government. So the picture becomes muddy, unclear as to whether events are disturbances or insurrections or insurgencies, whether they are terrorism or wars of national liberation or whether they are wars at all. The rights and wrongs of each event depend, like beauty and ugliness, upon the eye of the beholder.

To complicate matters further, when we look into this morass of world conflict, we see that different ideologies or religions teach different motives and different constraints; this is nowhere more evident than in the twilight world between war and peace. In these grey areas of ethics, somewhere in the middle between war and peace, between right and wrong where moral instinct does not naturally guide decisions, there is an increased need for a firm foundation on which to build a code of behavior, and the clear guidelines on which these decisions may be made. Without such foundation both personal and national action is liable to be inconsistent at best, nonexistent or totally misguided at worst.

In today's confused arena, have Western nations rejected or debased the ethical foundation of their Judeo-Christian tradition? Without making a catalogue of examples of Western misdeeds and our systematic "fall from grace" over the past decades, I do believe that a vacuum exists in the Western world. The effects of Islam and Marxism on the actions of their adherents make me believe that the Judeo-Christian ethic has been debased.

The Christian Ethic

Oh, for the days when soldiers would charge into battle for God, the King, England, and Saint George. Although the King and England were fine and much loved, it was the patron saint and God who gave such a certainty and feeling of righteousness to their soldiers' endeavours. This feeling of certainty and righteousness is surely what we would hope and want to give to our soldiers when they do battle.

General Clay Buckingham contends, "Whether we like it or not, ethical reflection has seldom been carried out in isolation from theology. Ethical values generally reflect our views of human life as it is embodied in the teachings of the prevailing religion, because all human conduct, essentially, takes places in relationship to other human beings."[1] Buckingham explains, if we believe that human life has equal and infinite value, then our concept of right and wrong will reflect this conviction. If on the other hand, we believe that human life has limited value, then our concept of right or wrong conduct will reflect that conviction.

Those yeoman archers of England at the Battle of Agincourt in 1415 knew that they could not separate their cause and their actions from their belief in God. Today, our Western values are still founded on the

baseline of Old Testament laws, updated and amended by the teachings of Jesus (the New Covenant). My concern here is simply that this Christian base has become so eroded in our time as to no longer give clear and unequivocal guidance on the ethical and moral behavior of our peoples.

Two incidents disturbed me greatly while I lived in the United States. The first concerned the argument of whether school children should officially start their day with a prayer, and the other concerned the matter of whether shops should be allowed to play Christmas carols at Christmastime. The point in question for both arguments was, "Is it inappropriate or insulting to other religions to do so?" Perhaps these are not earth shattering events, but nevertheless they are indicative of the dilemma of free religious choice, and also of the religious vacuum that we are wont to create for ourselves. When I look at a quarter, I see In God We Trust. What God are we talking about these days?

Even our language has debased our Christian foundations. The word love—think how that word has been polluted and corrupted, so that we may hardly dare use it. We speak of *liberalizing* abortion laws, which means facilitating more abortion—using a fine and honorable word to describe an act totally against our Christian beliefs. We talk of *reforming* our marriage laws, when we really mean creating more facilities to break up marriage and even further abuse of its Christian sanctity.

In both your country and mine we have made a conscious point of separating church and state. In other religions and ideologies, the secular and the religious (or ideological) are inseparable. John Whitehead, scholar historian, points to a heated argument as to whether America was ever a Christian nation. The nub of such an argument is that the Constitution does not

mention Christianity. The counterargument is simple:
There is no mention of Christianity because it never
crossed the framers' minds that there could ever be any
doubt that the country was founded by and on deep
Christian conviction. But even the fact that such argu-
ment exists points, I think, to this debasement or disap-
pearance of the traditional base for ethical and moral
decisionmaking. With this in mind, consider the moral
baselines underscoring the behavior of our two greatest
potential enemies, the Soviet Bloc and the Arab world.
I refer, of course, to the adherence to the precepts of
Marxism-Leninism and the somewhat lesser threat from
certain tenets of the Islamic faith.

Islam

"Western civilization and its heritage, for which Europe
and America fear so much, live only on the debris of
the East and would not flourish if they had not sucked
its blood. That is the astonishing truth." This rather
intemperate statement was made not by an extreme mili-
tant shiite, as you might expect, but by that paragon of
moderation, Anwar Sadat, in 1957. But what might one
expect? There is no point in examining the present with-
out first looking at the past and taking into account the
Arabs' perception of their own history.

History, like religion, is a fundamental cornerstone
of Arab life; the two are inextricably intertwined.
Mohammed, born sometime between A.D. 570 and
580, promised the Arabs glory and dominion, and for
hundreds of years they enjoyed just that. They achieved
a great Islamic community spread across the three conti-
nents of Asia, Africa, and Europe. They founded and
developed a vast empire stretching from the borders of
China to the Atlantic coast of Spain. At a time when
western Europe was stagnating in its Dark Ages, Arabic

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literature, philosophy, mathematics, and medicine were flourishing. Mohammed had declared that Arabs were the chosen of the nations, and certainly up until the twelfth century (for some eight hundred years) this appeared to be the case. Then came the Renaissance of Europe and the emergence of Christianity as the known world's premier religion. As Christianity rose, the Arabic empire and influence waned. By the early part of the twentieth century, they were regarded by the Western nations as rather romantic figures, riding camels, wearing long robes, and plotting in casbahs—very much a secondary existence. The establishment of the state of Israel gave the Arabs another stereotype as an enemy of the Jews, but the romantic, almost trivial image remained. In the eyes of the Arab, history had "turned wrong." Their past glories and the promises and desires of Mohammed for them lay in ruins on the desert floor.

To most people in the West, the oil price war of the 1970s was a lever to force Israel to release land that the Arabs felt should belong to them, an attempt to influence Israel by hitting Israel's allies where it hurt most. But it was far more than that. The West had become dependent on oil for survival and was prepared to pay almost any price to keep the flow coming. The Arabs quickly discovered that we had no stomach for a fight; we were prepared to stoop, kneel, or even grovel for the precious commodity. All of a sudden the unconquerable and imperialistic West had been brought to its knees. The shame and humiliation of centuries had been expunged and people again listened to and respected the Arab voice. This, in effect, illustrates the one major driving force behind the Arab mind: the determination to see the spread of Islam throughout the world. This was the mission of Mohammed and one of the duties of the Caliphs (the successors of Mohammed); extend the

faith and Moslem-ruled territory. That part of the world that is not Islamic is known in Islamic theology as "territory of war." Furthermore, Islamic law does not recognize the possibility of peace with nonbelievers (or infidels). This may hold certain similarities with Christianity, which also demands its followers to "preach the gospel to all men." The difference perhaps lies in the Moslems fervent belief that the ends will always justify the means, and that violence is an acceptable method of achieving conquests for Islam. This of course justifies the traditional call for jihad, or a holy war.

In any analysis of the Arab personality, a study of violence and their historical adherence to it must take a prime place. Even before Mohammed, the Bedouins had always been a savage nation. They are infamous not only for perpetrating savage acts but for the fact that they actually appear to enjoy and seek violence. Soldiers fighting the Arab, traditionally kept a last bullet for themselves, such was the legendary brutality of the Arabs (the women as well) toward their captives. If the Arab tradition was historically prone to violence, then Mohammed and the Koran that he delivered certainly encouraged and gave it a heavenly authority.

> Kill them wherever you find them ... if they attack you put them to the sword ... fight against them until Allah's religion is supreme. (Sura ii)
>
> Permission to take up arms is hereby given to those who are attacked ... Allah has power to grant them victory. (Sura xxii)
>
> Fight for the cause of Allah with the devotion due to him. (Sura xxii)
>
> If you should die or be slain in the cause of Allah his forgiveness and his mercy would surely be better than all the riches the infidels amass. (Sura iii)

Violence continued as part of the Islamic culture. Arab slavers were amongst the cruelest that the world has known. For hundreds of years a kind of holy war was waged by a murderous group of Syrian Moslems called the Assassins, who of course gave our language a new word. They were truly the forerunners of today's terrorist.

The Assassins were ruthless and possessed a complex and well-integrated system of underworld contacts and alliances. John Laffin, in his *Arab Mind Considered*, relates an astounding story of the great Saladin himself.

Rashid al Din, the Assassin leader, sent a courier to Saladin and ordered him to deliver his message only in private. Saladin had the man searched but nothing dangerous was found, so the great man dismissed his assembly except for his two highly trusted Mameluke guards. He then ordered the agent to deliver the message. He replied, "I have been ordered to deliver it in private."

"These two men do not leave me," said Saladin. "Deliver your message or go."

"As you sent the others away, why do you not dismiss these two men?" the messenger asked.

"Because I regard them as my own sons and they and I are as one," Saladin said.

The messenger turned to the two Mamelukes.

"If I ordered you in the name of my master Rashid al Din to kill this Sultan, would you do so?"

They drew their swords and said, "Command as you wish." While Saladin sat astounded the messenger left, taking the two Mamelukes with him.[2]

Perhaps Saladin's experience shares similarities with the death of Indira Gandhi at the hands of her two trusted Sikh guards some 750 years later. Between 1948 and the present day there have been almost a hundred

revolts in the Arab world, most of them bloodily vio-
lent. Thirty-eight were successful and twenty-six politi-
cal leaders were murdered. In Iraq alone, 2,426 Iraqi
were killed in a military revolt in 1959; up to 5,000
were murdered as a result of the 1963 revolution; 37
were executed after an abortive coup in 1973. Perhaps
the most horrendous was the mass murder of 30,000
members of the El Ansar religious sect by Sudanese
military forces in March 1970. In the Yemen civil war,
Egypt did something which the Germans, Russians,
Japanese, Americans, and Britons refrained from in
World War II; they used poison gas against the Yemeni
tribesmen. So for the Arabs, violence is a tradition, a
habit, a legal imperative, and a religious necessity.
"Violence ... is the Moslem's most positive form of
prayer." So said a Libyan cabinet minister.[3] So the
Islamic faith endorses violence—in support of the
cause—and motivates all Moslems to continue
Mohammed's mission of extending the borders of
Islam.

Jesus and Mohammed personify one important
contrast between Islam and Christianity. Jesus Christ
was born into a country occupied by a mighty foreign
power. His followers were a persecuted minority, dis-
claiming vociferously any intent to overthrow their
rulers by force of arms. Mohammed founded his own
state, established its policies, and set about conquering
not only souls but lands as well. Islam was, and is, a
religion of pride; humility is almost an insult to its very
being. Christianity is a religion of humility, and hurt
pride, whilst not nonexistent, is certainly discouraged.
It is not hard to see which religion offers the clearer
encouragement to fight, and which religion offers fewer
constraints on the methods used.

An added bonus for its followers is the totality of Islam. "Islam is not a religion in the common, distorted meaning of the word, confining itself to the private life of man. It is a complete way of life, catering for all the fields of human existence. Islam provides guidance for all walks of life—individual and social, material and moral, economic and political, legal and cultural, national and international."[4] Consequently, Moslem leaders like Qaddafi can say in all truthfulness, "There is no contradiction between religious consciousness and political decisions." The two facets of life are indistinguishable. In the words of President Bhutto of Pakistan, "The life and teachings of the Holy Prophet have been the cornerstone of my government's foreign policy, and our land, labour, law, education and other numerous reforms." In the Christian West, so far from attempting to interlock our spiritual and secular aims, we have made legal provisions to separate church and state. As a base for moral decisions, both personal and national, Islam in the twentieth century provides clearer guidance for action than does Christianity or indeed any other ideology espoused by the West.

Marxism-Leninism

This second comparison involves an ideology, not a theology, but a dangerous threat, nevertheless, in that "Russia has simply brought to the bitterness of its logical conclusion—and to the only conclusion possible— the idea of the messianic conflict, the notion of a war for democracy."[5]

Because the Soviets are our greatest potential enemy, it is important to take a look at what drives the Soviet mind, what ethics or moral imperatives govern their actions. When considering communism alongside Islam, one cannot help but be impressed by the

similarities between them, the belief in the inevitability
of war, the conviction that ends always justify the
means, the evangelical fervor to destroy western imperi-
alism, and the totality of their ideologies.

Perhaps, unlike with Islam, there is no necessity to
delve back in history and uncover national traits of the
Soviet peoples that explain their behavior in today's
world. It is however worth noting that if there is a gen-
eralization about these diverse peoples who comprise
the USSR, it is that they have all been accustomed,
throughout history, to ruthless, violent, and extremely
autocratic leadership. A history festooned with such
rulers as Tartars, Mongols, Genghis Khan, Rasputin,
and Ivan the Terrible is hardly likely to produce people
too concerned about the morality of present day Com-
munist leadership. One might go so far as to claim that
it could also produce a hard and violent people, or at
least a people not too squeamish in their relations with
the rest of the world.

I have referred to the "grey" area between good
and evil or between war and peace. This admission of
imprecision would, I think, be unacceptable to the
Communist mind. In contrast with the often open-ended
approach of Western thought, the Marxist-Leninist will
insist on a clear-cut single-track theory, even on such a
complex and many-sided phenomenon as war, believing
that only Marxism-Leninism offers a key to war's
understanding, as well as to its abolition. "War is a
social phenomenon whose essential meaning can be
revealed solely by using the only scientific method:
Marxist-Leninist dialectics"[6] Marx's studies were
basically and initially in capitalism and the evils of cap-
italism. From this foundation, Marx built his belief that
all social events and activities, including war, derive
from the relationship between the classes and that this

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relationship is bound to be antagonistic because private ownership owns the means of production and seeks to serve its own economic interests by exploiting the working class. To expand this argument still further, Lenin himself says, "War is a continuation of the politics of particular classes in pursuit of class goals."[7] This explanation of the cause of war naturally points the accusing finger towards capitalism, because it is in capitalistic systems that the class society exists. The Marxist-Leninists contend that war is a product of class society, inseparable from capitalism (or colonialism) and "will cease to exist only with the destruction of capitalism, and the victory of the socialist order in the whole world."[8] Therefore, as in Islam we are seeing an ideology that teaches that wars are inevitable and that capitalism or imperialism is the major enemy; not only that, it almost imposes an obligation to fight against it and a "right from above" to indulge in such wars.

As indulged in the present day propensity for conflict in the twilight zone below all-out war, arguably the most regular feature of low-intensity conflict has been revolutionary war. Although, of course, there are other forms of revolution, the most frequent (and most successful) has been the Communist model. It is this model that we have seen in China, Vietnam, Cuba, Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and of course in Russia itself. The revolutionary creed of Karl Marx is simple enough: "All philosophies have sought to explain the world; our business is to change it." The *Oxford Dictionary* definition of *revolution* is, "A complete change such as that caused by the overthrow of a government or political system." Marx's own thinking indicated two possible ways of achieving such change, peaceful evolutionary transformation or violent revolutionary change. In practice, the ruling or exploiting class has always resisted

being dislodged, thus making the peaceful evolution almost a nonstarter. Lenin, to whom fell the opportunity to put Marxist theory into practice, soon discovered that the overthrow of capitalism could not be accomplished without violence. He rejected Marx's evolutionary path and declared, "The overthrow of capitalism is impossible without violence, without armed uprising and wars of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie."[9] His concept not only justifies violence but does the same for revolutionary war. It gives it an acceptability and an almost divine authority.

This is also an appropriate time to talk about the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine, because it is this doctrine that, above all, justifies intervention in other countries' "revolutionary" affairs. We in the West must understand that although our Western morality will often restrain us from interfering in another country's internal problems, no such constraints apply to Marxist-Leninist countries. The ideology of COMINTERN regards the defense of socialism as the highest international duty.

There is no doubt that the peoples of the socialist countries and the Communist Parties have and must have freedom to determine their country's path of development. However, any decision of theirs must damage neither socialism in their own country nor the fundamental interests of the other socialist countries nor the worldwide workers' movement, which is waging a struggle for socialism.[10]

This goes some way to explaining Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and even Afghanistan. It is equally relevant to any counterrevolutionary movements in the Caribbean or Central America. In Brezhnev's words:

The socialist states stand for strict respect for the sovereignty of all countries. We emphatically oppose interference into the affairs of any states, violations of their sovereignty.

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At the same time the establishment and defense of the
sovereignty of states, which have embarked upon the road of
building socialism, is of particular significance for us, Com-
munists. The forces of imperialism and reaction seek to
deprive the people now of this, now of that socialist country
of their sovereign right they have gained to insure the pros-
perity of their country, the well-being and happiness of the
broad mass of the working people through building of a
society, free from any oppression and exploitation. And when
encroachments of this right encounter a harmonious rebuff by
the socialist camp, bourgeois propagandists raise a clamor
around "defense of sovereignty" and "non-intervention"....

However, it is known, comrades, that there also are
common laws governing socialist construction, a deviation
from which might lead to a deviation from socialism as such.
And when the internal and external forces hostile to socialism
seek to revert the development of any socialist country toward
the restoration of the capitalist order, when a threat to the
cause of socialism in that country, a threat to the security of
the socialist community as a whole, emerges, this is no
longer only a problem of the people of that country but also a
common problem, concern for all socialist states.[11]

We may not like this particular doctrine or ideol-
ogy but one cannot deny that it is fairly unequivocal and
gives indication to both fellow travelers and to the rest
of the world of how a country and its military forces are
likely to react. As a soldier I sometimes hanker after
such unambiguous guidance, from my own political
masters.

Like everything else in Marxism-Leninism, morals
and ethics are clear cut: everything that pertains to cap-
italism is immoral, and anything that supports the revo-
lution or assists in the destruction of capitalism is
moral.

From the point of view of Communist ethics only what
aids the destruction of the hated features of the bourgeoisie,

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of the old capitalist world of exploitation and poverty, only that which goes to build the new Soviet, Socialist order is moral and ethical. Soviet patriotism is the most profound manifestation of a new ethic, a Communist ethic, a new psychology of man. Soviet patriotism is the highest stage of moral behavior and ethics in man and society. Purging the mind of man of vestiges of capitalist ethics, the Soviet, Socialist system has formed and developed new ethical values in the human character; loyalty to the leader, to the Soviet homeland, loyalty to one's native party, and loyalty to the Party and the Government.[12]

The strength of this new morality is well illustrated by looking at the Stalinist purges, which perhaps accounted for some two million lives. The word purge is used on purpose, since it has a clinical connotation, implying that the treatment will ultimately enable the body to regain its health. In other words, it is a surgical operation, necessary for removing something evil like a gangrenous growth, and necessary for the sake of producing the perfect society. "The final criterion is the safety of the people." This Communist ethic inherently supports the doctrine that ends will always justify means, that element of philosophy so completely at variance with Christianity, and yet so in accord with our other example, Islam. With this frightening and unloving new morality comes the sine qua non that those who do not like it must be forced to like it, or be liquidated.

In comparison with Christianity, communism is contrary to our whole culture and way of life; it is uncaring, harsh, and totally unmindful of the rights of the individual, but its ideology does provide a clear form of guidance on the sort of morality that it expects its adherents to follow. That guidance is clearer than ours.

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Black and White or Grey

I am aware that, in arguing my thesis, I have fallen
headlong into the Marxist trap. I have painted my pic-
ture using only the stark colors of black and white. I
have used the single-track method. Communism and
Islam provide all the answers; Christianity has lost its
teeth. I have done this of course because I wish the con-
trast to underscore my argument, and in order to draw
your attention to three paramount facts: (1) that in an
increasingly complex world where the edges of morality
are becoming blurred and indistinct, there is a shrieking
need for clear moral guidelines; (2) that Christianity,
either by design or by gradual degradation, no longer
provides such moral guidelines; and (3) that the greatest
potential threats to our Western world—Communism
and Islamic Fundamentalism—provide their adherents
with an unambiguous baseline for their bahavior, indi-
vidual, national, and international.

Of course I realize that life is not as clear-cut as
that. Things are seldom what they seem, and we in the
West are not blundering around in a darkened world of
total moral anarchy; no more so than all Arabs and all
Russians are living lives of controlled moral purpose.
For example, all is not sweetness and light in the Arab
world. There is no single world view, no one Moslem
way of regarding life, statecraft, or international
relations.

Qaddafi "claims to be running an Islamic state, but
Saudi Arabian religious leaders regard him as a heretic.
The Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini maintains that he is
the arbiter of Islamic values, but Sadat denounced him
as an apostle of hatred who betrayed the spirit of
Islamic justice and mercy. Iran and Iraq are Moslem
countries, but they have been at war since 1980, and the
Kurds, who are also Muslims, rise up periodically

against both Iran and Iraq because they seek a state of their own based on ethnic, not religious, foundation."[13]

Likewise, however vociferously and with whatever conviction the Communists may state their beliefs on the world stage, it still does not seem to work in practice, in feeding, unifying, or even apparently making happy its followers. Any economic comparison between Communist nations and the capitalist West are but sick jokes; it is the evil capitalist West that must go to the help of Ethiopia because its Communist overloads cannot even manage their own harvest; the two main Communist powers, Russia and China, are still undisguised enemies. The Soviet Union has higher rates of suicide and alcoholism than any other country in the world, and perhaps most telling of all, in the darkest days of World War II, Stalin had to invoke the support of the Russian Orthodox Church in order to galvanize and unify the people against the German threat. Furthermore, he had to release them from jails and prison camps in order to do so.

Thomas Jefferson, if I may say so, not the most committed Christian to have held office in the United States, asked:

Can the liberties of a nation be sure when we remove their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties are the gift of God?[14]

In the Western world where we have achieved so much and have so much to be grateful for, let us not use other nations' problems as a cloak for our own shortcomings. Rather, let us look at our enemy's strengths, and reflect on our own weakness. This is a wiser philosophy, and this is what I want you to remember.

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Notes

1. Clay T. Buckingham, Major General, USA (Ret.), "Ethics and the Senior Officer: Institutional Tensions," *Parameters* 15, no. 3 (Autumn 1985), p. 23.

2. John Laffin, *The Arab Mind Considered; A Need for Understanding* (New York: Taplinger, 1975), pp. 51–52.

3. Ibid., p. 131.

4. N.A. Daniel quoted in G.H. Jansen, *Militant Islam* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1979), p. 17.

5. Herbert Butterfield, Sir, *Christianity, Diplomacy and War* (London: Epworth Press, 1963), p. 111.

6. Vasili D. Sokolovskii, *Soviet Military Strategy* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1963), p. 270.

7. Thomas Wolfe, *Communist Outlook on War* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1967), p. 6.

8. Ibid., pp. 6–7.

9. Ibid., p. 12.

10. *Pravda*, 26 September 1968, quoted in United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, *Czechoslovakia and the Brezhnev Doctrine* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 3.

11. Leonid Brezhnev at Warsaw, 12 November 1968, quoted in *Czechoslovakia and the Brezhnev Doctrine*, pp. 22–23.

12. Unnamed official Russian publication quoted in Martin C. D'Arcy, *Communism and Christianity* (New York: Devin-Adair Co., 1957), p. 122.

13. Thomas W. Lippman, *Islam: Politics and Religion in the Muslim World* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1982), p. 10.

14. Thomas Jefferson quoted in John Whitehead, *The Separation Illusion* (Milford, MI: Mott Media, 1977), p. 21.

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PART THREE

Military
Applications

Leadership and Ethics:
A Practitioner's View

PERRY M. SMITH

LEADING LARGE ORGANIZA-
tions is different enough from leading small organiza-
tions that you really have to think through the problems
carefully; if you don't do that, you're likely to fail. I
reached this conclusion as a result of watching many
people fail in big leadership jobs. Particularly in the Air
Force but also in other services, there are leaders who
seem to do pretty well in running smaller organizations,
but when they come to the point of running very large
organizations they have great difficulty delegating, they
have great difficulty communicating, and they have
great difficulty reaching out and touching their people.
They have trouble motivating them, setting a higher
vision for the organization, doing the planning that's
necessary, establishing levels of integrity, and so forth.

To share with you a few of my leadership experi-
ences and give you a few vignettes of leadership prob-
lems as they relate to ethics, I'll give you a few case
studies. First of all, I'll take you back to 1976. As the
Chief of Maintenance of a maintenance organization at

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mander, served as Commandant of the National War College
from 1983 through 1986.

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Hahn Air Base in Germany, I've got one thousand people working for me and I've been in this job now for three or four weeks. I've just come out of the Pentagon to go to Germany.

One evening, I found out that every night we were falsifying the official report that the Wing sent forward to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the higher headquarters on the state of readiness of our airplanes. At 0300 every morning we were submitting a report that said that 70 percent of our aircraft were fully combat ready, although, in fact, somewhere between 50 and 70 percent of our aircraft were really combat ready. I kind of stumbled over this one night when I was down in our job control where we monitored the aircraft status.

I asked the basic question, "Why are we doing this?" And, of course, the answer was, "We're trying to make the Wing look good." The maintenance people were trying to make the organization look good, so they falsified the records to do that. Well, my dilemma was that I was brand new, I had known the Wing Commander only a few weeks, and I didn't know the situation there. What should I do? I decided the best way to do this was to approach it directly. I went to the Wing Commander and said, "Do you know we're sending a false official report every night to the JCS?" And he said, "No, I didn't know that." And I said, "Don't you think we ought to knock that off?" and he said, "Yes, I think we ought to knock that off." So I got a good answer from the Wing Commander; I went back to my maintenance people and said, "I know you've been doing this in the past, and I know you think you're helping out the Wing, but there are two reasons why I can't stand to do this. One is because it's wrong, and two is because it's dysfunctional. If you tell everybody you're doing great and you're not, you're not going to

get the command support, the logistics support, the manpower support to fix it." So I said, "We've got to quit doing that."

The nice thing about that story was it was fairly easy to turn that problem around. The Wing Commander supported me, and my maintenance community went along, and it worked out fine. But it is an example of an organization that had been doing the wrong thing for many, many months and had rationalized that that was the right thing to do.

Another problem occurred in Bitburg. I commanded the Wing there before Bitburg was made famous by President Reagan's visit in 1985. We were in the middle of one of the major flying exercises that NATO periodically conducts. The exercises are meant to test the full capability not only of the F–15s during the air defense but of the flying, missile, and radar forces. The intelligence officer, who was an Air Force major, got up and said, "When you are returning from your mission and you're reporting in the air down to the command post, I want you to report that you've killed four airplanes, you've expended half your missiles, and half the rounds from your 20mm Gatling gun. No matter what you do or what you see, or whether you ever intercept any airplanes, or whether you shoot down ten or whether you shoot down none, always report four kills."

I'm sitting there as the Wing Commander, saying to myself, I wonder why we are doing that? I jump up and say, "We're not going to do that." My reaction was spontaneous; it didn't seem to me that it was useful to lie in these reports, and so I said, "We will *not* do that. Just report whatever you see. So if you intercept two airplanes and shoot them down and you expend two missiles or four missiles to do that, report that; if you

intercept none, report that; if you intercept eight and shoot those down, report that.''

I did that because of the fact that it didn't seem to me, even though it was an exercise, that we should get every one of our aviators to lie and get in the habit of doing that. If you do that in peacetime you might well do that in wartime. I think most of you know the United States Air Force record in that regard is not too outstanding because we, in fact, did that during the Vietnam war. But here was a good example of what looked like a pretty good idea to fully exercise the intelligence system; just have everybody report this and then the intelligence system gets exercised. But the fundamental question that had not been asked up to that time was, ''What does that do to us? What does that force us to do to ourselves?''

For another example, I'll take you to Washington. I would say that ethical and integrity issues in Washington are frankly tough. The issues are not easy; there are many fuzzy areas. This is a very political town, as you would expect a national capital to be, and so the issues get more complex and tougher. In 1982 I testified before the House Armed Services Committee. With Sam Stratton in the chair (Mel Price had left for the day), I was being asked questions by Beverly Byron. She's a congresswoman from the State of Maryland. She's pressing me on the issues of flying safety. She has a son in the Air Force who's flying airplanes, so she knows quite a bit about airplanes and a lot about the Air Force. She's trying to make the point that the Air Force needs to fly more in order to improve its flying safety. She claims that pilots who don't fly very much crash more than pilots who fly more. Well, she's right; we all know she's right; everybody who flies airplanes knows she's right, but unfortunately the data were not showing

that at the time. We had been flying a little bit more each year, but the flying safety record had been staying, at this time back in 1982, about the same. She was trying to make the case for the Air Force that we need to get more flying hours, but her data were not right. So I couldn't agree with her. I said, "I'd love to agree with you, Mrs. Byron, but I can't because the data do not show that. We think, over time, data *will* show that, but they haven't shown that in recent years."

Now that is an example of Byron trying to help the Air Force. It would have been easy to answer that question in the affirmative; that might have even helped the Air Force in that regard, but you just can't *do* that in dealing with the Congress. I find from all my experience with the Congress, the *worst* thing you can do is be dishonest with the members. If you ever do that, first, you're going to get caught because the staffers are very smart; two, you'll never *ever* have any credibility on the Hill from that moment forward. Although I have been encouraged to do so by some people, I have never done that, because it's wrong and it's dumb.

Another example, which is kind of an in-house story in the Pentagon, may give you a little bit of a flavor for the kinds of dilemmas that you run into. In 1982, for General Lew Allen, who is the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, I am in the process of briefing the general on the famous POM, the "Program Objective Memorandum." The POM is the next five-year plan and program that is developed about a year and a half in advance of the five-year period. Every May each Service will submit its program; in the case of the Air Force now, that's a hundred billion dollars times five. So that's a five hundred billion dollar program for the next five years. Each Service submits its POM to the Secretary of Defense. He then works on it for a while,

changes it a bit, and then submits it to the President, who after additional modifications, sends it to the Congress the following January or February. The chief planner briefs on the planning aspects of the POM; what's the strategy; what are the priorities, how well do we meet the guidance from the Secretary of Defense; and so forth. Then the programmer, who's also a two-star general, briefs on the specifics. How many B–1s are we going to buy in each year, and so forth. The briefing goes on for about an hour. It's a very complicated briefing; there's a lot of detail in it. At the end of the briefing General Allen says, "This is a dishonest POM; I will not submit it to the Secretary of Defense. Go back and redo it." What he was saying was, and I was part of this, in the process of putting together our program, we had played some games, as all the Services have a tendency to do.

"Gaming the system" it is called. We know, for instance, that the Congress will give us x number of C–130Hs built in Georgia. So you take the C–130s out of your program, put some other things in you'd like to have, knowing that when it gets to the Congress, you're going to get the C–130s anyway. These are the kinds of games that are played. Well, the staff had done some of that. We just saw that as kind of smart operating business in the tough political environment of Washington. But General Allen hit it right on the nose, and I could have hugged him for doing it, even though we had to go back and work weekends to get the program fixed because he set a higher standard. His point was clear; he was not going to play those kinds of games. He wanted to play it straight so we could defend it as not only a good POM but an honest POM. Here is a really nice example of a leader, in this case the Chief of Staff for a military service, setting a standard for his Service and making us live up to that standard.

For my fifth example, an interesting case of dealing with a command situation, I'll take you back to Bitburg in the late 1970s. When you come into work as a wing commander, every morning sitting in the middle of your desk is the police blotter. What that is, is about ten or twelve or fourteen pages of what's happened the last twenty-four hours as reported to you by your security police (the military police). The police blotter has everything on it. It has speeding violations; it has doors left open, security violations, safes left open, fights in the NCO club, drunken driving cases, wife abuses, husband abuses, child abuses; it's not a "fun" way to get the morning started. It's a very sobering document because it is all the bad things that happened in a twenty-four-hour period. And a lot of things happen in a twenty-four-hour period in a community of about ten thousand.

Well, I came in one morning, and looking through the police blotter, I noticed that a technical sergeant with about fourteen years of service had been picked up leaving the main gate because his car had been weaving. He'd been stopped, and he was clearly driving under the influence. He had alcohol all over his breath; he couldn't walk the line. The security police took him down to the base hospital for a blood alcohol test and then delivered him home. Well, I put the name in my head and a couple of weeks later we got the results back from Weisbaden, showing that the same sergeant had 00.000 alcohol in his blood, but was "positive" for amphetamines. I thought, there's something wrong here. I don't know what's wrong, but how could he be blowing alcohol all over the security police and yet not have a bit of alcohol in him? So I called in the chief of the security police and the hospital commander, and I said, "Check into this."

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Well, what had happened is a very curious story, but it's the kind of thing that's useful to talk about. After the drunken sergeant had been delivered home by the security police, he went to his neighbor and said, "I'm in big trouble. I was drinking; I'm gonna be DWI; I'll lose my license for six months. My wife doesn't drive; she has a job; I just can't afford to lose my license." His next door neighbor said, "No sweat! We'll go on back and do a blood swapping exercise." So they did that; they convinced the young two-striped corpsman in the hospital that they should do a little blood swapping. So they extracted some blood out of the neighbor. The only trouble with this was that the neighbor was popping lots of pills. So what do you have? You have an opportunity to discipline not one person but three. It also gave us an opportunity in the base newspaper, within a few weeks, of telling the story to our people and letting them know these are the kinds of things that we wouldn't tolerate in the name of integrity.

Let me make some generalizations about integrity in large organizations. First of all, as I mentioned, there are lots of temptations. There are temptations to fudge the figures, to withhold a little bit of information, to tell 95 percent of the story instead of the full story, to try to make your boss look good, to try to make your organization look good, and to beat out somebody else who's playing dirty pool. I remember so often the Air Force people would say in the Air Staff, "We've got to fudge the figures because the Navy's doing it." And I'm sure the Navy guys were saying, "We've got to fudge the figures because the Air Force guys are doing it." That kind of rationale is quite common. Sometimes, if you're scrupulously honest, it doesn't pay off. For example, when the Marine Corps went forward with a POM input

to the Navy one year, they got hit very hard by the Congress. If they'd played games, they might have done a little bit better. Sometimes by being honest you do lose, but integrity still pays off in the long term.

It's particularly important to be honest in military organizations because trust in combat is so essential. Trust in combat is so essential that military institutions must generate a mentality of trust and honesty in peacetime. The role of leader is very, very important. I find that integrity will go down hill fast if the leader isn't on top of that issue and doesn't set very high standards for himself. Leaders have to be squeaky clean in this area and set very high standards.

Some techniques are worth thinking about. One of the things that I do when I first come into any new organization is to get my immediate subordinates around me and show them my "hang-up" slide. I throw up a slide, and I say, "These are my hang-ups. I might as well tell you now the first week, so you don't have to learn them slowly." On that slide I have a list of usually ten or twelve things, but number one is integrity. I put it down always as number one, and I spend some time talking about that. I make the point that if the integrity level of the outfit is not in real great shape, it can be corrected. Work done together moves that level up higher. My "hang-ups" also include procrastination, hyper-ambition, authoritarianism, parochialism, lack of dignity, and so forth. In looking for opportunities to reinforce standards of integrity in life, if you have a situation like the blood swapping, use that as an example of what you will not tolerate. You can use that in newspapers and in newsletters. Compliment those people you find exhibiting high integrity. These are some of the techniques that are useful.

From my experience, there's always a small group on every base, in every situation, everywhere I've ever

been, including the National War College, that has low
standards of integrity. I had to throw a uniformed mili-
tary student out of the National War College. It turned
out that he claimed an earned doctorate. When we
checked into it, it was from the Sussex Institute of
Technology of London, England. The Institute awarded
a doctorate for a certain amount of money, a letter, and
some credits. No dissertation, no language require-
ments, and no oral or written examinations are required.
The student also turned out to be a convicted felon, and
so we removed him from the course. We also had a
very serious case of plagiarism here at the National War
College, no more than four or five years before my
time.

No matter where you are there are going to be peo-
ple who are going to violate basic standards of integrity.
They will sell their souls for money. I had an officer
who worked for me who falsified a report on household
goods during a move. He took a "1" and turned it into
a "7" for the repair of a piano; he sold his soul for six
hundred dollars. I'm not sure he saw it that way, but
that's what he did. He also sold his career for six hun-
dred dollars.

People will sell their souls to avoid work, to avoid
embarrassment, to cover up for their subordinates, to
cover up for their families, to cover up for their weak-
nesses, to get back at the system, to cover gambling
debts, to look out for friends, and to solve particularly
tough problems; there are lots of rationales for low
integrity. A leader must be realistic about these things.
He's got to be an optimistic person without being a pol-
lyanna. He's got to stress integrity, and he's got to be
willing to take strong action when violations of integrity
take place. And he also needs to understand the close
relationship between personal and institutional integrity.

Some people will never lie for themselves, but they'll lie for the institution. As a leader, it's important to emphasize both sides of the integrity equation.

In the issues of tactics and strategy as they relate to moral behavior, the two most interesting issues for the future are strategic defense and terrorism. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is a concept; it's a technology; and it's a potential weapon system. The moral issues of deterrence and defense are very complex. Mutual assured destruction, which is our basic nuclear strategy today, is moral as long as it works; it provides deterrence and prevents war, and those are both very good. When it becomes immoral is when it becomes an operational reality. People who say mutual assured destruction is inherently immoral cause me problems. There *are* some immoral and moral aspects of it. But as long as it works, I don't think it's immoral; SDI could become profoundly moral if it works, if we can transition to it peacefully, a very important question, and if it doesn't increase the chances of conventional war breaking out. That's one of the great concerns the Europeans have—will SDI make the world safe for conventional war? The Europeans have had experience with conventional war, and they have not found it a particularly happy occasion in the last sixty years or so. In fact, you can argue that to *not* pursue SDI can be immoral if SDI could lead to the end of strategic nuclear weapons.

I can see the day, if you'd like to think long term out to the year 2025 or so, when nuclear weapons will be so obsolescent that the numbers of them could be quite small. This evolution can only take place if a number of events take place. First of all, if nonnuclear technology is pushed and, in fact, works. I think there's a pretty good chance that will take place. I'm talking now about accuracies within inches. Second, if SDI

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becomes a reality. Third, if leaders of the major nations of the world actively pursue nuclear arms reductions through both multilateral and unilateral steps. In the meantime, in the next forty years, the great challenge of our time is the maintenance of our basic values while avoiding both nuclear war and major conventional war. Any arms control or arms elimination proposal must be carefully evaluated in terms of maintaining our basic values while avoiding war.

As a long-range planner, I appeal to all of you to not be determinists. Americans *can* make a difference. Western Europeans can make a difference. Canadians can make a difference. Take the long-term view and help this country and the West create a strategic vision. I don't think we can move the world very much, but we may be able to move it 1 or 2 percent over the next thirty or forty years. That can make a real difference, particularly if we set and pursue our goals with a full consideration of the ethical dimensions.

Rejecting the
Torturer

ROY G. DIXON

TORTURE IS AN ODIOUS
topic. That relatively few philosophical articles have
been written about this subject may be a consequence of
its repulsive nature. Or does its neglect result from our
ambivalent emotions? On one hand, we prefer to reject
the use of torture categorically, relegating its practice to
barbaric tribes, Nazi-like regimes, or depraved mad-
men. At the same time, we recognize this imperfect
world creates situations where practical necessity
seemingly mandates its use. In consequence, our views
of torture often represent an emotional dichotomy. Can
a moral justification of torture be given? Practical ques-
tions of this nature challenge the philosopher to make a
rational examination of relevant issues in an effort to
derive or discover a moral position on which to base a
decision.

The Issues

Some writers have attempted to give a moral justifica-
tion for torture. Professor Michael Levin expressed his

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views in a *Newsweek* article, "The Case For Torture,"
arguing that "there are situations in which [torture] is
not merely permissible but morally mandatory," that
under certain circumstances a moral agent has a moral
obligation to torture.[1]

Examination brings into sharp focus the conflicting
emotions that substantiate the generally dichotomous
view of torture. Although not usually explicitly stated,
for some persons, their arguments rest on utilitarian
considerations. For example, the torturing of terrorists
might become a contemplatable—even obligatory—
means of accomplishing the desired end of saving
human lives. Levin expresses this qualification specifi-
cally when he says, "Torture is justified only to save
lives," and "the decision to use torture is a matter of
balancing innocent lives against the means needed to
save them"[2]. This type of argument is directed against
the deontological (moral obligation) assumption about
torture, that is, the belief that each individual has a right
not to be treated in a cruel and unusual manner.

Defining Torture

The Constitution of the United States does not sanction
the practice of inflicting "cruel and unusual punish-
ment" (Eighth Amendment to the Constitution), which
would include acts of torture, upon its citizenry. More-
over, punishment is intended either to deter possible
actions at some indefinite time in the future or, as Levin
states, to address "deeds irrevocably past." A util-
itarian interest in torture involves its effectiveness in
alleviating immediate, specific evils.

Professor Henry Shue, in his article entitled "Tor-
ture," describes a form of torture that he calls interroga-
tional torture.[3] Interrogational torture is torture

applied only for the purpose of extracting information and ceasing once this end is accomplished. This explanation fulfills the utilitarian requirement to gain information that will prevent an impending evil—specifically, the destruction of particular innocent human beings. Shue's definition, however, only identifies this classification of torture. It fails to capture the quintessence of the concept of torture itself. Barrie Paskins defines the term.

Torture is the systematic and deliberate infliction of acute pain in any form by one person on another ... in order to accomplish the purpose of the first against the will or interest of the second.[4]

Thus I will deal with the deliberate, systematic infliction of acute pain in any form, that is, either physically or psychologically, on an individual for the explicit purpose of gaining information to prevent future harm to particular innocent human beings.

Arguing What If

Michael Levin sets the stage for his discussion by describing a hypothetical situation:

Suppose a terrorist has hidden an atomic bomb on Manhattan Island which will detonate at noon on July 4 unless ... (here follow the usual demands for money and release of his friends from jail). Suppose, further, that he is caught at 10 a.m. of the fateful day, but—preferring death to failure—won't disclose where the bomb is. What do we do? If we follow due process—wait for his lawyer, arraign him—millions of people will die. If the only way to save those lives is to subject the terrorist to the most excruciating possible pain, what grounds can there be for not doing so? I suggest there are none.[5]

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Although I will refrain from calling this problematic situation a moral dilemma, it is clear that this scenario is a troublesome one. Because of the nature of the threat and the innocent lives at stake, the individual responsible for resolving this crisis must act rationally, carefully evaluating the alternatives available. It is the role of philosophy to assist in discerning the proper course of action.

Professor Levin asks us to speculate, "What do we do?" under the circumstances described. For the sake of argument, I want to focus that question more specifically, "What course of action should we expect our recognized leaders of civilian and military communities to take under such conditions?" This restatement represents a more realistic proposition because it is the leader who will have to make the difficult decisions and then be capable of justifying his actions to the American public and to himself. More important, this new focus makes the argument more relevant in that it is those recognized leaders of both communities who have taken an oath to not only defend the Constitution but also to protect the lives and well-being of the citizenry. Hence, a leader of the civilian or military community has assumed the dual responsibilities of defending the Constitution and providing for the welfare of the American public. That leader has an obligation to perform those actions that fulfill the oath of office, and according to utilitarian argument, this obligation includes the use of torture.

Levin presents five possible criticisms of arguments advocating the use of torture. (1) Even though it is probably unconstitutional to torture terrorists, the lives saved outweigh constitutional prohibition. (2) Even though torture is barbaric, mass murder exceeds it. (3) One unwilling to "dirty one's hands" by torturing a terrorist known to be threatening innocent lives is

guilty of moral cowardice. (4) If the individual terrorist's rights are important, so are those of the multiple innocent persons who will be victims of the terrorist's actions. (5) Pre-emptive attack and assassination represent precedents for the use of torture. According to Professor Levin, as soon as we concede that torture is justified in extreme cases, we have agreed that "the decision to use torture is a matter of balancing innocent lives against the means needed to save them".[6] Consequently, it does not matter if one life or one million lives hang in the balance; a moral obligation exists to torture an unyielding terrorist known to be holding innocent lives in his hands.

Utilitarian argument is based upon our acceptance of a very significant implicit premise: either we torture the terrorist or innocent human beings will be killed. Because no one wants innocent human beings to die, it follows that we should torture the terrorist. This kind of reasoning is problematical, however, in that it fails to consider viable alternative resolutions of the threat. What alternative resolutions? The most obvious example is the option to meet, or at least appear to meet, the terrorist's demands. "The usual demands," says Levin, are "for money and release of his friends from jail".[7] Two immediate objections to this alternative will be raised. The first is that you never deal with terrorists and the second is that the terrorist's demands are not a necessary part of the argument.

Some will object that meeting the demands of terrorists is unacceptable—never bargain with terrorists! For the most part, I agree with this line of reasoning; however, we need to examine this argument more closely. How do we know with absolute certainty that torture is going to work on our terrorist? Given two hours in which to extract the information and get to the

bomb to disarm it, how long will this "hard core" terrorist, one who prefers death to failure, hold out? We expect the members of our armed forces to withstand torture for extended periods of time (for example, the Vietnam POWs) and regard them with contempt if they succumb too easily to pressure. Should Professor Levin expect terrorists who are fanatically committed to a cause, those like the terrorists who conducted suicide bombings of the US Embassy in Beirut, to succumb easily to torture? Our POWs did not have an irrational enthusiasm or excessive zeal for their cause. For the most part, they were rational, dedicated soldiers who believed in their country's cause, and not irrational, zealous outlaws whose perverse actions incense our perceptions of fair play. And these rational soldiers, subjected to torture by "experts" for years, maintained their integrity and self-respect, refusing to submit easily to the demands of their captors. What evidence is there to suggest that fanatical terrorists, whose cause may represent their way of life (for example, third generation PLO members), will succumb to torture? The stakes are too high to base one's argument on this kind of assumption.

The problem with utilitarian argument is that assumptions result in too many unanswered questions. For example, who will administer the torture? Because the practice of torture is not condoned in the United States, we do not have "experts" on the government's payroll to accomplish the task. Should we create "torture squads" to respond to crisis situations? Or is it not more likely that some unsuspecting leader will have to assume the awesome responsibility of the gruesome duty? What type of torture will be used? More important, in a given situation what type will produce the desired results in the time available? How does one

"measure" or "calculate" the amount of torture to administer? How much is too much? Should the government publish a manual for leaders? How does it go about gathering data? Can we enlist the help of the medical profession for either research or actually administering the torture? Does this violate the Hippocratic oath? Is there time to perform a thorough physical examination of the terrorist to ensure that he can withstand the amount and form of torture prescribed? If he lapses into unconsciousness or the trauma causes him to die, we become self-degraded. In fact, any excessive use of force, either by accident or anxious frustration, that incapacitates the successfully resistant terrorist cannot but worsen the situation. And finally, how do we determine whether or not the terrorist is lying when he succumbs? How many false leads will we have time to track down? But the question remains, if the terrorist does not yield, what is the alternative?

My contention is that one can never know with the kind of certainty needed the answers to these important questions. This situation *is different* from other speculative decisions we make about future events. For example, any leader proposing a specific course of action can never be confident that all the possible factors influencing the outcome of his decision have been taken into account or that the variable factors will materialize as predicted. This is true for the civilian leader proposing a new policy and for the military leader devising a battle plan. We carefully scrutinize these decisions, especially if they fail, to determine whether the leader considered relevant options available.

The most viable alternative, the one that represents the most powerful utilitarian argument, is to meet (or at least pretend to meet) the demands of the terrorist. This may be distasteful, but there are numerous precedents in

kidnapping cases. When there are serious doubts concerning the success of other alternatives in situations involving overwhelmingly disastrous consequences, we should meet the terrorist's demands. This will defuse the immediate tensions and will allow rational minds to determine a subsequent course of action. The advantage of this alternative is that it will more nearly ensure the lives in jeopardy, whereas the use of torture may not. In fact, a thoroughgoing utilitarian will, in my opinion, find this alternative to be the most appealing.

There is one other alternative that will alleviate many of the objections I have raised. This alternative is captured in the core meaning of torture. In order to avoid serious, possibly incapacitating injury to the terrorist, we should torture a third party—namely, one of his relatives (for example, a wife, child, father, or mother) or close friends, if they can be had. In doing so, the terrorist is still being tortured psychologically, assuming of course he has personal feelings for his relatives and friends, while ensuring that he remains safe to provide the needed information. Torture used in this manner, what I refer to as surrogate torture, may be most useful against the terrorist who does not care what you inflict upon him but who would object to the harming of personal friends or relatives in the name of his cause.

The obvious problem with surrogate torture is that an "innocent" individual, that is, one not blameworthy for the criminal act, is being treated in a cruel and unusual manner, treatment prohibited by our Constitution. When Michael Levin states that we should "torture only the obviously guilty," he excludes the possibility of surrogate torture. Can we dismiss the torture of a third party as an unacceptable means of torture? Torturing the terrorist psychologically may

represent the only means that will save the hostage lives at stake. What argument could be given against this form of torture? What about an argument emphasizing the importance of individual rights? Levin answers this objection.

The most powerful argument against using torture as a punishment or to secure confessions is that such practices disregard the rights of the individual. Well, if the individual is all that important—and he is—it is correspondingly important to protect the rights of individuals threatened by terrorists. If life is so valuable that it must never be taken, the lives of the innocents must be saved at the price of hurting the one who endangers them.[8]

Using similar reasoning, how could you refuse to save the innocent lives at stake if surrogate torture were the only effective form of torture available? We can rephrase one of Michael Levin's questions to read, "If *you* caught the terrorist [or his *relative or friend*], could you sleep nights knowing that millions died because you couldn't bring yourself to apply the electrodes?"[9] To be consistent, the utilitarian must readily agree that even though the innocent life is important, it cannot override the greater number of lives at stake. Consequently, any form of torture, including surrogate torture, will be acceptable if it will save innocent lives. In doing so, the issue of justice becomes obfuscated; the terrorist threatens innocents, and the captor threatens innocents.

Utilitarian argument is dangerous, in my opinion, because it is too permissive. If all persons in authority were to follow guidelines for the use of torture, we would probably invite an epidemic of cases of torture. Contemporary examples support this claim.

In 1984, Americas Watch, a human rights organization, accused "Peru's civilian Government ... of 'fighting terror with terror' in its effort to combat a rural

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insurgency movement.''[10] In order to combat what Americas Watch called "the most brutal and vicious guerrilla organization [known as Sendero Luminoso or 'Shining Path'] that has yet appeared in the Western Hemisphere,'' Peru's government forces perpetrated

extremely serious abuses of human rights—torture, disappearances, executions and massacres.... Over the past three months, in the Ayacucho region, numerous mass graves have been uncovered containing some corpses "identified as individuals who were reportedly arrested by the security forces.''[11]

This contemporary example clearly illustrates a case where the question of which side is acting "justly" or represents the "just" cause becomes obfuscated. Both sides are using terrorist tactics, including the use of torture, in the name of their cause. The result is that both sides are condemned by the moral community at large for their egregious violations of human rights. Consequently, both sides are guilty of crimes against humanity and have debased their cause.

In another example, Israeli soldiers beat to death two Palestinian bus hijackers while trying to extract information from them concerning possible "booby-traps on the bus and/or additional terrorists who might present an immediate danger.''[12] Although this example does not precisely follow Michael Levin's criterion of torturing only those known to be threatening innocent lives, it is useful to raise the question of intention. What was the intention of the Israeli soldiers? Their declared purpose was not to "kill" their captives. They were making, at least in their minds, an honest attempt to save the lives of their comrades. However, does having an intention that aims at good (in this case saving lives) provide *carte blanche* in these circumstances? Apparently not; the Israeli soldiers were charged with murder

What about our hypothetical torturer? What limits should be placed upon his intentions?

Michael Walzer, in *Just And Unjust Wars*, answered this question when he examined the utilitarian explanation of how it is possible for a soldier to fight justly. Walzer believes that Henry Sidgwick expressed the twofold rule that best summed up the Rules of War according to the utilitarian. Sidgwick's twofold rule prohibits excessive harm by applying two criteria: utility and proportionality. First, as long as an agent's actions contribute to accomplishing the goal of victory, they meet the requirement of utility. Second, the agent's actions must conform to

some notion of proportionality: we are to weigh "the mischief done," which presumably means not only the immediate harm to individuals but also any injury to the permanent interests of mankind, against the contribution that mischief makes to the end of victory.[13]

First, if the torturer's actions promote the goal of saving innocent lives, they satisfy the criterion of utility. Second, the torturer must weigh the "mischief done" in accomplishing this goal. In the case of torture, the "mischief done" is the cruel and unusual pain inflicted upon either the terrorist or, in the case of surrogate torture, an innocent third party, balanced against the potentiality of saving innocent lives.

The problem with Sidgwick's argument is that it

sets the interests of individuals and of mankind at a lesser value than the victory being sought. Any act of force that contributes in a significant way to winning the war is likely to be called permissible; any officer who asserts the "conduciveness" of the attack he is planning is likely to have his way.[14]

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Moreover, the same kinds of criticisms can be raised against other arguments for the practice of torture. Any use of torture that contributes to saving innocent lives, whether or not its use can be justified as a last resort, will be permissible. Any leader who honestly believes the use of torture is warranted will have his way. The only use of torture that is ruled out is *purposeless* or *wanton* torture. The result is that human interests and moral worth are held in abeyance on the chance of *possible* promotion of goodness and the certainty of a measure of evil.

Danger awaits because of the "metastatic tendency of torture."[15] In other words, once the prohibition against the practice of torture is lifted, the use of this practice has the potential of spreading like a cancerous growth. The chronicles of Amnesty International and the United Nations provide empirical data to support this claim. Once the prohibition against the practice of torture is lifted, the door is opened for justifying its use in other than "hard cases." Michael Levin argues that once torture has been justified against the terrorist, how can one argue against using it against the plane hijacker or the kidnapper? One cannot, Levin states, because "the decision to use torture is a matter of balancing innocent lives against the means needed to save them."[16] Although I disagree with the reasoning that the "justified" use of torture in one case entails its use in other life threatening situations, this logic demonstrates the kind of reasoning that propagates the use of torture.

I believe those who state that our political leaders face some tough decisions concerning not only terrorists but also any individual (for example, a kidnapper or arsonist) who threatens innocent human life. I also agree that the situations which *seem* to dictate the use of

torture represent "hard cases"—maybe even the hardest of cases because the stakes are so high. Innocent lives, possibly millions of them, may hang in the balance of a decision to perform what I consider to be a debasing act. However, I still have not answered whether there is ever a moral justification for torture.

Facing the Hard Case

If I change the scenario to present the hardest of cases, the terrorist controls life threatening means but makes no demands, an alternative—meeting the terrorist's demands—no longer exists. Hence, we are faced with a fanatic who wants nothing except to see innocent millions die. How could anyone possibly object to torturing a terrorist under these circumstances? This change is obviously significant because we are presented with a radically new, yet realistic, case. For example, the pyromaniac does not threaten or make demands but burns just to watch. And what of the third and fourth generation PLO members? Terrorism represents not just an ideology; it is a way of life. Moreover, it is the only life they know. It is conceivable that such a group would destroy an entire city in order to promote or enhance its cause or demonstrate its power.

Extreme cases, however, do not represent the norm. Therefore, the "no demand" scenario does not justify a rule approving the practice of torture. Shue stated that "there is a saying in jurisprudence that hard cases make bad law and there might well be one in philosophy that artificial cases make bad ethics."[17] The case remains realistic and worthy of inquiry as long as it is remembered that even though there are no demands to be met, there is still no guarantee that the use of torture will be successful. We are still dealing in the realm of possibility.

The utilitarian argument proves problematic even for the hard case. To pursue this argument, I will assume that a utilitarian justification for the use of torture in the new scenario is substantiated. Upon acceptance of a utilitarian argument for torture, however, one must concede that torture is justifiable as a means for saving innocent lives. But if this premise is true, then why should we limit the use of torture to "hard cases?" If one life, ten lives, or ten million lives are at stake, torture should be recognized as an acceptable means for saving human beings. Moreover, surrogate torture should also be acceptable in some, if not all, cases.

The problem with this argument is that we do not condone the practice of torture in any form within our society. If such a powerful argument can be given in favor of torture, then why have our leaders refused to adopt it before? Is it possible that we recognize torture itself as inherently evil, regardless of the *seemingly* good consequences it produces? To answer this question, I want to retain the new scenario, but shift to a different, a deontological, line of examination.

Deontological Analysis of Torture

The deontological position about torture is radically different from that of the utilitarian. The deontologist denies the utilitarian claim that the morality of an action depends on the good or bad consequences an action produces. For a deontologist, the moral rightness or wrongness of an action is independent of its consequences. One has a duty to perform morally right actions and to avoid morally wrong actions, irrespective of the consequences of doing so. The deontologist believes that an action is moral if it conforms to the moral law. The test for conformity is a formal one; hence, if an action has a certain form, it is morally right. If it does not have the

proper form, it is immoral.[18] Immanuel Kant, in *Foundations Of The Metaphysics Of Morals,* describes three formal conditions that an action must have if it is to be moral: it must be consistently universalizable, respect rational beings as ends in themselves, and respect rational beings as autonomous. It is this respect for rational beings that I find particularly compelling because it is germane to any discussion of torture. Two contemporary rights theorists, John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, have emphasized the importance of respect and moral worth of human beings *qua* human beings in formulating their respective theories. Their comments on this subject are relevant here.

So far, it is easy to see that the classical deontological approach, that is, one which is primarily Kantian in nature, will condemn the use of torture for at least two reasons. First, the act of torture fails to satisfy the second formulation of the moral law: "Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or that of another, always as an end and never as a means only."[19] If we torture someone out of anger or because we are trying to prevent an anticipated evil, we have not treated them with respect. We have treated him or her as a means to accomplish some other end—specifically, as a means to save lives. Second, the justification of our action is solely dependent upon consequences—namely, the *possibility* of saving threatened lives—and not concerned with conforming to the moral law. But what could be wrong with trying to save lives? The answer lies in an examination of the role of rights within our society and of the role of our leaders.

To avoid the problems of "natural rights" theorists, I limit my discussion to those rights which rise out of a social setting—in particular, the rights which have played a key role in the development of American society.

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Equal Concern and Respect

From the beginning, the founding fathers set our government on the basic foundation of human rights. National and international manifestoes have promulgated the sanctity of human rights: the American Declaration of Independence (1776), the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens (1789), the first 10 Amendments to The Constitution of the United States known as the "Bill of Rights" (1791), and the General Assembly of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (1948). In our society we are eager to embrace the language of rights. We advocate our right to free speech, our right to life and liberty, right to travel, right to bear arms, and our right not to be treated in a cruel and unusual manner (the latter is the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution), to name just a few. How do we acquire these rights? Many are inherent in the Constitution, but this statement does not adequately explain how those rights have been derived. Moreover, the Constitution represents positive law, making the torture of citizens a violation of their fundamental legal rights. What makes torture a violation of the moral law?

John Rawls, lecturing on "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," provides a useful explanation of the more fundamental American conception of rights, one which captures the moral realm.

A Kantian doctrine joins the content of justice with a certain conception of the person; and this conception regards persons as both free and equal, as capable of acting both reasonably and rationally, and therefore as capable of taking part in social cooperation among persons so conceived.[20]

Ronald Dworkin, in *Taking Rights Seriously,* complements Rawls' theory and states

our intuitions about justice presuppose not only that people have rights but that one right among these is fundamental and even axiomatic. This most fundamental of rights is a distinct conception of the right to equality, which I call the right to equal concern and respect.[21]

The concept of "person" is inextricably linked with the concepts of freedom and equality. Any society that incorporates this conception of the person with a sense of justice ascribes to the individual certain rights and establishes the parameters of how he or she may be treated within the social setting. Even the individual who deviates from rational behavior and transgresses against the laws of society and the rights of others (the criminal) retains the fundamental respect attributed to the individual and must be treated in a prescribed manner. Hence, we do not allow an individual to be beaten in order to get a confession, nor do we allow him to be punished in any capricious way. A sense of justice and fundamental respect for the individual mandating how one *ought* to be treated is enmeshed in the American judicial system.

Rawls and Dworkin both capture the quintessence of the most fundamental right, the "axiomatic" right, from which our other rights are derived. Moreover, Rawls has infused a sense of justice into the concept of person as well. The individual *qua* individual, therefore, acquires certain rights and ought to be treated with respect and dignity solely because he is a human being. Several essential factors can help us discern the role of rights when discussing torture. First, each person has human worth that belongs to him regardless of his actions. Second, in order to have respect for an individual, one must ascribe dignity to him. Third, torture, a manifest disrespect for human worth, strips the individual of his dignity and metamorphoses him into a being

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less than human—a screaming, cowering animal willing to do anything, deny anyone to escape torment. Our Constitution provides for the requisite social setting to engender the right to equal concern and respect and implies the multiplicity of rights derived from this most fundamental right.

Because a person has human worth, for that reason is entitled to maintain his human dignity; he should not be tortured. To advocate torture is to erode the very edifice of our values because torture degrades and dehumanizes both the victim and the torturer. How, then, to address whether a leader who has taken an oath to uphold the Constitution and protect the public can have an obligation to do torture? Of course he cannot. In the first place, the leader has taken that oath to uphold a Constitution that assures equal concern and respect for all. That Constitution is the shield that protects all our rights, but what is most important, it must protect that right to equal concern and respect. The principles embodied in the Constitution—a conflating of the concept of "person" with a sense of justice—are to be protected, but the processes of protection do not themselves negate the principles. That is why organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union feel compelled—even obligated—to defend the American Nazi party's right to free speech, not because they agree with Nazi party beliefs, nor because they are swayed by the unfortunate effects of party activity on contemporary Jewry. The stake is principle itself, which has to be protected at all costs. Likewise, the judge who sets the murderer free because of a technicality of the law—if the young police officer, for example, forgot the Miranda Act in making the arrest—is supporting this same belief. The consequence of releasing the convicted murderer may indeed result in future innocent deaths.

Nevertheless, the principle, which the deontologist does not tie to consequences, remains safeguarded for the protection of all Americans.

What about the leader's responsibility to the public? If the leader has taken an oath of office, does the leader have an obligation to do whatever is necessary to protect the public? Again the answer is no. The oath of office does not allow *carte blanche*; the leader is restrained by the standards of the Constitution. The leader has an obligation to act but to act in compliance with the law under which the oath was taken. Otherwise, whatever the leader conceived to be the right action would be justified. It does not take a vivid imagination to contemplate the kinds of abuses and prejudices that could become common practice if there were no fixed standards by which to judge public actions. John Winthrop, English colonist and colonial governor of Connecticut, stated,

The great questions that have troubled the country, are about the authority of the magistrates and the liberty of people. It is yourselves who have called us to office, and being called by you, we have our authority from God, in way of an ordinance, such as hath the image of God eminently stamped upon it, the contempt and violation whereof hath been vindicated with examples of divine vengeance.... [Magistrates are] men subject to like passions as you are.... Therefore when you see infirmities in us, you should reflect upon your own, and that would make you bear the more with us, and not be severe censurers of the failings of your magistrates, when you have continual experience of the like infirmities in yourselves and others.[22]

Winthrop's comments illustrate the reason why abuses of the principle cannot be tolerated. Michael Levin assumes that the individual who administers the torture has a certain character that remains coolly rational under

the most adverse conditions and capable of discerning egoistic desires and cultural prejudices from "justified" abuses. To sanction the practice of torture would allow leaders with infirm characters or those easily swayed by public opinion (that is, political leaders desiring reelection or appointed officials wanting to maintain their positions) to justify their abusive actions by citing the awesome responsibilities they shoulder in the performance of their duties. But in cases where "mistakes" are made, how do you recompense the victim and his family? Any abuse of power or authority by our leaders is dangerous. Abuses that disregard the most fundamental right, the right to equal concern and respect, represent the most dangerous of all.

The conclusion that I draw is that torture, which violates deliberately or ignorantly the right of equal concern and respect, can never be morally justified. To authorize the use of torture in "hard cases" on either a utilitarian or deontological argument is to devalue the most fundamental moral principles upon which our democratic heritage is founded. With the first constitutional yielding to sanction the practice of torture, we would authorize the gradual decadence of the democratic values of our society. It is a risk not to be taken.

The grim reality of extreme cases of terrorism in which millions of lives are at stake remains. How is the responsible leader to act under conditions beyond the pale of our normal experiences? The practice of torture is not condoned. What about individual acts of torture that are seemingly mandated in these "hard cases." If a leader has exhausted, to the best of his knowledge, all conceivable options and resources available, can he be morally justified in torturing an individual? For two important reasons the answer must remain no. First, although we are trying to prevent a future evil, it is possible that we do not have all the relevant facts. The

bomb may not go off; the whole scenario may be the hoax of a terrorist organization trying to invoke abusive behavior by government officials to generate sentiment for their cause. No leader can ever know all the relevant factors; because we are human—mistakes can be made. Second, out of respect for the sanctity of human beings, we want all people, especially our leaders, to feel guilty for resorting to such a demeaning act. The ability to provide a moral justification for your actions entails freedom from guilt. The best a leader who tortures can hope for is to have his or her behavior "excused," that is, not to be punished according to the letter of the law because of the extraordinary circumstances that the terrorist forced on him. That his actions remain immoral, however, must never be doubted. The onus of responsibility remains on the leader's shoulders; we want him to denounce any moral praise for his actions, and we will require substantive explanation of his decision if he is to escape punishment.

Walzer rejected "a general account of war as a realm of necessity and duress" and refused to justify violations of the rules of war merely as "humanity under pressure."[23] According to Walzer, one violates the provisions of the war convention (those rules governing the actions of combatants and the status on noncombatants during war) "at one's moral and physical peril."[24] Likewise, anyone who commits an act of torture does so knowing that he or she has transgressed against the most fundamental, axiomatic right embodied in the Constitution—the right to equal concern and respect; such actions necessarily entail a disregard for the respect and moral worth due the victim. Consequently, the act of torture must also be performed at one's moral and physical peril. The torturer must be held accountable for culpable actions. Because of the

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very nature of torture, "dirty hands" should engender guilt and remorse for one's actions. In other words, in the name of justice—trying to save innocent lives—the torturer will have performed an unjust act. Because of the inherent nature of justice itself, however, the action must be condemned.[25]

In summary, I have argued that the practice of torture is never morally justified and that the most powerful argument in favor of torture, utilitarianism, is too permissive and would allow for countless abuses. Moreover, I have argued that torture must also be rejected on deontological grounds because it threatens the most fundamental of rights in "enlightened" societies—the right to equal concern and respect—that recognizes the human worth of the individual. For humanity to retain its necessary regard for human worth, we must safeguard all humans from torture—even the terrorist.

Notes

1. Michael Levin, "The Case for Torture," *Newsweek*, 7 June 1982, p. 13.

2. Ibid.

3. Henry Shue, "Torture," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 7 (Winter 1978): 133.

4. Barrie Paskins, "What's Wrong with Torture?," *British Journal of International Studies* 2 (1976): 138.

5. Michael Levin, p. 13.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. "Peru Is Criticized by a Rights Group," *New York Times*, 29 October 1984, p. A5.

11. Ibid.

12. "Israelis Beat Hijackers to Death," *Poughkeepsie Journal*, 29 May 1984.

13. Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p. 129.

14. Ibid.

15. Henry Shue, p. 143.

16. Michael Levin, p. 13.

17. Henry Shue, p. 141.

18. Richard T. DeGeorge, *Business Ethics* (New York: Macmillan, 1982), pp. 58–59.

19. Immanuel Kant, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), p. 47.

20. John Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: The Dewey Lectures, 1980," *The Journal of Philosophy* 77 (1980): 518.

21. Ronald Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. xii.

22. John Winthrop, "A Little Speech on Liberty." in *American Poetry and Prose,* ed. Normal Foerster, 4th ed. (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957), p. 33.

23. Michael Walzer, p. 4.

24. Ibid., p. 47.

25. Ibid., p. 323.

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The Ethical Characteristics
Of Three Eras of Strategy
And Tactics

J. HAROLD ELLENS

FREQUENTLY WE FORMULATE
our concerns as soldiers, or as citizens interested in the
practical matters of the profession of arms, under the
rubric of "professional ethics." In our hearts we all
know, of course, that when we speak of the ethics of
military life, operations, leadership, command, or phi-
losophy, we are always dealing with matters that go far
beyond the confines of personal professional ethics. We
face, rather, the issues of the ethics of war itself and the
ethics of its methods, objectives, and consequences.
The heart of the matter of military ethics is not merely
that of the ethics of our personal professional behavior,
style, goals, or integrity.

The history of warfare has progressed through
three discrete eras. Each is distinctive for the tactics,
and to some degree for the strategy, which characterized
it. The functions and characteristics of military opera-
tions in each era were surprisingly different from those
of the other two eras. Nonetheless, basic principles in

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the science and art of war have remained very much the same throughout history. The eras are, first, that before Clausewitz; second, the Clausewitz or Napoleonic era; and, third, the post-Clausewitz era. The first era runs from the days of primitive warfare to about the end of the eighteenth century, the second from 1800 to 1953, and the third from that time forward. By examining the similarities and differences in tactics and, by implication, the differences in strategy throughout these eras, with an eye to the dynamics and functions of both in the light of basic ethical principles such as humaneness and economy of resources, I address the ethical claims that should shape the strategy and tactics of the present era.

Exposition

From the earliest primitive assault by one human being upon another, throughout the age of medieval warfare, and until Napoleon in the modern era, the primary key objective of military operations was assault upon and reduction of persons, groups of persons, and populated areas. There are rare exceptions to this in the strategy and tactics of the ancient Persians and Macedonians, but none are thoroughgoing exceptions, nor do they indicate a generalized difference of policy from that which describes the era. The prevailing policy of assault upon and reduction of persons and populated areas typically took the form of envelopment and siege, whether in the primitive form of sneaking up on and murdering persons individually, surprising and burning down homes or hamlets, or surrounding and starving out major cities. The basic ethical issues raised by or during this era, whether they were thought of seriously at the time or not, were three in number: first, issues related to the necessity of the extermination of humans and

destruction of their cultures for the sake of increasing the safety or prosperity of the aggressor's policy, society, and culture; second, issues related to how ruthlessly or humanely this "necessary" extermination could be carried out and whether noncombatants were taken captive for integration into the aggressor society or exterminated along with the combatants; and finally, issues related to the relative advantage of the result compared with the losses realized in achieving it, the cost-benefit ratio.

Napoleonic warfare brought new objectives. With Napoleonic mobility and Napoleon's refinement of the fundamentals of strategy, principles of war, and elements of tactical maneuver, persons and populated areas were no longer seen as key objectives. Indeed, they came to be seen, in this second era of the history of warfare, as obstacles because they tended to tie down the freedom of military maneuver and delay or prevent the achievement of domination and control of the high ground, of other key terrain such as mountain passes, river crossings, and road or rail junctions, and of supply and communication routes. Therefore, they were avoided, since the intent of military field operations was to interdict enemy forces in their efforts to gain control of the key objectives themselves. Such frustration of the enemy's tactical intentions tended to undermine the enemy field force's success in battle and the enemy nation's will to continue the military contest, thus nullifying its strategic plan.

Jomini formulated the underlying assumption of military operations for the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, pointing out that in this era of massive armies and grand strategies, reflecting geopolitical perspectives, the purposes and objectives of warfare were not the slaughter of enemy

soldiers or the genocide of enemy populations but, rather, the effective killing of enemy strategy. Moreover, he saw clearly that the killing of enemy strategy rather than enemy soldiers ..quired, primarily, the domination of key real estate zones.[1]

For both Jomini and Clausewitz, strategy dealt with national purposes, wide spaces, long periods, large movements, ultimate objectives, and geopolitical perspectives. Tactics, on the other hand, were understood to deal with the factors involved in management of the action on the battlefield itself. All were seen as designed to compel the enemy to engage at a disadvantage, depriving him of freedom of maneuver, key terrain, effective communication, and satisfactory supply.

Clausewitz applied the lessons of Napoleonic strategy and tactics, in the light of Jomini's dictum, to the formulation of the "total war" concept. This is the notion that any action is appropriate to war if it hampers the enemy's ability to carry out his strategy. Any economic, political, psychological, or military insult is an appropriate act of war if it kills enemy strategy or the will to carry out that strategy. The total war notion in the Napoleonic or Clausewitzian era has generally been viewed as a condition to avoid if possible but to pursue with thoroughness when it is necessitated by international conditions. Western nations have, apparently for moral reasons, usually been hesitant to undertake warfare, but once war has become apparently unavoidable, modern Western nations, particularly the USA, have been impatient with the process and with its moral constraints. Total war has, in such circumstances, readily seemed to be the only moral mode to bring the hostilities to end quickly, with maximum humaneness and economy of resources. The Vietnam war was an

exception to this, but that was not unrelated to the fact that it took place in the post-Napoleonic era of warfare.

With the ascendance of contemporary sophisticated technology applied to warfare, particularly with the introduction of the helicopter and its potential for vertical envelopment, new tactics were necessitated. In consequence, neither populated areas as in the pre-Napoleonic era, nor key terrain features as in the Napoleonic era, survived as the primary objectives controlling the management of the battlefield. Instead, mobility, strong points, escape and evasion, and targets of opportunity on a fluid battlefield have come to dominate field operations in this third era of the history of warfare. The intent of war is still the same, to kill enemy strategy by defeating the effectiveness of enemy tactics, but the battlefield methods and objectives have significantly changed because the battlefield conditions have changed as the battlefield environment has become infused with high-technology weapons.[2]

In this new era, the ethical concerns take new shapes as the tactics of field operations move further and further from the logic of Napoleonic objectives and principles of maneuver.

Clausewitzian Theory

Clausewitz was a voracious student of Napoleonic military operations and distilled from them, and the then-developing philosophy of war, a number of concepts that he saw as the rudiments of the science of war. He delineated his principles as follows. He contended that war should be kept to as limited an enterprise as possible, defining it as a rational instrument of foreign policy, "an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will." Therefore, he thought that

all military science becomes a matter of simple pru-
dence, its principle object being to keep an instable bal-
ance from shifting suddenly to our disadvantage and the
proto-war from changing into total war. He saw the
importance of· deterrent threats for intimidating the
enemy from initiating war, escalating war, or turning
potential war into total war. "Peace is maintained by
the equilibrium of forces, and will continue just so long
as this equilibrium exists, and no longer."[3]

Ironside summarized this dimension of Clause-
witzian theory in his observation that the object of war
is to defeat the enemy armed force and to destroy his
power to resist, with minimum expenditure of men,
money, and material. However, it is clear in Claus-
ewitzian perspective that when the enemy escalates the
contest to the point of serious threat, a nation is morally
bound to opt for total war, mobilizing the total popula-
tion and economy and identifying the total enemy force,
psyche, and sources of supply as fit targets of military
action.

War is not merely a political act, but also a real political
instrument; a continuation of policy, carried out by other
means.... War admittedly has its own grammar but not its
own logic.[4]

That is to say, the logic of war lies in its political objec-
tives. By implication, the ethics of a war concern the
appropriateness of its political objectives, the relative
humaneness of their pursuit, and the appropriateness of
the cost-benefit ratio in the cause of terminating enemy
strategy and counter-strategy.

War as Science

In contending that war has its own distinctive grammar,
rooted in the general principles of universal logic,

Clausewitz intended to claim that war is a discrete and significant science, with precisely identifiable laws and components. His motivation in research and writing about the theory and practice of war was to delineate and develop the contours of that science. He endeavored with considerable success to articulate its paradigms and taxonomy. The categories of his scientific understanding of war fall mainly into three sets. They are the Fundamentals of Strategy, the Principles of War, and the Elements of Tactics or Battlefield Management.

Clausewitz perceived that the Fundamentals of Strategy are made up of four specific elements: a society's national aims, national policy, assessment of the acceptable calculated risk, and the employment of battle to gain the political objective which the first two fundamentals of strategy intend.[5] Clausewitz' concern in defining the science of war was to establish once and for all the understanding that war can be a rational instrument for gaining wholesome and responsible national objectives in responsible and humane ways. He believed that such an understanding would rid the world of irrational wars of impetuosity, adventure, vindictiveness, piracy, narcissism, and irresponsible arrogance or accident. He clearly assumed that by bringing war under the claim and control of a rational scientific system of thought, it could become answerable to ethical claims in that it would be controlled by rational constraints. One can see readily the influence of Hegel's thought upon the Clausewitzian philosophy of war.

In this light, Clausewitz set down what he conceived quite appropriately to be the Principles of War. In his taxonomy they are eight in number: the advantage of the offensive; unity of command; economy of force; mass (or concentration) of force; fire power; surprise; maneuver; and security of force and movement (from

attack, sabotage and subversion). British theorists have added a characteristic tenth, namely, annihilation of the enemy force. Clausewitz assumed the ninth in his second and third. He would have found the tenth unethical, erroneous, unnecessary, and illogical.

The management of the battlefield itself was of particular interest to both Clausewitz and Jomini. They knew a great deal about this practical matter, as well, since both had served significantly as leaders in battle. Clausewitz saw the laws and elements of battlefield maneuver or tactics as finite and definitive, in the sense in which mathematics is finite and definitive. He felt that there were only a specified number of things a battlefield commander could do with his forces, and only predictable ways in which he could do them. Battle management was, in his view, subject to a precise set of laws. If these were not followed seriously, failure was inevitable. A commander could employ the tactic of defense; the frontal assault; penetration; envelopment, single or double; pursuit; focus upon a specified objective; exploitation; diversion; speed; and retrograde action. If he employed these, he could win. If he did not, he would lose.

War as Ethical Imperative

A subtle but certain implication of Clausewitz' way of viewing war is its ethical implication. Though he did not draw out this aspect of his theory to any great extent, one can clearly see in his system the notion that war becomes an expression of national policy when illegitimate threats arise against legitimate national aims. Assuming the legitimacy of the national aims, therefore, the policy designed to achieve those aims is legitimated. Assuming the adherence to the principles of the science of war, then, the process and consequence is inevitably ethical as well.

Moreover, that ethical implication can be drawn out one step further. Assuming the ethical and legitimate pursuit of national policy, when legitimate national aims are illegitimately threatened, warfare as an extension of that policy becomes an ethical imperative. For Clausewitz war was an ethical imperative. When war did not conform to these legitimate criteria, it was, by definition, irrational and, therefore, an inappropriate expression of national policy. By implication, he would have argued, one would imagine, that when international conflict deteriorates into guerrilla warfare it is a calamity and a social disaster because it ceases to be a rational expression of legitimate aims of a responsible society or its government, and it then and therefore ceases to be rationally managed or manageable, in keeping with the science of war.

This perspective, arising as it did at the outset of the great age of humanist rationalism, the nineteenth century, has its roots and source in the Just War Theory, particularly as it was developed by Thomas Aquinas and articulated in the work of Hugo Grotius, the Hague Conventions, and the Geneva Conventions. It inevitably links itself with the long history of the pursuit of a philosophy of international law and its application to the conduct of nations at war. All these notions and efforts at statutory constraint upon international affairs have as their common denominator the assumption that war when legitimately waged is an ethical enterprise, indeed, an ethical imperative, and that when it is not an ethical imperative, in that sense, it must not be perpetrated. A secondary assumption is that "necessary" war when waged in keeping with rational and scientific principles such as Clausewitz articulated in his three sets of categories is ethical in style as well as in aims and purposes. The conclusion one is led to draw from this is

that tactics and strategy are, in and of themselves, amoral but become legitimated components of an ethical enterprise when conditions prevail that make war an imperative of legitimate national aims and policy. Conversely, they become illegitimate as components of an unethical enterprise when they are not carried out in keeping with the rational constraints of the science of war, or when they are employed in an unjust war.

It is in this context, precisely, that the total war concept recommended itself to Clausewitz, Jomini, most military theoreticians and commanders since then, and particularly to the movers and shapers of World War II, such as Marshall, Roosevelt, and Churchill, as well as Eisenhower and MacArthur.

Contemporary Practical Views

In a speech delivered on 28 November 1984, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger declared that the responsible use of military force is a moral issue. Its employment by a democracy is the employment of war as a final political tool that is legitimate only when all else in diplomacy and statesmanship has failed.[6] Based on Clausewitzian theory he set down six tests of ethically defensible and morally responsible engagement in warfare.[7] They express in practical terms Clausewitz' Principles of War.

Weinberger enunciated the doctrine as follows. First, the United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies. Second, in the event that the United States decides it is necessary to put combat troops into the field in a potential combat situation, we must do so wholeheartedly and with the intention of winning. If we are not willing to commit the forces or resources

necessary to achieve our objectives, we should refrain from involvement. Third, if we decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. We must know precisely how our forces can accomplish those objectives, and we must provide the forces and resources to accomplish that. Fourth, the relationship between our objectives and our committed forces, that is, their size, composition, and disposition, must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary. Fifth, before we commit forces abroad we must have reasonable assurance that we have the support of our citizenry and the Congress. To secure such support requires that we are candid in clarifying the threats we face. The support can be sustained only with close and continuing consultation with the Congress and the American people. Sixth, the commitment of US forces to combat should be a last resort. These six constitute the ethical implication of the logic of war for our time, as perceived by the Secretary of Defense.

George F. Kennan contends that moral principle is the motivator and guide for national foreign policy. He points out that the conduct of diplomacy is the responsibility of government and not of private individuals or of the entire society. The first principle of moral constraint, says Kennan, is that government action genuinely serve the interests and not just the preferences or tastes of the society, a people's needs rather than merely its wants. The main obligations the government holds to its people are two: security of its territory and culture against military aggression and security of its environment against waste and abuse. Unfortunately, Kennan points out, there are no objective or internationally accepted standards of morality to which a government may appeal or against which it may measure its own or

another's behavior. There are merely high-sounding statements or charters, such as the Hague and Geneva Conventions or the statements of international law of Hugo Grotius and his disciples. These have no substance or statutory character to them. The policies and actions of a government can conform to moral standards, therefore, only in the sense that they conform to the nation's own principles of justice and propriety. When other governments threaten the national interests of the former, retaliation is ethical, so long as its aims and methods conform to the reacting nation's own principles of justice and propriety. To ensure the success of such morally upright policy we must always distinguish with care between "the true substance and mere appearance of moral behavior."[8]

It is quite clear that both Weinberger and Kennan assume that strategy and tactics are in and of themselves amoral and that the ethical quality of their employment in the pursuit of policy depends upon the legitimacy of that policy, the humaneness of the methods of its pursuit, the appropriateness of the cost-benefits ratio, and the rational coherence of the military process as it is managed in the theater of war and on the battlefield, in keeping with the science of war.

One can cite Creveld, Weigley, Wells, Millis, Brodie, Fuller, Hart, Earle, and Dupuy to the same effect. Most of them are still thinking in terms of the second era of the history of warfare, namely, that dominated by Napoleonic strategy and tactics, Clausewitzian theory, and the philosophy of Jomini. However, the world has changed greatly. Battlefield tactics have been revised by the impact of technological changes of an entirely new order of magnitude and of a genuinely monstrous character and nature. The third era of the history of warfare is irrevocably upon us. This is the era

in which the introduction of the helicopter and other machines has added new tactical elements, for air and land warfare such as the vertical envelopment, the potential for long-range tactical nuclear explosions, air assault and the like. In consequence, neither populated areas nor key terrain make sensible objectives for battle. Both can be rendered highly vulnerable and, therefore, highly disadvantageous in war. Instead, a fluid battlefield of undefined boundaries, in which tactical patterns are, perforce, increasingly clandestine, and employed in terms of targets of opportunity, reduces the entire enterprise to something increasingly like guerrilla warfare. That reduces the entire operation of warfare to a form of irrational terrorism, carried out at various levels of force, sophistication, and legitimacy. Little care can be given to distinguishing between combatants and noncombatants, humane and inhumane methods, rational or irrational war grammar, an appropriate cost-benefit ratio, or coherence of separate actions with the general strategy and defined national purpose.

Arab-based terrorism has added a devastating new dimension to the nature of warfare in this third era, with its reversion to primitive, pre-Clausewitzian objectives of siege and slaughter of persons, groups of persons, populated areas, and noncombatants, and the barbaric enterprise of hostage holding and terrorist bombings. The Arab experiment in terrorism is based upon four Islamic principles that must be permanently and incontrovertably reprehensible to the Western mind. They are, first, that the ends always justify the means, second, the conviction that violence is a standard procedure for expanding Islam, third, violence is a tradition that is both legal and imperative, and, fourth, that violence is an Islamic form of prayer. These assumptions are amply demonstrated in Islamic-Arabic history by the

fact, for example, that the Arabs imported one hundred thousand black slaves each year from A.D. 800 to A.D. 1800 from central Africa, a total of one hundred million persons violently wrenched from their homes and hamlets and absorbed or lost in the vast Arabic empire during those one thousand years of terror to blacks.

Marxism shares some fundamental characteristics with this violent tradition of the Arabs. First, the inevitability of war, second, the legitimacy of violence to gain any objective, and, third, evangelical fervor to destroy Western society.

Terrorism and guerrilla tactics are the war of the future. That kind of war is affordable in an era of excessive cost of sophisticated war machines and can be carried out by relatively unsophisticated and poor Third World countries, as a way of wielding inordinate power in a world of superpowers. Moreover, such guerrilla wars can be implemented by the superpowers without the danger of escalation into more generalized war or total war and can be carried out by the superpowers without the conflict being clearly attributable to either of the superpowers. The third era of strategy and tactics has introduced a change that is likely to be permanent. It has rung in an era of guerrilla terrorism as the contemporary design of the tactics of a battlefield without boundaries, with targets of opportunity and clandestine operations, indiscriminate as regards combatant and noncombatant targets. The Just War Theory is permanently bankrupt.[9]

What does this change do to the ethical question, to the morality of tactics or strategy? If such warfare as characterizes the era since 1953 is to retain any inherent legitimacy and ethical warrant, it must conform to one fundamental principle; war in all of its manifestations, must reflect legitimate national aims and must achieve

those aims humanely, at the earliest moment and at the lowest level of insult to humanity, to the universe, and especially, I suppose, to the nation that has defined those aims. To do that, it will most certainly be the case that massive destruction of enemy populations or occupation of key terrain will not be of the highest priority nor maximum long-term usefulness.

Destruction of enemy strategy and will to fight will still be the main issue. Whatever can or must be done to achieve that at the lowest cost in men, money, and material is surely the moral imperative. That may be the massive mobilization of whole populations and economies against enemy societies and political-economic systems, or it may be the skillful application of scientific battlefield tactics in a local situation, or it may even be a surgical guerrilla tactic like a CIA action. If it achieves the original legitimate objective in the most humane way available, with the best cost-benefit ratio, it is the course of inevitable ethical imperative. The tactics and strategy have no inherent moral quality. How and to what end they are employed does. Instruments are always nonmoral, actions are always moral or immoral.

The progress from primitive, ancient, and feudal warfare to Napoleonic practice and from there to modern mobile or guerrilla warfare does not change the essence of the enterprise. It changes only the objectives and tactics. The ethical questions remain the same throughout. Are the national aims legitimate? Is the policy for their achievement a responsible one? Does the strategy afford an appropriate cost-benefit ratio? Do the tactics provide the most humane pursuit of the national aims? Can the war be controlled in terms of the rational science of legitimate and successful battlefield management?

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The strategy and tactics are not moral or immoral in quality or character in themselves. The objectives for which they are employed and the coherence and rationality with which they are executed give rise to issues of ethics and morality.

In the end, of course, and in a more cosmic perspective, it seems quite clear that in any ultimate sense all war is immoral, but it is legitimated when it is less immoral than all of the other options in a given situation. In any case, the overriding principle that seems more urgent now than at any other time in the three eras of the history of warfare, or in any of the theories, philosophies, and practical designs for the enterprise of the Profession of Arms is the principle that we are under moral constraint to complete any war at the earliest possible moment with the least possible damage to all of humanity, particularly the offended nation. Any measure necessary to accomplish that goal in the most humane way possible is the ethical and moral imperative. As Kennan declared wryly,

In a less than perfect world, where the ideal so obviously lies beyond human reach, it is natural that the avoidance of the worst should often be a more practical undertaking than the achievement of the best, and that some of the strongest imperatives of moral conduct should be ones of a negative rather than a positive nature. The strictures of the Ten Commandments are perhaps the best illustration of this state of affairs.

Weinberger would agree, ''The commitment of ... forces to combat should be a last resort.''

I would go further than that; War may never happen again. If it does, it must be prosecuted so as to end at the soonest possible moment, at the lowest cost to humanity and the universe. That is the ultimate ethical imperative for war, regardless of the legitimacy of national aims, purposes, and policy.

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Notes

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Military Strategy
And Morality:
Some Relationships

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BEFORE DISCUSSING ANY POS-
sible relationships between military strategy and moral-
ity in the US experience, it would be helpful to consider
that there may well be certain basic notions and pre-
dispositions concerning the central phenomenon of war
that are shared not only among Americans but by most
societies that have been influenced by the Western lib-
eral tradition. This tradition, based on the ideals of
Judaism, Christianity, and the Enlightenment, at times
manifests itself in an abhorrence of war and in the cor-
responding tendency to use reason, law, and morality as
a basis for peaceful settlement of potential conflict. By
the same token, however, when war is unavoidable
there clearly exists a tendency to make it a moral
crusade. Thus, the values and beliefs that usually are
used to denounce war become a justification for it; vio-
lence, instead of being viewed with abhorrence, is
accepted as necessary.

The strategy formulation process in the US experi-
ence cannot escape this powerful Western tradition.

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Indeed, the basic attitudes, concerns, and beliefs of those who formulate US strategy are so conditioned by Western antecedents that the outcomes of their efforts are predictable to a considerable extent. One merely needs to examine the central factors or variables that contribute to the development of strategy to recognize that US strategy cannot be made in a moral vacuum. As such, the strategy formulation process assures that US strategy will reflect its moral values.

Key Elements

For discussing military strategy, let me suggest that strategy is the manner in which one uses military force to deter war or to achieve the desired political objectives in war. The distinction drawn between the deterrent and employment functions is not intended to imply that a different strategy can exist for each but, rather, that a credible strategy can serve different functions. But this relationship notwithstanding, fundamental differences do exist between deterrence and employment, and these distinctions, in turn, place a heavy functional burden on military strategy. Deterrence, as Thomas C. Schelling reminded us some two decades ago, "is about intentions—not just *estimating* enemy intentions but *influencing* them.'" Estimating enemy intentions, of course, is a major undertaking (a point well understood by most members of the national security community), but the task of influencing intentions, is so difficult that it generally defies the rationalization of attempted approaches. Indeed, it is the uncertainty about the cause and effect relationship that might exist, for example, between US deterrent actions and Soviet response behavior, that raises fundamental questions about the efficacy and morality of US nuclear deterrence policy.

When viewed in the context of the use of force to achieve political objectives, strategy poses yet another set of difficult (and at times unanswerable) questions. Because the aim of force is to achieve political objectives, both the goals and means of strategy become legitimate topics of moral concern. In this regard, however, goals present less of a problem simply because the criteria for just war apply across the spectrum of war. (The criterion of just cause, for example, would apply to revolutionary war, limited war, or total war.) The moral issue concerning strategy, therefore, is not so much a question of its aims or goals; rather, it is a question of its means; that is, how does one plan to use military force?

The process of formulating strategy is a multidimensional one that requires incorporation of a number of variables or factors. In the main, these are threat analysis, doctrine, force structure, and, above all else, the influence of society. These variables when viewed in an interactive sense largely explain one's strategy and suggest the extent to which moral considerations contribute to the outcome.

Although the first of these variables, the threat, can be viewed at several detailed levels of analysis, for our purposes a broad and general approach is a more useful way to demonstrate any moral implications. Moreover, by examining a specific threat, the moral issue can be brought into clearer focus.

By any measure of merit, the Soviet Union is the most serious military threat to the United States. Contrary to widely accepted opinion, however, Soviet military power is not the essence of the threat; indeed, that power is only symptomatic of a more fundamental issue. The real threat is a combination of historical Russian expansionistic tendencies and the nature of the

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Soviet system. Russian literary giants, from Gogal to Solzhenitsyn, have offered us ample warnings on this point. Consider this passage from Gogal's *Dead Souls:*

And thou, Russia, art not thou, too, rushing headlong like the fastest troika that is not to be outdistanced? ... Russia, whither art thou speeding? Answer me! ... She gives no answer. The jingle bells pour forth their wonderful peal, the air, torn to shreds, thunders and runs to wind. Everything on earth is flying past, and other nations and states, eyeing her askance, make way for her and draw aside.'

Likewise, let us remember the specific warnings offered to us by Solzhenitsyn. Our conceptions about the Soviet Union, he claims, are clouded by basic errors, one of which is our

failure to understand the radical hostility of communism to mankind as a whole—the failure to realize that communism is irredeemable, that there exist no "better" variants of communism; that it is incapable of growing "kinder," that it cannot survive as an ideology without using terror, and that, consequently, to coexist with communism on the same planet is impossible. Either it will spread, cancer-like, to destroy mankind, or else mankind will have to rid itself of communism (and even then face lengthy treatment for secondary tumors).'

Other sources, such as prominent and knowledgeable American politicians, also have expressed serious concern about the Soviets. One of them wrote that "the leaders of the Soviet Union are no friends of freedom. They are cynical, ruthless, and dangerous. Their relentless military buildup—well beyond defensive needs—directly challenges our security and that of many other nations, including our friends and allies.'" (These words, incidentally, are not from Ronald Reagan but Walter F. Mondale.)

In addition to the verbal warnings, we must consider Soviet actions such as the treatment of dissidents

in the USSR, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (and its tactics therein), and the downing of Korean Air Lines flight 007; all clearly are indicative of Soviet attitudes and behavior. It is for these reasons that Ronald Reagan is basically correct when he identifies the Soviet Union as the Evil Empire. When viewed in this light, the Soviets are not so much a threat to our physical security, but they are a clear and dangerous threat to our value system. That being the case, any military strategy formulated for use against the Soviets will carry heavy moral overtones. Stated differently, the nature of the Soviet system, that is, the threat, is such that any US strategy can hardly be *amoral*.

Our second variable, military doctrine, also tends to carry moral overtones. Because doctrine is an *"implicit orientation with which a military culture collectively responds to the unfolding circumstances of war,"*[5] United States' military doctrine is but a representation of its combat experience, basic assumptions, and fundamental beliefs about war. And what does the history suggest? If one takes a broad view, the conclusion seems to be that moral overtones are clear and persistent in American strategy. In the US Civil War, for example, both policy and strategy initially were quite consistent with the Just War theories for *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*. At the outset, President Lincoln's policy focused on reconciliation, and General McClellan's doctrine and strategy supported that goal. However, the failure of these efforts in America's first experience at total war is what brought about the morally questionable and extreme military approaches of General Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley and General Sherman in his march through Atlanta and on to the sea. In that regard, recall General Grant's specific message to Sheridan in 1864: "If the war is to last another year, we want the

Shenandoah Valley to remain a barren waste.'"[6] And
Sheridan delivered. In his report to Grant, Sheridan out-
lined his effectiveness:

I have destroyed over 2,000 barns filled with wheat, hay and
farming implements; over 70 mills, filled with flour and
wheat; have driven in front of the army over 4,000 head of
stock, and have killed and issued to the troops not less than
3,000 sheep.... The people here are getting sick of war.[7]

And perhaps it is the last of these—the people—that
represents the culmination of the strategy as executed by
William Tecumseh Sherman.

We "must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard
hand of war," said Sherman about his march from Atlanta to
Savannah and northward to the Carolinas. "They must feel
the effects of war.... They must feel its inexorable neces-
sities, before they can realize the pleasures and amenities of
peace."[8]

In World War II, similarly, the US strategic bomb-
ing efforts against Nazi Germany could hardly be
described as amoral. Although the applied doctrine of
US strategic air attack has been judged, quite correctly,
as deterministic and mechanistic,[9] that doctrine did
express an attempt to terminate conflict quickly and
with minimum casualties by avoiding the German mili-
tary force structure and by destroying instead the Ger-
man economic means to fight. Later, US air leaders
attempted the same approach against Imperial Japan,
but when results could not be achieved quickly enough,
the approach turned (as it did in the Civil War) to more
direct methods.

The air war in Indochina, likewise, gives evidence
of a collective response to war that is tempered by
moral considerations. The Rules of Engagement were
designed in part to lessen the dangers to noncombatants.

That end may have been served, but one also needs to consider the advantage gained by the adversary and the increased hazards the Rules of Engagement presented to US airmen. In the final air offensive over North Vietnam, Linebacker II, US airmen demonstrated that even when given their last chance to employ airpower decisively, they adhered to the Rules of Engagement and the Laws of Aerial Warfare, and as a consequence, Linebacker II resulted in minimum collateral damage and civilian casualties.[10] Given this historical record, therefore, it would be incorrect to describe our collective response to war as amoral.

From threat analysis and doctrine, let us now turn to other instruments of war, commonly referred to as the force structure. Basically defined as the size and composition of the force, the US force structure, and its air component, in particular, has tended to exhibit some distinctive characteristics. The World War II belief by the United States Army Air Forces that strategic bombing of Germany's economic structure could be decisive required not only a theory of employment but the means to put it into practice. Technology made the latter possible by providing the B-17 bomber and, of equal importance, the Norden precision bombsight. The combination of these elements led US airmen to pursue against Germany what is known as the daylight, high-altitude, precision bombing campaign. At the outset of the war, the Royal Air Force, by contrast, lacked a strategic attack theory, a long-range bomber, and a precision bombsight, and as a consequence, they found it necessary to conduct urban area attacks. The United States, despite heavy losses during its daylight raids, resisted efforts to adopt the British approach, in part because it did not wish to be accused of "bombing the man in the street."

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The post-World War II concepts of strategic attacks, dominated by the nuclear weapon, have tended to reaffirm this basic belief in city avoidance. Despite the large yields of early nuclear weapons, particularly when combined with the relative inaccuracy of the ICBMs in the mid-1960s, some US airmen continued to advocate a *no cities* strategy.[11] Although overruled by civilian strategists, the decreased warhead yields and greatly improved accuracy of ballistic missiles available in the early 1970s provided the United States with a force structure capability that could reject total reliance on city busting and logically argue for counterforce. By 1976, the US Secretary of Defense could argue,

the United States had now acquired the combinations of yield and accuracy that permit long-range delivery systems to strike at a wider range of targets, and to do so with relatively low collateral damage. No law of physics prevents an ICBM warhead from attacking a radar, a submarine pen, a command bunker, a nuclear storage facility, an airfield, or a division in bivouac. The list of potential targets is long; many of them are relatively isolated from population centers and of considerable value. Depending on the circumstances it could make a great deal of sense to be able to target them, just as it has made sense in past wars to conduct a specialized strategic bombing campaign.[12]

In light of our strategic warfare concepts from World War II to present, the current effort of the Reagan administration to pursue the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) clearly is consistent with basic US beliefs. The existing US force structure is decidedly deficient in that it has almost no defensive capability, and as a consequence the policy of Assured Destruction remains as the ultimate threat to the Soviet Union. With adequate defenses, however, it would be possible to abandon the Assured Destruction strategy in favor of one that is

more consistent with traditional US practices, the nature of war, and the Just War theory.

The emphasis on SDI also seems to recognize that the capabilities and limitations of one's force structure directly affect the strategy of employment. The force structure, in other words, simply cannot be reshaped to fit a strategy. That being the case, the essential first step is to formulate concepts of employment, while the second step is to develop the required force structure. Not only is the current administration following the correct sequence in this effort, it also is infusing more traditional US moral judgments in the force structuring process. Thus when the President says that SDI ''is both militarily and morally necessary,'' he is rendering a correct and historically consistent judgment.[13]

The final variable in our conceptual framework is society. Beyond all other factors, it appears to exert a commanding influence on strategy formulation; it is the means through which moral considerations are infused in one's strategy. In our more recent past, perhaps Vietnam stands out as the best example of societal influences. Certainly all of us recall the tremendous opposition to US involvement in that war, particularly following the Tet offensive in January 1968. Some of the objections to the war were based on political and economic judgments, but, in the main, the Americans against the war seemed to cloak themselves in moral indignation. Recall that sufficient numbers of clergymen, lawyers, physicians, workers, and students protested the war and our strategy for pursuing it to such an extent that incumbent President Lyndon B. Johnson chose not to seek reelection in 1968. President Nixon, likewise, found it necessary to deceive American society about certain elements of his strategy, the secret

bombing of Cambodia being the chief example. More-over, his decisions to launch the 1972 Linebacker II air offensive and to redeploy squadrons of tactical fighters to halt the North Vietnamese spring offensive in 1973 were taken with full recognition of possible adverse reaction from US society.

The societal influences on the Vietnam war are perhaps obvious ones, but there are other examples that are worthy of mention. One would be the US decision to reject conscription, which many Americans found morally repugnant, relying instead on the All Volunteer Force (AVF). The AVF does not generate the levels of manpower required in wartime. The AVF is more of a peacetime rather than a wartime force; it cannot gener-ate additional manpower to replace combat losses. The implications for those tasked with developing US mili-tary strategy are obvious.

We have been viewing strategy primarily as the manner in which we would employ military force to achieve political objectives in war. Moreover, the inter-action of several variables—threat, doctrine, force structure, and society—contributes significantly to one's strategy, and, most importantly, these variables are the vehicles that carry moral considerations into the strategy formulation process. Given this approach, what then can be said about recent US military strategies? Do they exhibit moral considerations, or do they tend to be devoid of such considerations and, hence, are amoral? In this regard, a quick overview of the US experience during the nuclear period offers some instructive assess-ments.

Our nuclear strategy can be viewed at several dis-tinct levels. At one end of the spectrum is declaratory strategic policy, which is made at the highest level of government with the approval of the President; at the

other end is operational strategy, which, in essence, is the declaratory policy translated into practical application. Because it is the former, the declaratory strategic nuclear policy, that is subjected to considerable public scrutiny and debate, it is here where we can observe the extent to which moral judgments affect the strategy process. At the same time, however, it is necessary also to recognize that operational factors, from the very outset of the nuclear age, have placed serious limits on strategy options.

The evidence is clear that those who planned the first nuclear attacks against the USSR had to contend with numerous unknowns and limitations. Our intelligence had little accurate information on potential Soviet industrial and military targets; aerial charts of the USSR were of pre-World War II vintage as supplemented by German aerial photographs taken in 1942–43, and US aircraft limitations and lack of suitable radar data made precise attacks questionable."

Nevertheless, air planners adhered to their World War II bombing experience and continued to focus on the Soviet industrial base as the prime target. But most of these targets—the petroleum industry, steel, electric power, aircraft engine, and tank factories—were found in cities. The combination of the location of the targets, the operational limitations that prevented precise attack, and the size or yield of the weapons to be used ultimately resulted in a targeting approach that focused on approximately one hundred urban centers in the USSR." As a consequence, some (and one must emphasize *some*) US target planners in the late 1940s suggested that "atomic attacks might be directed against Soviet cities rather than the specific industries. After all," they argued, "what was a city besides a collection of industry?""

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Reaction to city busting developed immediately. At the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, George F. Kennan reportedly commented that "if you drop atomic bombs on Moscow, Leningrad, and the rest, you will simply convince the Russians that you are barbarians trying to destroy their very society and they will rise up and wage an indeterminate guerrilla war against the West." Charles (Chip) Bohlen, likewise, stated, "The negative psycho-social results of such an atomic attack might endanger postwar peace for 100 years."[17] Soon the Air Force leadership began to shift targeting emphasis. In 1951, Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt S. Vandenberg argued for "destruction of Soviet atomic delivery capability, direct attack on Soviet ground and tactical air forces, and destruction of the critical components of the enemy's war sustaining resources," saying, "If we do not provide an air force tactically strong enough to deliver atomic weapons on target with a high degree of reliability ... we will have committed a military blunder which will defy logical explanation to the American people."[18]

Although at the operational level the Air Force continued to plan for an offensive against a combination of military and urban-industrial targets, the *no cities* strategy gained adherents. By 1954, Air Force Secretary Thomas K. Finletter, Brigadier General Bernard Schriever, who was then serving at the Air Staff, the Evaluation Staff at the Air War College, and James Digby at Rand were arguing against urban-industrial attacks. A few years later, Rand analysts Herbert Goldhammer and Andrew Marshall produced a sophisticated model that enabled them to conclude "that targeting Soviet population centers would be the least effective strategy, while the most effective would be to focus on counterforce targets."[19] One year later, in 1960,

Brigadier General Noel F. Parrish used computerized war gaming of alternative targeting strategies to demonstrate the value of a no-cities strategy.[20] In that same year, Brigadier General Robert C. Richardson made clear the moral implications of the targeting debate. In an *Air University Review* article, he stated that a city busting strategy violated fundamental principles because "the only rational military objective in war is the enemy forces, or targets that affect the forces. Destruction which does not affect the outcome of the war in one's favor is irrational and politically and morally unjustifiable."[21]

By 1960, therefore, the Air Force and analysts in the defense community had developed a rationale for a no cities strategy based on military and moral considerations. To implement the strategy at the operational level, however, the Air Force required a substantial improvement in its force structure to cope with the demands of a no cities strategy. Enter now, as Secretary of Defense, Robert Strange McNamara.

In one of his first public pronouncements, Secretary McNamara seemed to accept the no cities strategy. At his 1962 University of Michigan address he argued,

The US has come to the conclusion that to the extent feasible basic military strategy in a possible general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. That is to say, principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the Alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population.[22]

Soon, however, Mr. McNamara retreated from this approach, in part because the Air Force used it to justify an expanded force structure and also because he could not answer critics who charged him with building a

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first-strike nuclear capability. In due course Mr. McNamara's ignorance of war and his penchant for quantification led him to the Assured Destruction strategy, the remnants of which remain with us some two decades hence. He defined it as the ability to

deter a deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States or its allies by maintaining at all times a clear and unmistakable ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any aggressor, or combination of aggressors—even after absorbing a surprise first strike.[23]

Approximately four hundred of one-megaton equivalent delivered warheads, capable of destroying as much as 30 percent of the Soviet population and 76 percent of its industrial capacity, would be necessary to execute the strategy.[24]

Mr. McNamara, thereby, had brought US strategic declaratory policy to a point where it had been before. Once again, the US placed emphasis on the destruction of urban-industrial areas and not on the destruction of the adversary's force structure. This emphasis remained until modified by a National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM-242) during the Nixon administration and a Presidential Directive (PD-59) under President Carter. These policy directives represent a shift away from the city busting of Assured Destruction and toward the more morally defensible strategy of counterforce targeting.[25]

Thus, it appears that some of our key variables—threat analysis, doctrine, and force structure—contributed to the development of nuclear strategies that exhibited clear moral considerations. What seems surprising, however, is the lack of a broadly based societal influence in the process. Our society appeared to accept the city busting strategies of the late 1940s (although the

lack of debate can be explained in terms of understandable public ignorance about nuclear weapons and government secrecy), and the society seemed to tolerate the Assured Destruction strategy developed in the mid-1960s (when public debate became more frequent). From a moral standpoint, and perhaps equally surprising, much of the debate following Nixon's NSDM–242 and Carter's PD–59 argued against a counterforce strategy on much the same grounds that forced Mr. McNamara to retreat from city avoidance, that is, the new strategies appeared to suggest a first-strike option. The immorality of Assured Destruction seemed to matter little in the debates. The final surprise about US society is the near hysterical clamor raised recently over SDI. Because its objective is to defend and thus to preserve and protect rather than to destroy, in this light, therefore, it is a more morally acceptable approach.

What this examination of the strategy formulation process—with its attendant variables—seems to suggest is that the process itself assures that moral considerations and judgments will be inherent in any military strategy. Indeed, as the US nuclear strategies of the recent past suggest, the moral implications are quite evident. Moral concerns have been implicit in the strategies developed to date, and there is every reason to suggest that they will continue to be evident in the future. Strategies, therefore, are not—and indeed cannot be—amoral. Rather, they tend to be as moral or immoral as the societies that sanction them.

Notes

1. Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 35.

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2. Quoted in William E. Odom, "Whither the Soviet Union?" *The Washington Quarterly* 4, no. 2 (Spring 1981): 30.

3. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, "Misconceptions About Russia Are A Threat to America," *Foreign Affairs* 58, no. 4 (Spring 1980): 797.

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13. Ronald Reagan, *The President's Strategic Defense Initiative* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1985), p. i.

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18. Rosenberg, p. 22.

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Amorality—
The Product
Of Teaching

LINDA M. EWING

IN JULY 1982, ISRAELI COLO-
nel Eli Geva, fearful that he might be ordered to lead
his brigade against the city of Beirut and subsequently
be ordered to fire on civilians, asked to be relieved of
his command. Instead, he was discharged. The colonel,
in demonstrating personal integrity, became a moral
survivor.

On 1 September 1983, a member of the Soviet mil-
itary locked on the radar that aimed the missiles that
destroyed 229 civilian lives aboard flight KAL-007.
The wantonness of the act was condemned throughout
the world. The individual who caused the destruction
and the government that directed the act are moral
casualties.

Conscience is a human capacity. In the most gen-
eral sense, it is the ability to know moral values, princi-
ples, and laws and to apply these to situations
encountered.[1] The idea of "right" conscience or integ-
rity is the conformance of action and conscience.

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Assisted by education in the moral norms of human society, our integrity or right conscience, whether learned or innate, helps to limit the moral casualty rate in the world. The action of the person who shot down KAL–007 revolts against right conscience. The action of the Israeli colonel supports right conscience, integrity. These examples illustrate that no matter how dramatic the situation or lethal the hardware, decisions and actions by individuals and the policies of governments can be judged in moral terms and culpability assigned accordingly.

New Technology and Personal Responsibility

In the future, American soldiers may order and be ordered to launch nuclear missiles with the indiscriminate destructive power to decimate civilians, in the course of destroying military targets. Awesome responsibilities demand that soldiers know what constitutes proper moral conduct, as well as the technical specifications of their jobs. The school system that teaches the technical must also educate in moral demands of conscience.

In peace, the military prepares for war. Current preparations emphasize the ''high lethality'' and extreme potential for chaos on the modern battlefield. Facets of the situation can be analyzed and understood, but how these facets will interact and what their result will be are difficult to understand or even imagine. We may know a great deal about nuclear technology, for example, but we know little about nuclear war. Because the ''big picture'' is so chaotic and unknowable, the most secure response to chaos is to become absorbed in the knowable, separate, compartments. Once there, the comfortable reaction is to stay and specialize.

In his article entitled "How to Change An Army," Colonel Wass de Czege declares that the Army has changed more substantially in the last few years than at any time since the period 1938 to 1941. He cautions, however, that the more rapid the rate of change, the greater the chance that the change is wrong or poorly understood.[2]

The unsettling nature of change is not military unique, but there is the potential for great harm when change is wrong or poorly understood in the military. "While there must be continued emphasis on pushing technological frontiers, we must be ever mindful that technological superiority alone has rarely been decisive."[3] This is why military schooling must educate professionals on the theory as well as the methodology of change. The theory of change analyzes the impact of change on people, both those who implement change and those against whom the change is directed. This is where we find the moral dimension of change in warfighting that demands integration of people and things and limits the acceptability of specialization in preparations for war. Further, this dimension of change owns up to the moral responsibility to prevent, if possible, moral casualties of war.

Strategy and tactics planning must incorporate technology, logistics, operations, and people to approach any realistic simulation of the future battlefield. Today's schoolhouse battlefield, however, lacks reality because it lacks integration of people and things. Tactics, operations, and logistics are taught separated from each other and isolated from talk of morality. Value-neutral teaching methods result from technology overpowering tradition. In the past, tradition kept technology in balance and at least marginally integrated, through an accepted belief within the profession

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that a military leader must be both technically and morally competent. Today, this equation is threatened. Tactics and strategy are amoral because this is the way planning and preparedness are taught.

Amid times of "static manpower ceilings" and curtailed budgets, hardware is today's emphasis. The military-industrial community's concern is hardware, the final definition of the nature of the modern battlefield. Change is hardware. Technology drives the doctrine that directs its employment.

The mission of the military school system is to meet the demand for technical skills. Given the competition for limited resources, technical competence vies to dominate, leaving moral competence as an assumed and implied component of military leadership. Leadership and ethics courses have been reduced in length to make room for more technical skill training.

Restoring the balance between moral and technical competence, requires a more integrated approach in teaching. Our methodology must be built on a foundation of traditional values and principles. "To create armies is one thing; to lead them and handle them is another."[4] Technology may appear to be a challenge to morality; no military hardware neutralizes moral judgment by society or silences the moral conscience of the individual soldier.

Traditionally, technical and moral competence both exerted pressure on the professional life of a soldier. In the military school system, pressure was expressed as a tension between soldier skills that need *training* and soldier values that need *educating*. Training subjects were and are still perceived as the "hard" soldierly skills, while educating subjects are pejoratively perceived as "soft," less manly. In spite of this disparity, a balance ensued. This was not a condition of equality, but rather,

training and educating existing in a fluid relationship that reflected the current trend in military thinking. With fluidity, however, both competencies achieved a stable position in the definition of American military leadership. In the past, the way we trained, educated, and fought reinforced traditional beliefs, demonstrating that the combat multiplier for American forces is the properly led American soldier. Proper leadership demonstrates technical and moral competence. Omar Bradley believed, "The American soldier ... demands professional competence in his leaders. In battle he wants to know the job is going to be done right, with no unnecessary casualties."

Tension between educating and training grows out of an assumption that critical thinking interferes with doing what you are told to do.[5] Soldiering by this assumption requires skills that must be trained and practiced until they are automatic because the command to do them under duress must be followed without question. The implication here is that the liberally educated soldier cannot reconcile differences between situations needing reflection and situations needing action.

An analogy for the military perception problem between educating and training is expressed in the title John Lovell uses for his book about the Service academies—*Neither Sparta Nor Athens*. *Sparta* is military tactics and physical training. *Athens* is educating in the traditional academic sense. At West Point, for example, Sparta and Athens are physically separated by Washington Road. The Spartans in years past controlled cadet life on one side of the street; the Atheneans maintained control of cadet life on the other. Over the years, emphasis shifted from one side to the other following the same patterns of fluidity as those for the Army-at-large. In recent years, Spartans and Atheneans have

ventured into each other's territory, cautiously challenging the separation and evolving into an effort toward a more liberal, whole-person program.

School System Compartments

Evolution has not, however, spread to the Army school system. Most schools continue to teach and train in compartments that compete for judgments about the compartment's importance to the profession and, thus, become susceptible to further compartmentalization and specialization in light of training demands made by modern technology. Winners and losers are decided by a series of variables such as scheduling, time, integration, and instructor qualification.

If a subject is taught "up front" at the beginning of a course and during the testable portion of the course, then the subject is important. If it's buried at the end of the course during the non-testable instruction, then it's not important. If a lot of time is devoted to a subject, it's important. If little time or less time in relation to other subjects is spent, the subject isn't important. If a subject is integrated into the curriculum and other topics are connected to it, it's important. If, on the other hand, a subject is isolated, not connected or termed not related to the "real" Army, it's not important. Likewise, the status of the instructor connotes worth for a subject. If the instructor is perceived as a credible professional, the subject is important. If the instructor is perceived as an outsider, or is not a credible spokesperson, the subject isn't important.

During the 1985–86 year at the Command and General Staff College, ethics and leadership instruction consisted of nine hours scattered across ten months. The sole instance of integration occurred during the final

weeks. Graded work had already been completed. The ethics and leadership problem was infused into a regional assessment exercise on Africa. Groups dealt with or ignored the problem, depending upon whether or not the academic advisor guiding the group pushed for any analysis or resolution. Those advisors who insisted that the problem be addressed were coincidentally from the ethics and leadership department. At no other time was ethics or leadership mentioned in formal instruction or informally in group discussions about warfighting.

The message during the ten months was clear. Tactics is the ordering and maneuvering of forces. The operational level of war is strategic planning on a grand level to achieve a wide goal. Both require training. Training consists of countless maps with symbols representing faceless forces pitted against an equally faceless force called "Ivan," in a war fought on terrain of high and low ground that contains population centers identified as obstacles to avenues of approach.

Disparity between soft and hard skills has historically suffered as a subset of the tension between educating and training. In the civilian academic world, *soft* and *hard* are not judgmental terms in the way they are used in the services. They do not carry connotations of importance, worth, or sexuality to a discipline or profession. Using soft and hard as value terms is military unique.

For generations, the Spartan evaluation of cadet performance held more sway than that of the Atheneans. The order of merit was calculated primarily by performance in the "hard" skills. This has changed, but this is not the pattern for the Army-at-large. Today, grades continue to be variably weighted. A rough guesstimate is that the Service school grading systems may

assign as much as four times the weight to hard skill subjects as soft skill subjects.

It can't be overlooked that a popular pastime in the military is to recount how poorly famous leaders did academically, as though this proves that soldiering is an activity for mental deficients. Much of this is mythical bravado, but it continues. Somehow, it is unsoldierly to boast of MacArthur's ability to quote Shakespeare at will or brag about how Chamberlain, Middleton, and Collins went on to become presidents of major academic institutions.

The conclusion that scholars don't make good soldiers is as nonsensical as the contention that critical thinking is incompatible with soldierly action. Professionalism "does not evolve solely from technical competence any more than it evolves solely from moral competence."[6]

Logically, there is no reason to separate conceptual understanding from learning by repetition just as there is no reason to separate technical training from moral education. A soldier who knows how to do something does not have his or her skill level reduced by knowing why and under what circumstances it is to be done. Education can take place in the context of training, and training can take place in the context of educating. Why should a discussion of the morality of nuclear war be declared off-limits during a class on how to calculate fallout predictions—or during a staff battle exercise?

Instead, we persist in sanitizing, segregating ourselves from the human elements of war. A typical memorandum for the conduct of a staff battle exercise at military service schools reads:

This year's battle exercise is a new and exciting experience. It is a 21-hour staff battle exercise that reinforces principles of division and corps combat operations learned

during the course. Students are planning and executing a river crossing of a major water obstacle by a light infantry division and a corps level follow-on attack, analyzing the ability of combat service support structure to sustain the battlefield. The exercise exposes the students to the light infantry division, causes them to make decisions at the operational level of war, and makes them consider deep battle solutions. Students will plan an operation and execute their plan on a foreign battlefield against a controlled force, and based upon their analysis, planning, and decisions, will either succeed in mission accomplishment or be allowed to fail.

Excitement is furthered by the environment created for the exercise. The lounge has been taken over by the Headquarters, complete with camouflage netting. Uniform is BDU for all. Throughout the halls rings the sound of battle, and the halls are strung with banners and flyers of AirLand Battle tenets. Supporting TV resources are broadcasting nonstop historical battle films over the TV monitors. There is a display of war memorabilia in the foyer, and slide monitors in the hallways display 35mm slides of battlefield terrain.

The memorandum addresses the where, what, and how of battle. What has fallen out is any mention of the who. Without the who, there can be no moral dimension for consideration. There are banners and movies to inspire planners to plan, but no reason or inspiration for leaders to lead because there is no recognition of who will execute the plans or what leadership challenges are posed because of the where, what, and how of the battle situation. It would not seem incongruent to deck the halls with banners and flyers touting the principles of leadership to be infused into the battle analysis.

The key to the problem is recognizing the value of rigorous thinking when and where it occurs in the schooling process. Tension need not even be eliminated between educating and training. Instead, it can be manipulated to the fullest extent possible. Now, as in

the past, tension can be the cause for stability. Manipulation can create a system of sequential and progressive instruction appropriate to the hierarchical nature of the military, rather than the present system that is not only responsive but potentially harmful, failing to teach the moral dimension of war—the ultimate contingency for mankind as well as the soldier.

Sequential and progressive methodology may not seem novel to the civilian academician, but it is as revolutionary for the military as integrating tactics, logistics, operations, and personnel considerations into the same courses. Both ideas require recognition that the military is more than a tradition of utility.[7] Emphasis redirected from abstract planning to the execution of plans changes us from simply making marks on maps that represent formulaic courses of action to incorporating considerations of complex questions about human beings involved in complex actions. Further, this all requires an acceptance that an integrated approach to teaching warfighting is a better way because preventing moral casualties is as important as the tactics and strategy employed to wage the war.

An integrated approach to teaching warfighting accepts the moral dimension of war. It asserts that tactics and strategy are moral rather than amoral because planning, conducting, sustaining, positioning, and engaging are done by human beings. Meeting the needs of the individual, which includes provoking rather than silencing conscience, strengthens the organization. No one knew this better than General George Washington. At the outset of the Revolutionary War, his concern was not with grand schemes of operational maneuver. His concern was instead with the immediate need for obtaining, maintaining, and sustaining people.

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Teaching and TRADOC

A plan to implement an integrated approach to teaching concerns itself with infusing sound ethical leadership into all aspects of the teaching scheme. This plan can be divided into two elements for discussion. The first is structure or administration. The second is conceptual or the basic idea behind the plan. A structure for integration requires centralized control for military education to a degree that does not now exist. It involves assuming total responsibility for program design, instructor selection and training, and systems for implementation, evaluation, and enforcement. This is very different from the current system. The current controller of the system, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), directs programs but does not have the manpower to develop those programs. Instead, the controller tasks others in the school system to do the design and development work. Instructor selection and training are left to the individual school personnel assignment section. There are no vehicles provided to implement, evaluate, or enforce programs Army-wide. Any Army school can avoid implementing any directive by applying the principle of passive dissent—putting the proposed change on the bottom of the in-basket pile never to surface again.

The conceptual element of the educational design establishes the goals, methods, and content, as well as developing the best means to adapt these to the demands of sequential and progressive schooling. Centralized control for military education means centralized educational activities. Such a structure would be fundamentally different from what the Army currently uses, but not so different from the administrative structure of school systems in the civilian sector. The Training and Doctrine Command, or an element of it, could serve as

a board of education to set official curriculum policy.
This policy would emanate from realistic goals and
result in realistic, integrated programs because, ideally,
the board would view curriculum from a "big picture"
perspective rather than from the bias of an individual
school interest.

If curriculum could be developed centrally with
allowances for modification to meet the needs of the
individual schools, tasking schools to do training
development work would cease. Training development
is not now well understood, and taskings usually end up
on the desk of the instructor who teaches the most
closely related area. The instructor usually dusts off an
old lesson plan, pens a few changes, and returns it as a
completed action. A specific example of this malady in
the present system occurred a few years ago. A mandate
was issued for a common core curriculum to be taught
at all Service schools. Each school was asked to submit
what it thought the Army-at-large should know about its
particular area. This was done and a list compiled.

Not a bad start. The list was not scrutinized with
an eye for integration, however. Rather, it was purged
according to whether a committee of peers thought each
subject should be taught. The list was returned to the
individual schools with the tasking to develop lesson
plans for the areas each said everyone should know
about in its special field. The majority of the schools
submitted old lesson plans. Others submitted book-
length treatises that could not be taught in a semester
course, never mind in an hour lesson. When all the
lesson plans were assembled, they filled two standard-
size book cartons. There was enough material to keep
instructors gasping for years. And no surprise, each
lesson plan represented an individual unit unrelated to
any other unit. Later attempts were made at integration,

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but it was a futile effort by people who did not have the time or the expertise to complete the task.

Even the best materials will not be implemented unless there is a plan that ensures the field clearly understands not only the change but the need for it. There must be a systematic conversion that includes the on-site supervision by the people mandating the change. This meets the needs of the individuals who are expected to execute the change, giving them the needed support and guidance. Change implemented in this way will be instituted because it will be perceived as responsive. Conversion is simplified by extracting the trainer from the training environment whenever possible and educating him or her to the change. Outside the training arena, it is much easier to talk integrated training by getting the trainers to integrate themselves. In the school teaching day, there is rarely time for this luxury.

Long range, after converting to a new system, instructor selection can greatly benefit from centralization and simplify the train-the-trainer process. To a large extent, *who* is available to teach has determined the *what* and *how* of teaching, with the exception of the Service academies. Instructor duty of any kind has been termed "out of the main stream" and therefore not career enhancing. Quality control is lacking. Integrated teaching requires vitality, creativity, and imagination in addition to professional knowledge. Channeling the best and the brightest to teaching can only be accomplished by a process similar to that used for instructor selection for the Service academies. Although every potential instructor need not be required to complete advanced civilian schooling, as for the academies, each individual ought, as a minimum, to complete an instructor training course in preparation to teach. Centralized and competitive selection could raise the status of teaching

assignments as well. Also, as is the case with the Service academies, tenured faculty positions should be considered at all schools for a portion of the teaching positions. This would do much to ensure continuity of programs as well as stimulate in-house, on-going training. Whether tenured or not, individuals who are skilled in teaching or training development ought to be allowed to carry these areas as primary specialties returning to historical recognition that there is special skill needed to train and educate the military.

Goals for Teaching Ethics

On the conceptual side, goals should be agreed upon as guidelines for educational design before any training development work is begun. These goals should be in line with sound educational principles and developed in concert with the individual schools. If schools coordinate in the development of teaching goals, support for programs will come much easier. Goals developed should be expandable to each level of schooling and be the thread for sequential and progressive teaching. Such goals could be adapted, for example, from those used in ethics course development from the Hastings Center: (1) Stimulate moral and technical imagination to promote creative problem solving, (2) Practice issue and problem identification in all subject areas, (3) Develop analytic skills, (4) Elicit a sense of responsibility and obligation from individual soldiers, and (5) Develop an understanding of tolerance and its limitations within the military.

Each of these goals or goals of this type can be addressed at any level to meet the needs of a hierarchical school system. Using the goal-centered approach also prevents repetition of the sort that destroys the integrity of the military school system and is rampant

under the current system. Because a method or aid works well at one level does not guarantee its success at the next level. In fact, considering the likelihood of a repeat performance to a repeat audience, the chance of failure is greatly enhanced. For example, the Massey value clarification tapes might be worth seeing once. But, by the time an officer has viewed them in the Basic Course, the Career Course and again at the Command and General Staff College, the tapes cease to be a "significant emotional event." If the topic is values, the time could be better spent discussing values clarification at the point where the individual is in his or her own career at that moment and in relation to everything else that is going on below, above, and peer-wide in the profession.

Goals guide content and suggest method. Integrating the subject matter along with making it sequential and progressive suggests "corporateness." Corporateness is not necessarily team teaching, although as an individual teaching technique it should not be overlooked. Rather, corporateness is cooperating and communicating. It is knowing not only what you are teaching but what others are teaching and how everything connects to make the whole operate in terms of people and things. The overall methodology, then, is to never allow students to forget that there is a corporate ethics whole of which they are only a part. The object is to become skilled in the function of the part, not to remain apart but to integrate, which requires understanding of the whole.

It is interesting to note that the concern over high technology is affecting the civilian educational domain as well as generating concern in the military. *US News and World Report,* on 23 December 1985, reported on high-tech concerns altering public education and

pushing it in new directions. The how and what of public school curriculum is under examination. Preliminary results are that there is now more emphasis on problem solving and less on function performance. The demand of the future, projected, will be for individuals who can cut through excess data and arrive at the problem. This isn't so far away from the argument for integrated education and the demand for moral and technical competence for future military professionals. Stripping away excess data is, after all, arriving at the basic principles of warfighting and sound, ethical leadership.

Perhaps at some time in the near future, every school will issue a memorandum that reads something like the following:

This year's staff battle exercise is a new and stimulating experience. The staff battle exercise reinforces all the principles of combat operations and leadership taught thus far with emphasis on planning and executing the what, where, how, and who of battle. Students will plan and execute an operation coordinating tactical, operational, logistical and personnel aspects to sustain the battlefield. Students will be challenged in each area to make decisions that are tactically and strategically sound as well as congruent with proper moral principles governing the conduct in war. Success or failure depends upon mission accomplishment in all aspects of the battle.

Excitement is furthered by the environment of realism attempted for the exercise. Casualty reports will begin at D+1. TV monitors will broadcast adverse news reports on your operation and you will be visited by a hostile press who will attempt to disrupt your operation. You will be ordered to file false casualty reports by your superior. You will receive reports that subordinates in your command have violated the Laws of War. And finally, tactical nuclear weapons will be an option for your consideration at some point during the exercise.

Good Luck. The modern battlefield is adrift with chaos and it is up to you to order this experience and make sense of it. This exercise is the chance of a lifetime.

Notes

1. Eileen P. Flynn. *My Country Right or Wrong* (Chicago, IL: Loyola University Press. 1985). p. 4.

2. Hubba Wass de Czege, "How to Change an Army," *Military Review,* November 1984, p. 33.

3. Ibid.

4. Winston Churchill, quoted in *Military Review,* July 1980.

5. Sam C. Sarkesian, "Moral and Ethical Foundations of Military Ethics and Professionalism," in *Military Ethics and Professionalism* (Washington. DC: Government Printing Office, 1981). p. 9.

6. Ibid., p. 10.

7. Ibid., p. 11.

Ethics Versus
Self-Interest
In How We Fight

THOMAS C. LINN

WE STAND ON THE VERGE OF seeing our Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff reorganized because of congressional and public dissatisfaction with the military. After spending over a trillion dollars in defense over the past five years, the American people have become angered by the $700 wrenches discovered in defense contracts and by officers who have sold classified information to foreign governments, as well as the revelations concerning difficulties in Grenada and Lebanon. When considering these cases with the experiences of Desert One, Koh Tang Island, and Vietnam, it becomes increasingly difficult for us to explain these failures. Although the military does not deserve complete blame for these failures, it must assume responsibility for major portions. Because of these difficulties Congress may force us to accept a reorganized defense system that it sees as a means of reform but which in reality may have serious consequences for our national security structure. We

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will probably accept these changes without understanding the reasons why they occurred.

The problem is not so much with the system as it is with the people who make up the system. Effective national security and defense depend upon the ethics and moral obligations of men and women who are tasked with these responsibilities. It is imperative that we in the military seek an ethical reawakening. Otherwise, we may be forced to accept external attempts at reform.

Altruism Versus Self-Interest

The purpose of the military is to provide for the defense and security of the nation. Military service, therefore, requires altruistic men and women because of the magnitudes of power and responsibility that have been entrusted to them. Plato provided an insight into the nature of the military professional and what makes him different from others. In *The Republic*, Plato describes the soldier as a man of emotion, one who lives for those emotions experienced when leading men to victory on the battlefield. The man of emotion differs from the man of desire, who is the merchant seeking the accumulation of material wealth.[1] What can be inferred from Plato's writing is that the military professional is an individual who derives satisfaction from giving of himself.

As Lewis S. Sorley wrote, the ethic of the military professional is one of service and contribution to the general interests of society.[2] When acting on issues of relative importance in the military service, it is vital that this ethic take precedence over matters of self-interest. Not only do we accept the responsibility for maintaining the defense of the nation when taking our oath, we also accept this ethic.

We are concerned if members of the military have lost sight of their purpose, their altruism subverted by self-interests. For some, contributing on issues that require moral courage and conviction has come to mean risk to such self-interests as promotion, career survival, and image. For these individuals, contributing to self-interest has been given greater importance than contributing to the general interests of society. Unfortunately, this is a widely held perception that is becoming all too easy to quantify and qualify.

In a 1985 Army War College study on military professionalism, of the 14,500 Army officers surveyed, 68 percent agreed the officer corps was focused on personal gain rather than selflessness.' In a similar study conducted in 1977, 30 percent of the officers surveyed believed that unethical behavior was rewarded while 63 percent believed that ethical behavior went unrewarded. The same study determined that the most frequently mentioned ethical problems centered on competitive pressures placed on officers, lack of integrity perceived in senior officers, career survival through statistics, and little tolerance for mistakes.'

The Marine Corps 1981 Russell Leadership Conference confirmed much of the same problems within the Marine Corps. Major General Gregory A. Corliss stated that amoral behavior and self-interest have had an impact on the Corps, in part, because in a large organization in which frequent transfers occur, it is possible for self-serving individuals to conceal their motives. The general also pointed to the fitness report system, as it "promotes loyalty to one's reporting senior and not some nebulous idea of loyalty and honor."'

The emphasis on self-interest rather than integrity and commitment to nation has been detected in our military readiness reporting. In 1977, the Army War

College Strategic Studies Institute questioned officers on the Army's unit readiness reporting; the survey revealed that the reporting system was considered important, but generally regarded as ineffective. Officers felt the system was not a reliable one because concern over image as well as individual and unit competition had caused inaccurate reporting.[6]

The value of self-interest leads to promotion being the standard of success rather than service and contribution, and it also leads to ethical disasters. When service to country and Corps is forsaken for matters of self-interest, the sense of purpose is lost, commitment to mission and men wanes, and military competence degenerates. This effect is not always understood. For those who seek self-interests, service to nation is more often interpreted as doing what you are told. This interpretation allows an individual to avoid ethical judgments as well as his moral obligations. What is not being understood is that military service means you are morally obligated to competently serve the general interests of society even if it means risk to your promotion as well as risk to your life.

The relationship between the military ethic of contribution and our military functions has often been neglected. A general lecturing an Army War College class stated, "Ethics never won a battle." This officer obviously did not understand the connection between the two and was summarily dismantled by the class.' If soldiers are committed to the ethic of service and contribution to the general interests of society, they will generally be concerned with serving in the best possible manner. The general would be hard-pressed to explain the failures of Vietnam and Desert One with this logic.

The military ethic can no longer be considered as some esoteric issue separate from the execution of our

military functions. It is not an area of interest just for the chaplains but for all military professionals as well. The application of this ethic in our strategy and tactics can prove effective or its absence can be disastrous. Our failures in the past have resulted from our inability to make the connection between our ethic and the execution of these functions. However, we can no longer afford failure. Not only is the confidence of the American people in our ability to protect them at stake but so is their confidence in our dedication to them.

Competence Versus Pragmatism

If a leader in the military accepts the ethic of serving the general interests of society, he then becomes morally obligated to serve in a competent manner. Not only does the defense of society require competent service, so do society's youth who have been entrusted to the military. It should be remembered that World War I British military leadership acting in the defense of British society squandered the flower of its youth on the fields of Flanders and later contributed to the bankruptcy of the British labor force. Although British military leadership served the defense of society, its lack of competent service was not in the best interest of society. Competent service is more than just doing what you are told. As Lewis Sorley wrote, competent service requires knowledge of your profession, foresight beyond short-term goals, and understanding of the context within which you are working.[8]

What must be understood about the military is that the application of force, as in strategy and tactics, is not an exact science. It is instead a very subjective art acquired through education and experience. When most individuals consider the moral issues associated with the already elusive art, they tend to think in terms of

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extremes. They will recognize that it is wrong to develop a strategy or tactic that is based on genocide, torture, or terrorism. However, the majority of the moral issues related to the development of strategy and tactics are not black or white. The majority of issues faced by leaders, as Henry Kissinger put it, fall into a grey area, and it is only after a period of time that decisions made regarding these issues can be discerned as right or wrong. Many of the moral dilemmas faced by commanders in Vietnam were not extreme ones but were, instead, lesser ones associated with intelligence reporting, body counts, and purposeless operations. Because of these grey moral issues associated with the subjective nature of strategy and tactics, it is vital that a military leader be dedicated to the ethic of competent service to the general interests of society and follow the established principles of his profession. If a military leader is more concerned with self-interest, he will fear the risk of taking a position on a seemingly lesser moral issue that is related to this already subjective area of strategy and tactics. He will avoid moral judgments and pursue a course of action that minimizes risk to himself but may not be in the best interests of society.

The collective effect of such individuals within an organization is dramatic. Frances A. Schaffer, in his book *How Should We Then Live?*, further describes the effect of declining social interests and increasing self-interest within a society. He states that when self-interests prevail within a society, its values are not sufficient to sustain it during difficult times.[9]

The Leadership Instruction Department of the Marine Corps Development and Education Command approach parallels Schaffer's thoughts on the effects of self-interest within the military. According to department instruction on organizational leadership challenges,

Individuals motivated toward their own self-aggrandizement have little place in an organization founded on principles of services, sacrifice, and brotherhood, but often one finds someone whose values and motivation seem at variance with the organization's best interests. When an organization ceases to be a team, then it begins to fall apart at its very foundation and fails to accomplish its mission.[10]

The decline of the ethic of service within a military organization has a definite impact on the functions of the organization. Those who value self-interest generally seek a more pragmatic approach to strategy and tactics, that is, doing what seems to work without regard for fixed principles of right or wrong. Frances Schaffer bears this thinking out again in his book, *How Should We Then Live?*, saying, "Pragmatism is largely in control. In both international and home affairs, expediency at any price to maintain personal peace and affluence at the moment—is the accepted procedure. Absolute principles have little or no meaning."[11]

We have heard all too often the quote from fellow officers, "Hell, don't give me all that theory. I just want to know what works." This is theory of pragmatism, "What works is right."

Over the past twenty-five years, pragmatism has been allowed to exist within the military. This pragmatic approach to our functions has resulted in our failure to follow the precepts of our profession that have been established by Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Liddell Hart, and even our own doctrine. This deviation from established principles had a devastating effect on our professional competence, as evidenced by Vietnam, Koh Tang, and Desert One. However, of all of these, Vietnam warrants the greatest study. It is the most severe case of the military's deviation from established principles. We must come to a realization that a primitive nation of nineteen million was able to strategically

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defeat a superpower such as the United States partially because the military, as Colonel Harry Summers, Jr., put it, was in "violation of the truths" pertaining to the established principles of war." We owe this realization not only to the society we will serve in the future, but also to the fifty-five thousand men who gave their lives in this war.

The Results of Pragmatism: Vietnam

Assistant Secretary of Defense Noel C. Koch calls Vietnam the least studied war in our history." His statement adds testimony to our aversion to analyzing the moral dilemmas that led to our strategic defeat. We in the military have attempted to avoid the agony of self-criticism by relying on the trite excuse that political leadership was responsible for the failure of Vietnam. This excuse is not entirely valid. Colonel Harry Summers, Jr., a moral hero for our ranks, has provided us with more than sufficient evidence of strategic military failings in his book, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*. Should we avoid our psychoanalysis of this war, we will not achieve the moral catharsis necessary to prevent future failure.

Vietnam serves as an extreme example of a pragmatic approach to military strategy. Strategic military leadership failed to follow the precepts established in Clausewitz's *On War*, the work that both Bernard Brodie and Colonel Summers call the unsurpassed seminal work of our profession." In developing strategy we are morally obligated to follow these precepts much the same as a doctor is morally obligated to follow the principles of surgery.

In *On War*, Clausewitz describes the moral obligations of the military in the civil-military relationship. He states that a military leadership must adopt strategic

military objectives that will support the accomplishment of civilian leadership's political objectives. Clausewitz goes on to say that strategic military objectives will generally be related to the destruction of enemy forces, the occupation of enemy territory, and the erosion of the enemy's will to fight.[15]

Complaints concerning civilian leadership restraints were true. The Kennedy administration's involvement in Vietnam was not motivated by a specific political objective but rather by a "Cold War Syndrome." As David Halberstam put it, the administration saw a need to demonstrate a tough position against communism.[16] The political objective was not one focused on Vietnam. Kennedy's political objective was, instead, nebulous in nature. It was "to stop the advance of communism."[17]

Such a political objective was difficult for the military to support. General MacArthur described the difficulty of supporting such an objective in 1951, "When you say merely, 'we are going to continue to fight aggression,' that is not what the enemy is fighting for. The enemy is fighting for a very definite purpose—to destroy our forces." He further elaborated on the strategic military objectives in a war, saying, "It seems to me that the way to resist aggression is to destroy the potentialities of the aggressor."[18]

The solution to adopting strategic military objectives in the Vietnam war and accomplishing Clausewitz's three precepts lay in destroying the forces of the North as well as those in the South, occupying the North and subsequently breaking the will of the North. However, this course was blocked by the Johnson administration out of fear of Chinese intervention. The administration further limited the military by forcing a strategy of "gradual response" upon them.

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But, what of the military's role in this relationship? Are military leaders morally absolved because they have been directed by their civilian leaders to adopt a flawed strategy for an elusive political objective. General Westmoreland reflected on the moral obligations of military leaders, quoting Napoleon in his autobiography,

A Commander in Chief cannot take as an excuse for his mistakes in warfare an order given by his sovereign or his minister, when the person giving the order is absent from the field of operations and is imperfectly aware or wholly unaware of the latest state of affairs. It follows that any Commander in Chief who undertakes to carry out a plan which he considers defective is at fault; he must put forward his reasons, insist on the plan being changed and finally tender his resignation rather than be the instrument of the Army's downfall."

General Westmoreland went on to say, "I suffered my problems in Vietnam because I believed that success eventually would be sure despite [civilian policies and objectives], that they were not to be as Napoleon put it, instruments of my Army's downfall."

Although civilian leadership establishes policies and its objectives, military leadership is morally obligated to advise the seniors on matters of war since it is only the military that possess the unique experience of battlefield. Contrast the case of military leaderships in Vietnam with that of World War II. General George Marshall, under political and diplomatic pressure, threatened resignation unless his personnel assignments were accepted for the US Army and the combined commands of Europe."

Too much evidence exists showing that military leadership recognized the failings of civilian directed policies but chose to remain silent. Brigadier General Douglas Kinnard in his book, *War Managers,*

referenced a 1974 survey that stated that 70 percent of
the army general officers who commanded in Vietnam
were uncertain of the war's objectives.[22] Although this
survey reflects on the civilian leadership's ability to
adopt tangible policy objectives it also reflects on the
military's obligation to advise its seniors. Colonel Her-
bert Y. Schandler in his book, *The Unmaking of a Pres-
ident,* stated, "It does not appear that military leaders
threatened or even contemplated resigning to dramatize
their differences with the opposition to the limitations
on the conduct of the war insisted upon by the president
and his civilian advisors."[23]

Most military leaders realized that sound strategic
thinking required that the war be taken to the North and
Clausewitz's three precepts accomplished. However, as
Colonel Summers put it, "Our military leaders evi-
dently did not feel so strongly about their strategic con-
cepts that they were willing to 'fall on their swords' if
they were not adopted."[24]

Even when military leadership was presented the
opportunity to speak out on strategic matters concerning
the war, it remained silent and complied with the politi-
cally accepted. Today we often lament the lack of
national will necessary for support during our military
efforts in Vietnam. However, one of the key elements
to invoking the national will and also a necessity to mil-
itary planning in Vietnam was the mobilization of the
reserves. President Johnson had led the Defense
Department to believe that this mobilization would
occur. When the decision time came in July 1965, Pres-
ident Johnson asked General Earle Wheeler, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if he agreed with the deci-
sion not to mobilize the reserves. Wheeler agreed.
David Halberstam described the scene in his book, *The
Best and the Brightest,* "It was, said a witness, an

extraordinary moment.... Everyone in the room knew Wheeler objected ... but Wheeler was boxed in; he had the choice of opposing and displeasing his Commander in Chief and being overruled anyway, or he could go along. He went along."[25]

In January 1969, when the Nixon administration eagerly sought strategic military advice for the war, Kissinger complained of unimaginative thought, saying, "For years the military had been complaining about being held on a leash by the civilian leadership. But when Nixon pressed them for new strategies, all they could think of was resuming the bombing of the North."[26]

It is difficult to speculate on the motives of individual men. However, one cannot help but question their reasons for acting as they did. Why did such men with distinguished combat records from World War II and Korea remain silent? What made them unwilling to risk their careers for professional principles that they knew to be correct? Whatever their reasons, one may conclude that their failure to provide their leaders with their expertise and advice was not in the best interest of society.

Those who study Vietnam must be careful not to make incorrect assumptions. The men who failed were not evil men. They were, in David Halberstam's words, *The Best and the Brightest*. Vietnam serves us an example of what happens when men fail to follow the ethics of their profession and those professional principles that ensure competent service. It should also not be assumed that the entire military failed in Vietnam. The real heroes of the war were the leaders and men found at the tactical level. They did not only achieve tactical success on the battlefields of Vietnam; they also gave of themselves in the name of service to their nation.

We in the military must never forget that we exist to competently serve the general interests of society. When this ethic is overshadowed by self-interest, individuals seek a pragmatic approach to their functions, rather than following established principle. The strategy of Vietnam should serve as a permanent reminder of the cost of such an approach. Adherence to our ethic of service requires the military to continually educate and reinforce this ethic as well as the principles of our profession. The relationship between ethics and performance must be realized if effective military service is to be rendered. For the individual, adherence to this ethic requires knowledge of the profession and the moral courage necessary to state professional opinion to one's seniors. It is a paradox that a man would claim to be a paragon of physical courage on the battlefield but still be afraid to face his seniors concerning an issue that he knows to be important.

Failure to adhere to our ethic cannot be justified by saying that an individual's senior is unethical. This is to imply that ethics is someone else's problem. Ethics applies to everyone. Competent service to society means risk to career as well as to life. Should we fail to internalize this ethic in our ranks the consequences may be severe. We may be forced to accept a politicized general staff in the name of reform while the lack of ethical commitment may still remain in our ranks. However, the greatest consequence of our failure to internalize this ethic may be experienced by the nation of people we serve. It is this defense and security which may suffer.

Notes

Although I have relied extensively on Army studies and the works of Army writers, the problems mentioned are experienced by all of the

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Services. If anything, the Army should be praised for the integrity and courage demonstrated in self-examination.

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